lution being then postponed the committee proceeded then to the fifth resolution, relative to the second branch of the national legislature. After considerable discussion this resolution was disagreed to in its existing form10 by the committee and no substitute was at this time proposed or adopted. The sixth resolution, stating the cases in which the national legislature ought to legislate, was next agreed to after being slightly amended.11 The seventh resolution, relative to the national executive, occasioned a longer debate than that of any of the preceding resolutions. The Virginia plan had intentionally left a blank to be filled by the convention as to the length of the term of office of the executive and had also left it to the members of the convention to decide between a single executive and an Executive Council. It was finally voted, in the Committee of the Whole, by a vote of eight states to two12 that the national executive should be chosen by the national legislature for a term of seven years, and also that he be ineligible for re-election.13 By a vote of seven states to three it was decided that there should be a single executive.14 After some further slight amendments the seventh resolution of the Virginia plan was then approved by the committee.15 The eighth resolution, giving a qualified veto power to the executive and "a convenient number of the national judiciary" was amended by striking out the last cited clause and leaving the veto power exclusively with the executive department. A motion, however, to make this veto power absolute, i. e.: not 10 For the wording of this or other resolutions of the Virginia Plan refer to Appendix F. "The changes made can be seen by a comparison between Appendix F and Appendix H. 12 Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no-2. 15 This last by a vote of seven States to two, one being divided. 14 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no-3. 15 For a more detailed account of the discussions in the Constitutional Convention on the subject of the national executive, see Chapter IX, on the Executive Department. subject to be overruled by a two-thirds vote of Congress was, after discussion, defeated by the unanimous votes of the states present. The first clause of the ninth resolution: "Resolved, That a national judiciary be established" was agreed to unanimously. The words "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals," as was also the provision for the election of the judges by Congress, 16 the method of election of judges being left open for further discussion. The tenth and twelfth resolutions17 were then agreed to without discussion and consideration of the eleventh postponed. The thirteenth resolution, to the effect that provisions ought to be made by which amendments to the system now to be established might hereafter be made, without requiring the assent of the national legislature thereto was postponed after a short discussion on the question.18 The last two resolutions of the Virginia plan were then discussed for a short time and postponed and the committee went back to the earlier resolutions, which had been passed over without action. It was finally voted that no inferior Federal Courts should be provided for by the Constitution,19 but that Congress should be empowered to create such, if any, as it should deem proper.20 At this period a last effort was made to take away the elections by the people, by the State Legislature and by the Lower 16 Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye-9; Connecticut, South Carolina, no-2. See Appendix F. 18 Mr. Pinckney doubted the propriety or necessity of it. Mr. Gerry favored it. The novelty and difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to the government. Nothing has yet happened in the States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety."' 19 Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-6; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no-4; Massachusetts, divided. 20 Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Connecticut, South Carolina, no-2; New York, divided. people and to give them to the State Legislatures; this proposition was argued with great vigor on both sides,21 but was finally defeated by a vote of eight states to three.22 21 Mr. Gerry: "Much depends on the mode of election. In England the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme. Hence, in Massachusetts the worst men get into the Legislature. Several members of that body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance, and baseness, spare no pains, however dirty, to carry their point against men who are superior to the artifices practiced. He was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much principled as ever against aristocracy and monarchy. It was necessary, on the one hand, that the people should appoint one branch of the government, in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence; but he wished the election, on the other hand, to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was, that the people should nominate certain persons, in certain districts out of whom the State Legislatures should make the appointment. Mr. Wilson: He wished for vigor in the government, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The government ought to possess, not only, first, the force, but, second, the mind or sense, of the people at large. The Legislature The case will be changed in the new plan o. the government. The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the representatives. . . . Mr. Madison considered an election of one branch, at least of the Legislature, by the people immediately, as a clever principle of A full day was given to the discussion of the method of electing United States Senators, the suggested methods being elections by the people, by the State Legislature and by the Lower House of Congress, together with various combinations of these free government; and that this made, under proper regulations, had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the general one. . . Mr. Dickinson considered it essential, that one branch of the Legislature should be drawn immediately from the people; and expedient, that the other should be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This combination of the State Government with National Government was as politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate we ought to carry in through such a refining process as will assimilate it, as nearly as may be to the House of Lords in England. . . . ... Mr. Read: Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Governments. We must look beyond their continuance. A National Government must soon of necessity swallow them all up. They will soon be reduced to the mere office of electing the National Senate. He was against patching up the old Federal system; he hoped the idea would be dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on an old garment. The confederation was founded on temporary principles. It cannot last; it cannot be amended. If we do not establish a good government on new principles we must either go to ruin, or have the work to do over again. The people at large are wrongly suspected of being adverse to a General Government. The aversion lies among interested men who possess their confidence. Mr. Pierce was for an election by the people as to the first branch; and by the States as to the second branch; by which means the citizens of the States would be represented, both individually and collectively. General Pinckney wished to have a good National Government and at the same time leave a considerable share of power in the States. An election of either branch by the people, scattered as they are in many States, particularly in South Carolina, was totally impracticable. Mr. Wilson would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from Mr. Read; namely, that the idea of reserving the State Government ought to be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the National and State Government, provided the latter was restrained to certain local purposes; not any probability of their being devoured by the former. Connecticut, New Jersey, South Carolina, aye-3; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no-8. plans.23 It was finally voted, unanimously, that the Senators should be elected by the State Legislative.2+ 23 During the debate speeches were made by the following named members among others to the following effect: Mr. Gerry: Four modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. First, by the first branch of the National Legislature; this would create a dependence contrary to the end proposed. Secondly, by the National Executive; this is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. Thirdly, by the people; the people have two great interests, the landed interest and the commercial, including the stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will leave no security to the latter interest; the people being chiefly composed of the latter interest; and erroneously supposing that the other interests are adverse to it. Fourthly, by the individual Legislatures; the elections being carried through this refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the commercial interest against the landed; without which, oppression will take place; and no free government can last long He was, where that is the case. therefore, in favor of this last. Mr. Dickinson: The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether would degrade the councils of our country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the proposed national system to the solar system, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. Mr. Wilson: The subject, it must be owned, is surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Government cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States being devoured by the National Government. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the National Government. He was not, however, for extinguishing these planets, as was proposed by Mr. Dickinson; neither did he, on the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the sun. Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes, for which their existence is made essential by the great extent of our country. He could not comprehend in what manner the lauded interest would be rendered less predominant in the Senate by an election through the medium of the Legislatures, than by the people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was not complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice |