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sentations were false and fraudulent,
and made with the intention to de-
ceive; that the defendant then was,
and still continues to be, a married
man; and that his promise to marry
was fraudulent, and to the plaintiff's
damage; Held that the complaint
stated sufficiently the defendant's
promise to marry, and his represen-
tation that he was unmarried, and
competent to marry the plaintiff;
and that it was unnecessary to allege
that he knew his representation to
be untrue. Blattmacher v. Saal, 22

2. Held also, that the complaint set
forth a good cause of action; that if
the plaintiff could not recover for the
deceit and damage, she might, upon
the contract and promise to marry,
which implied and involved a prom-
ise and agreement that the defend-
ant was competent, legally, to mar-
ry.
ib
3. Where a complaint against two de-
fendants alleged that one of the de-
fendants erected a building across
an alley belonging to the plaintiff
and thus obstructed his right of way;
and that such defendant then trans-
ferred and conveyed the possession
of the building to the other defend-
ant, who kept, continued and main-
tained such obstruction; and the
plaintiff prayed judgment for dam-
ages, against both defendants; Held
that the complaint stated facts suffi-
cient to show a cause of action
against each defendant separately,
but not a cause of action against
them jointly; and that such causes
of action could not, therefore, be
united, in the same complaint. Held
also, that the objection, of such mis-
joinder, might be taken by a joint
demurrer. Hess v. Buffalo and Ni-
agara Falls Rail Road Co., 391

4. It seems that, in such a case, the de-
fendants may move that the plaintiff
elect which of the causes of action
he will prosecute.
ib

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. An act of the legislature, which
prohibits the transportation, over a
specified plank road, of any load of
iron or iron ore, of more than two
tons' weight, unless it be upon a ve-
hicle with wheels having a tire of at

2.

least six inches in width, is not un-
constitutional and void on the
ground that it operates as an ob-
struction upon the iron business and
those engaged in it, which is not
extended to other articles of freight,
or classes of persons. Seward v.
Beach,
239

An act of the legislature, altering
the charter of a bank incorporated
previous to the adoption of the con-
stitution of 1846, is valid, if passed
according to the provisions of that
constitution. Hence a two-thirds
vote in favor of it is not necessary.
Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 369

3. The court has power, under the act
of April 5, 1849, to order an appor-
tionment of the debts of a corpora-
tion among the stockholders, not-
withstanding there is a large amount
of assets in the receiver's hands not
disposed of.
ib

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5. Authority being given to the towns,
by the statute, to issue bonds, in-
struments appearing on their face
to have been executed in pursuance
of that authority, and so far as ap-
pears, in accordance with it, are
valid. in the hands of, and may be
enforced by, bona fide holders there-
of; whether the prerequisites pre-
scribed by the statute to the issuing
of the bonds, beyond the organiza-
tion of a rail road company, &c.,
and the filing in the county clerk's
office of the assent of resident tax-
payers, with the affidavit attached,
as specified in the statute, were com-
plied with or not.
ib

6. Instruments without seal, issued by
a town, which contain an acknowl-
edgment that, in pursuance of the
statute, and for the purpose of aid-
ing in the construction of the rail
road therein specified, the town
owes, and a promise by the town to
pay to, or bearer, $1000, with

interest at the rate of seven per cent, | 3. Prima facie, all stockholders in a

payable as therein mentioned, are
negotiable; although the statute
does not prescribe the form of the
bonds, nor expressly provide wheth-
er they shall or shall not be nego-
tiable.
ib

7. The omission of a seal is not a fatal
objection to instruments thus exe-
cuted by a town, as being instru-
ments not warranted by the law. ib

8. Although the statute specifies a
"bond or bonds" as the instruments
which it shall be lawful for the towns
to execute, this is to be deemed as
done with a view to the interests of
the creditors only; and if they are
willing to waive the proposed benefit
and accept unsealed obligations, the
towns cannot object that such obli-
gations were not authorized.

See BANKS, 2.

CONTEMPT.

ib

The supreme court cannot review, up-
on certiorari, the judgment of a
court ordering a commitment for a
contempt. The People ex rel. Mitch-
ell v. Sheriff of New York, 622

See HABEAS CORPUS.

CORPORATION.

1. Under the 12th section of the gen-
eral manufacturing act, (Laws of
1848, ch. 40,) requiring every compa-
ny incorporated under that act to
make and publish a report of its
condition, annually, within twenty
days from the 1st of January, and
providing that "if any of said com-
panies shall fail to make and pub-
lish such statement, all the trustees
of the company shall be jointly and
severally liable for all the debts of
the company then existing, and for
all that shall be contracted before
such report shall be made," those
trustees who are guilty of the neg-
lect of duty, and those only, are
liable to the penalty mentioned in
the statute. Boughton v. Otis, 196

2. For a neglect to make and publish
the statement, on the part of the
trustees in office on the 1st of Janu-
ary, trustees who are subsequently
elected are not liable.

ib

4.

5.

corporation, at any particular peri-
od, are equally interested in the
property and business of the corpo-
ration. Per INGRAHAM, J. Jones
v. The Terre Haute and Richmond
Rail Road Co.,
353

And when the directors undertake
to distribute among the stockholders
any portion of the funds or property
of a corporation-whether it be
called profits or not-all the then
stockholders are entitled to an equal
share in the fund, proportionate to
their stock; whether they have
been stockholders for a longer or
shorter period. Per INGRAHAM, J. ib

Unless the charter gives the direc-
tors power to discriminate between
the stockholders at different periods,
in the distribution of profits, they
are all entitled to share therein. b

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8. Where the power to alter a charter
is reserved, in express terms, in the
act by which it is granted, and such
power is subsequently exercised, by
an authority adequate for that pur-
pose, and in accordance with the
forms prescribed by the constitution
in force when the alteration is made,
the law is not obnoxious to the ob-
jection that it violates the contract
with the corporation contained in
its charter. Matter of the Recipro-
city Bank,
369

9. In respect to real estate situated in
this state, claimed by a foreign cor-
poration, it is for the courts of this
state to construe the charter of such

corporation, and determine whether
the corporation is authorized there-

COVENANT.

by to take or hold such real estate. 1. The right to further assurance,

Boyce v. City of St. Louis,

650

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when stipulated for, passes to the
successive grantees. It is a covenant
that runs with the land, and as a
consequence is assigned by a con-
veyance of the land. Colby v. Os-
good,
339

2. Where a grantor conveys land.with
full covenants of seisin, warranty,
right to convey free from incum-
brances, and for further assurance;
the covenants being made with the
grantee, his heirs and assigns;"
and the grantee subsequently con-
veys the land to another, the latter
may maintain an action, in his own
name, against the grantor, for a
breach of the covenant against in-
cumbrances, in the existence of a
mortgage which was a lien upon the
premises at the time of the original
conveyance.
ib

3. A release of a mortgage is a "fur-
ther assurance."
ib

COSTS.

See SURROGATE, 3, 4.

COUNTER-CLAIM.

In an action upon a due-bill, or prom-
issory note, by the holder against
the maker, the defendant set up as
a counter-claim that one N., by an
instrument in writing signed by him,
became surety for the payee of the
note and another person, in the sum
of $200; that N. afterwards died,
and at the time of his death there
was $180 due and payable upon the
said instrument, which the defend-
ant paid. It appearing that N., who
was the father of the defendant, de-
vised certain lands to the latter,
upon condition that he should pay
the testator's debts, (of which the
sum due upon the said instrument
was one ;) Held that the payment so
made by the defendant could not be
allowed to him as a counter-claim
or set-off. Lyman v. Newman, 162

See JUSTICES' COURTS, 4.

COUNTY JUDGE.

See APPEAL.

CREDITORS' SUIT.
See PARTIES, 4.

D

DAMAGES.

1. In an action for an injury to the in-
heritance, by cutting wood and tim-
ber, evidence of the comparative
value of the premises, with or with-
out the wood and timber, is admis-
sible, as furnishing an appropriate
criterion of damage, after a proper
foundation has been laid by showing
the acquaintance of the witness with
that species of property. Van
Deusen v. Young,

2.

9

On the 22d of April, 1846, the plain-
tiff agreed to sell to the defendant a
canal boat and a pair of horses, at
the price of $800, payable by install-
ments of $40 per trip; the boat to
be employed in the business of the
plaintiff, and the boat and horses to
remain the property of the plain-
tiff, until the price should be paid.
In pursuance of this agreement,
the defendant made four trips with
the boat, paying to the plaintiff
$40 each trip. About the 1st of
September he abandoned the boat

and the employment of the plaintiff, | DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, &c.
retaining the horses, and the plain-
tiff resumed the possession of the
boat in October thereafter, and sub-
sequently sold the same to C. for
$550, without notice to the defend-
ant. Held that the contract was put
an end to, by the voluntary act of the
parties, except so far as it affected
or controlled their rights in respect
to the question of damages. Mallory
v. Lord,
454

3. Held also, that treating the contract
as broken, by the defendant, the
plaintiff was entitled to recover such
damages as resulted from the breach.
And that, assuming the value of the
boat and horses to have been the
sum fixed as the price thereof, in the
contract, the plaintiff's damages
would be the difference or deterio-
ration in value of the boat between
the time when the defendant took
possession, and the time when the
plaintiff resumed the possession
thereof; the value of the horses re-
tained by the defendant; and any
other loss or injury sustained by the
plaintiff from the neglect or refusal
of the defendant to carry his freight,
with interest thereon, deducting the
amount paid by the defendant upon
the contract.
ib

1. In an action by the administrator
of a deceased person, to recover
damages for the negligence of the
defendant, whereby the intestate
was deprived of his life, to entitle
the plaintiff to recover, it must ap-
pear affirmatively that the accident
resulted wholly from the negligence
of the defendant, and that the neg-
ligence and improvidence of the
intestate did not contribute to bring
it about. Lehman v. City of Brook-
lyn,

234

2. The negligence of the defendant

3.

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must be made out and established
by proof, and not be left to be in-
ferred from circumstances.

ib

Where there was a well in one of the
streets of the city of Brooklyn, level
with the grade of the sidewalk, and
usually covered with a wooden cover
having a square opening in the cen-
ter, which was also covered with a
lid, opening and shutting on leather
hinges, and the intestate, a child
four years of age, was found dead in
the well, within half an hour after
leaving his home; Held, in an action
against the city, by the administra-
tor of the child, to recover damages
for negligence, that, considering the
tender years of the child, hiş inabili
ty to take care of himself, and the
nature of the accident, the plaintiff
was bound to show how the accident
occurred, and to throw some light
upon the causes which led the child
to the vicinity of the well, and the
condition of the opening into the
well, and whether it was closed or
not when the deceased came there. ib

That merely showing the existence
of the well, with its covering, and
the child being found in the water,
was not sufficient to entitle the plain-
tiff to recover, or to put the city
upon the defense.

ib

5. The interest which the next of kin

have in the life of a person negli-
gently killed, under the acts of 1847
and 1849, is merely pecuniary. The
personal wrong done to, or the suf
fering of, the person killed, have
nothing to do with the damages.
Nor should the anguish and grief of
his parents enter into the estimate
of the amount to be recovered. ib

6. Where a father brought an action to
recover for the negligence of the de-
fendant, in causing the death of his
son, a child four years of age, and
recovered a verdict for $1500; Held
that the damages were unreasonable
and excessive, and should have been
merely nominal.
ib

DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.

1. Rights and remedies of creditors.
1. A person claiming to be a creditor,
with a warrant of attachment under
the code, but with no judgment or
execution for his debt, has no stand-
ing in court which will enable him
to impeach and litigate the bona fides
of a sale of goods by the alleged
debtor, to a third person, which has
been consummated by transfer and
delivery of the possession before the
lien of the warrant attached. Hall
v. Stryker,

5. Until the creditors of the grantee
have acquired liens upon such land,
they have no legal or equitable
claims in respect to it higher than,
or superior to, those of the grantor;
and if the fraudulent grantee recon-
vey such land to the grantor, before
such creditors have acquired any
lien thereon, the creditors have no
right to have the conveyance set
aside as fraudulent.

ib

2. Assignments for benefit of creditors.
6. When an assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors contains provisions
which necessarily tend to hinder,
delay or defraud creditors, these
provisions are conclusive evidence of
the design of the parties to the in-
strument, and the law therefore de-
clares it void, as being within the
prohibition of the statute. Jessup
v. Hulse,
539

105 7. It is not necessary, in pleading, to
point out the particular features or
clauses of the instrument, which are
objected to.

2. To enable a party to question and
put in controversy the bona fides of a
sale of goods, it must appear affirma-
tively that he is a creditor of the
vendor. Not merely that he is a
person claiming a debt or obligation
due to him from the vendor, which
he proposes to establish by proof;
but the character in which the at-
tacking party prosecutes the action,
or interposes the defense, and claims
to overthrow the sale or conveyance.
must be settled, and put at rest, by
the judgment or decree of a compe-
tent court.

ib

3. Where a grant of land is made to one
person, the consideration for which
is paid by or in behalf of another,
the legal title is in the grantee, not-
withstanding the conveyance is
made for the purpose of defrauding
the creditors of the grantor, and up-
on a parol trust in his favor. And
so long as the grantee holds such
title, the property is subject to the
claims of his creditors, to the same
extent as any other property to
which he has title. Davis v. Graves,

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ib

8. It is the intent to defraud upon

9.

which the statute fastens, and the
law treats these directions or pro-
visions as conclusive proof of such
an intent.
ib

A provision in an assignment for the
benefit of creditors, directing the
assignee "to sell, dispose of, and
convey the said real estate and per-
sonal property at such time or times,
and in such manner as shall be
most conducive to the interests of
the creditors" of the assignor, "and
convert the same into money as soon
as may be consistent with the in-
terests of said creditors," renders
the assignment void, inasmuch as
it confers the power to delay making
sales of the assigned property, and
converting the same into money. ib

10. An assignment which authorizes a
delay in bringing the assigned prop-
erty to sale, is open to the same ob-
jection as a clause authorizing a sale
upon credit, involves the same con-
sequences, and must meet with the
same condemnation. Per EмOTT, J.

ib

11. The spirit of the later decisions
is, that a debtor can go no farther
than to direct the appropriation of

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