ΤΟ WILLIAM H. GREGORY, ESQ., M.P. MY DEAR SIR,-I have written some papers on the cotton trade, which, with these remarks addressed to yourself, I propose publishing collectively. I discuss at length several matters in connection with American affairs that have not before, I believe, been fully considered. During the last twenty-eight weary months-weary enough to all Confederate Americans in Europe-I have been more and more convinced, that the long train of calamities which have occurred within that time might have been averted, but for the opposition on the part of the British ministry and Radical members of Parliament to the motion which you, on March 4, 1861, gave notice of your intention to bring forward in favour of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy, then composed of the seven cotton States. Some time-a week or more-before my departure from America, on the 30th of that month, intelligence had been received in the Northern States of your proposition, which, coupled with the somewhat pacific tone of President Lincoln's inaugural message delivered on the same day, gave assurance to the public mind that the dissolution of the Federal Union would be accomplished in as peaceable a manner as was the case at its formation seventy-two years before, when eleven of the thirteen States 'seceded' from the Articles of Confederation.' Confidence in such a happy issue was likewise felt, from the fact that the commissioners appointed by X the Confederate States for the settlement of all questions of disagreement between the two governments upon principles of right, justice, equity, and good faith,' had reached Washington on March 5, but at the request of Mr. Seward, through a friendly mediator,' did nothing more than give formal notice of their arrival, in order to allow time for the new administration to become fairly organised. What happened subsequently is thus related by President Davis in his message of April 30, 1861: It was not until the 12th of the month that they officially addressed the Secretary of State, informing him of their arrival, and stating, in the language of their instructions, their wish to make to the Government of the United States overtures for the opening of negotiations, assuring the Government of the United States that the President, Congress, and people of the Confederate States desired a peaceful solution of these great questions; that it was neither their interest nor their wish to make any demand which was not founded on the strictest principles of justice, nor to do any act to injure their late confederates. South Carolina seceded from the Union on December 20, 1860, and her first act thereafter was to send commissioners to Washington to make a general settlement with her late political copartners. They arrived at the Federal capital on December 27, and left on January 14, 1861, the President having declined to treat with them. united with the other cotton States in forming the Confederacy. In the It was not until February that South Carolina meanwhile some correspondence had been conducted with a gentleman in London, who replied, upon good authority too, that an ambassador from the State would be received at this court by virtue of the Treaty of 1783. South Carolina did not cede her forts to the general government until 1806, and even then her conditions were, that she was to retain all sovereignty over them, her Legislature expressly reserving that control. So the Washington authorities never had jurisdiction in Charleston Harbour. The Constitution (Article I. Section 8) says: Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of Congress, 'become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased, by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings.' To this communication no formal reply was received until April 8. During the interval, the commissioners had consented to waive all questions of form, with the firm resolve to avoid war if possible. They went so far even as to hold, during that long period, unofficial intercourse through an intermediary, whose high position and character inspired the hope of success, and through whom constant assurances were received from the Government of the United States of its peaceful intentions, of its determination to evacuate Fort Sumter; and further, that no measures should be introduced changing the existing status prejudicial to the Confederate States; that, in the event of any change in regard to Fort Pickens, notice would be given to the commissioners. The crooked path of diplomacy can scarcely furnish an example so wanting in courtesy and candour and directness as the course of the United States Government towards our commissioners in Washington. For proof of this I refer to the annexed documents marked, taken in connection with further facts I now proceed to relate. Early in April the attention of the whole country was attracted to extraordinary preparations for an extensive military and naval expedition in New York and other Northern ports. These preparations commenced in secrecy for an expedition whose destination was concealed, and only became known when nearly completed, and on April 5, 6, and 7, transports and vessels of war, with troops, munitions, and military supplies, sailed from Northern ports bound southward. Alarmed by so extraordinary a demonstration, the commissioners requested the delivery of an answer to their official communication, and the reply dated on the 15th of the previous month, from which it appears that during the whole interval, whilst the commissioners were receiving assurances calculated to inspire hope of the success of their mission, the Secretary of State and the President of the United States had already determined to hold no intercourse with them whatever to refuse even to listen to any proposals they had to make, and had profited by the delay created by their own assurances in order to prepare secretly the means for effective hostile operations. |