sentations were false and fraudulent, and made with the intention to de- ceive; that the defendant then was, and still continues to be, a married man; and that his promise to marry was fraudulent, and to the plaintiff's damage; Held that the complaint stated sufficiently the defendant's promise to marry, and his represen- tation that he was unmarried, and competent to marry the plaintiff; and that it was unnecessary to allege that he knew his representation to be untrue. Blattmacher v. Saal, 22
2. Held also, that the complaint set forth a good cause of action; that if the plaintiff could not recover for the deceit and damage, she might, upon the contract and promise to marry, which implied and involved a prom- ise and agreement that the defend- ant was competent, legally, to mar- ry. ib 3. Where a complaint against two de- fendants alleged that one of the de- fendants erected a building across an alley belonging to the plaintiff and thus obstructed his right of way; and that such defendant then trans- ferred and conveyed the possession of the building to the other defend- ant, who kept, continued and main- tained such obstruction; and the plaintiff prayed judgment for dam- ages, against both defendants; Held that the complaint stated facts suffi- cient to show a cause of action against each defendant separately, but not a cause of action against them jointly; and that such causes of action could not, therefore, be united, in the same complaint. Held also, that the objection, of such mis- joinder, might be taken by a joint demurrer. Hess v. Buffalo and Ni- agara Falls Rail Road Co., 391
4. It seems that, in such a case, the de- fendants may move that the plaintiff elect which of the causes of action he will prosecute. ib
1. An act of the legislature, which prohibits the transportation, over a specified plank road, of any load of iron or iron ore, of more than two tons' weight, unless it be upon a ve- hicle with wheels having a tire of at
least six inches in width, is not un- constitutional and void on the ground that it operates as an ob- struction upon the iron business and those engaged in it, which is not extended to other articles of freight, or classes of persons. Seward v. Beach, 239
An act of the legislature, altering the charter of a bank incorporated previous to the adoption of the con- stitution of 1846, is valid, if passed according to the provisions of that constitution. Hence a two-thirds vote in favor of it is not necessary. Matter of the Reciprocity Bank, 369
3. The court has power, under the act of April 5, 1849, to order an appor- tionment of the debts of a corpora- tion among the stockholders, not- withstanding there is a large amount of assets in the receiver's hands not disposed of. ib
5. Authority being given to the towns, by the statute, to issue bonds, in- struments appearing on their face to have been executed in pursuance of that authority, and so far as ap- pears, in accordance with it, are valid. in the hands of, and may be enforced by, bona fide holders there- of; whether the prerequisites pre- scribed by the statute to the issuing of the bonds, beyond the organiza- tion of a rail road company, &c., and the filing in the county clerk's office of the assent of resident tax- payers, with the affidavit attached, as specified in the statute, were com- plied with or not. ib
6. Instruments without seal, issued by a town, which contain an acknowl- edgment that, in pursuance of the statute, and for the purpose of aid- ing in the construction of the rail road therein specified, the town owes, and a promise by the town to pay to, or bearer, $1000, with
interest at the rate of seven per cent, | 3. Prima facie, all stockholders in a
payable as therein mentioned, are negotiable; although the statute does not prescribe the form of the bonds, nor expressly provide wheth- er they shall or shall not be nego- tiable. ib
7. The omission of a seal is not a fatal objection to instruments thus exe- cuted by a town, as being instru- ments not warranted by the law. ib
8. Although the statute specifies a "bond or bonds" as the instruments which it shall be lawful for the towns to execute, this is to be deemed as done with a view to the interests of the creditors only; and if they are willing to waive the proposed benefit and accept unsealed obligations, the towns cannot object that such obli- gations were not authorized.
The supreme court cannot review, up- on certiorari, the judgment of a court ordering a commitment for a contempt. The People ex rel. Mitch- ell v. Sheriff of New York, 622
1. Under the 12th section of the gen- eral manufacturing act, (Laws of 1848, ch. 40,) requiring every compa- ny incorporated under that act to make and publish a report of its condition, annually, within twenty days from the 1st of January, and providing that "if any of said com- panies shall fail to make and pub- lish such statement, all the trustees of the company shall be jointly and severally liable for all the debts of the company then existing, and for all that shall be contracted before such report shall be made," those trustees who are guilty of the neg- lect of duty, and those only, are liable to the penalty mentioned in the statute. Boughton v. Otis, 196
2. For a neglect to make and publish the statement, on the part of the trustees in office on the 1st of Janu- ary, trustees who are subsequently elected are not liable.
corporation, at any particular peri- od, are equally interested in the property and business of the corpo- ration. Per INGRAHAM, J. Jones v. The Terre Haute and Richmond Rail Road Co., 353
And when the directors undertake to distribute among the stockholders any portion of the funds or property of a corporation-whether it be called profits or not-all the then stockholders are entitled to an equal share in the fund, proportionate to their stock; whether they have been stockholders for a longer or shorter period. Per INGRAHAM, J. ib
Unless the charter gives the direc- tors power to discriminate between the stockholders at different periods, in the distribution of profits, they are all entitled to share therein. b
8. Where the power to alter a charter is reserved, in express terms, in the act by which it is granted, and such power is subsequently exercised, by an authority adequate for that pur- pose, and in accordance with the forms prescribed by the constitution in force when the alteration is made, the law is not obnoxious to the ob- jection that it violates the contract with the corporation contained in its charter. Matter of the Recipro- city Bank, 369
9. In respect to real estate situated in this state, claimed by a foreign cor- poration, it is for the courts of this state to construe the charter of such
corporation, and determine whether the corporation is authorized there-
by to take or hold such real estate. 1. The right to further assurance,
Boyce v. City of St. Louis,
when stipulated for, passes to the successive grantees. It is a covenant that runs with the land, and as a consequence is assigned by a con- veyance of the land. Colby v. Os- good, 339
2. Where a grantor conveys land.with full covenants of seisin, warranty, right to convey free from incum- brances, and for further assurance; the covenants being made with the grantee, his heirs and assigns;" and the grantee subsequently con- veys the land to another, the latter may maintain an action, in his own name, against the grantor, for a breach of the covenant against in- cumbrances, in the existence of a mortgage which was a lien upon the premises at the time of the original conveyance. ib
3. A release of a mortgage is a "fur- ther assurance." ib
In an action upon a due-bill, or prom- issory note, by the holder against the maker, the defendant set up as a counter-claim that one N., by an instrument in writing signed by him, became surety for the payee of the note and another person, in the sum of $200; that N. afterwards died, and at the time of his death there was $180 due and payable upon the said instrument, which the defend- ant paid. It appearing that N., who was the father of the defendant, de- vised certain lands to the latter, upon condition that he should pay the testator's debts, (of which the sum due upon the said instrument was one ;) Held that the payment so made by the defendant could not be allowed to him as a counter-claim or set-off. Lyman v. Newman, 162
See JUSTICES' COURTS, 4.
CREDITORS' SUIT. See PARTIES, 4.
1. In an action for an injury to the in- heritance, by cutting wood and tim- ber, evidence of the comparative value of the premises, with or with- out the wood and timber, is admis- sible, as furnishing an appropriate criterion of damage, after a proper foundation has been laid by showing the acquaintance of the witness with that species of property. Van Deusen v. Young,
On the 22d of April, 1846, the plain- tiff agreed to sell to the defendant a canal boat and a pair of horses, at the price of $800, payable by install- ments of $40 per trip; the boat to be employed in the business of the plaintiff, and the boat and horses to remain the property of the plain- tiff, until the price should be paid. In pursuance of this agreement, the defendant made four trips with the boat, paying to the plaintiff $40 each trip. About the 1st of September he abandoned the boat
and the employment of the plaintiff, | DEATH BY WRONGFUL ACT, &c. retaining the horses, and the plain- tiff resumed the possession of the boat in October thereafter, and sub- sequently sold the same to C. for $550, without notice to the defend- ant. Held that the contract was put an end to, by the voluntary act of the parties, except so far as it affected or controlled their rights in respect to the question of damages. Mallory v. Lord, 454
3. Held also, that treating the contract as broken, by the defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to recover such damages as resulted from the breach. And that, assuming the value of the boat and horses to have been the sum fixed as the price thereof, in the contract, the plaintiff's damages would be the difference or deterio- ration in value of the boat between the time when the defendant took possession, and the time when the plaintiff resumed the possession thereof; the value of the horses re- tained by the defendant; and any other loss or injury sustained by the plaintiff from the neglect or refusal of the defendant to carry his freight, with interest thereon, deducting the amount paid by the defendant upon the contract. ib
1. In an action by the administrator of a deceased person, to recover damages for the negligence of the defendant, whereby the intestate was deprived of his life, to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it must ap- pear affirmatively that the accident resulted wholly from the negligence of the defendant, and that the neg- ligence and improvidence of the intestate did not contribute to bring it about. Lehman v. City of Brook- lyn,
2. The negligence of the defendant
must be made out and established by proof, and not be left to be in- ferred from circumstances.
Where there was a well in one of the streets of the city of Brooklyn, level with the grade of the sidewalk, and usually covered with a wooden cover having a square opening in the cen- ter, which was also covered with a lid, opening and shutting on leather hinges, and the intestate, a child four years of age, was found dead in the well, within half an hour after leaving his home; Held, in an action against the city, by the administra- tor of the child, to recover damages for negligence, that, considering the tender years of the child, hiş inabili ty to take care of himself, and the nature of the accident, the plaintiff was bound to show how the accident occurred, and to throw some light upon the causes which led the child to the vicinity of the well, and the condition of the opening into the well, and whether it was closed or not when the deceased came there. ib
That merely showing the existence of the well, with its covering, and the child being found in the water, was not sufficient to entitle the plain- tiff to recover, or to put the city upon the defense.
5. The interest which the next of kin
have in the life of a person negli- gently killed, under the acts of 1847 and 1849, is merely pecuniary. The personal wrong done to, or the suf fering of, the person killed, have nothing to do with the damages. Nor should the anguish and grief of his parents enter into the estimate of the amount to be recovered. ib
6. Where a father brought an action to recover for the negligence of the de- fendant, in causing the death of his son, a child four years of age, and recovered a verdict for $1500; Held that the damages were unreasonable and excessive, and should have been merely nominal. ib
1. Rights and remedies of creditors. 1. A person claiming to be a creditor, with a warrant of attachment under the code, but with no judgment or execution for his debt, has no stand- ing in court which will enable him to impeach and litigate the bona fides of a sale of goods by the alleged debtor, to a third person, which has been consummated by transfer and delivery of the possession before the lien of the warrant attached. Hall v. Stryker,
5. Until the creditors of the grantee have acquired liens upon such land, they have no legal or equitable claims in respect to it higher than, or superior to, those of the grantor; and if the fraudulent grantee recon- vey such land to the grantor, before such creditors have acquired any lien thereon, the creditors have no right to have the conveyance set aside as fraudulent.
2. Assignments for benefit of creditors. 6. When an assignment for the bene- fit of creditors contains provisions which necessarily tend to hinder, delay or defraud creditors, these provisions are conclusive evidence of the design of the parties to the in- strument, and the law therefore de- clares it void, as being within the prohibition of the statute. Jessup v. Hulse, 539
105 7. It is not necessary, in pleading, to point out the particular features or clauses of the instrument, which are objected to.
2. To enable a party to question and put in controversy the bona fides of a sale of goods, it must appear affirma- tively that he is a creditor of the vendor. Not merely that he is a person claiming a debt or obligation due to him from the vendor, which he proposes to establish by proof; but the character in which the at- tacking party prosecutes the action, or interposes the defense, and claims to overthrow the sale or conveyance. must be settled, and put at rest, by the judgment or decree of a compe- tent court.
3. Where a grant of land is made to one person, the consideration for which is paid by or in behalf of another, the legal title is in the grantee, not- withstanding the conveyance is made for the purpose of defrauding the creditors of the grantor, and up- on a parol trust in his favor. And so long as the grantee holds such title, the property is subject to the claims of his creditors, to the same extent as any other property to which he has title. Davis v. Graves,
8. It is the intent to defraud upon
which the statute fastens, and the law treats these directions or pro- visions as conclusive proof of such an intent. ib
A provision in an assignment for the benefit of creditors, directing the assignee "to sell, dispose of, and convey the said real estate and per- sonal property at such time or times, and in such manner as shall be most conducive to the interests of the creditors" of the assignor, "and convert the same into money as soon as may be consistent with the in- terests of said creditors," renders the assignment void, inasmuch as it confers the power to delay making sales of the assigned property, and converting the same into money. ib
10. An assignment which authorizes a delay in bringing the assigned prop- erty to sale, is open to the same ob- jection as a clause authorizing a sale upon credit, involves the same con- sequences, and must meet with the same condemnation. Per EмOTT, J.
11. The spirit of the later decisions is, that a debtor can go no farther than to direct the appropriation of
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