This committee labored hard, but accomplished little more than to increase the general concern as to the growing power of monopolies; to bring to light the important fact that virtual amalgamations in the form of private arrangements, outside of the provisions of law, were common, and to urge the imperative necessity of constituting a department of the executive government, to have "supervision of railways and canals, with full power to enforce such regulations as may from time to time appear indispensable for the accommodation and general interests of the public."

In pursuance of this recommendation, an act was that year passed constituting "The Railway Commission," consisting of five persons; the president, to be paid $10,000 a year, two other members at $7,500 each, and two unpaid members; the president and the two unpaid members to have the right to seats in Parliament.

In 1847, was established the voluntary asssociation of the representatives of railway companies, known as "The Railway Clearing House." It was established for the purpose of regulating matters of joint traffic between the companies having connection therewith. This association, legalized in 1850, has gradually come to embrace all the important companies of England, and has been eminently serviceable in producing uniformity and efficiency of management. The speculative power of former years having somewhat abated, in 1851, the railway commission was abolished; the duties being retransferred to the Board of Trade.

Two years later, howeyer, the fever revived, strife among the great companies became more active than ever, and the pressure of bills again made it necessary to refer the matter to a select committee. This committee, Mr. Cardwell being chairman, made, in all, five reports; the last one being especially elaborate in its discussion of amalgamation and interchange of traffic. Their recommendations on the last head resulted in what is styled "The Canal and Railway Traffic Act," passed in 1854-a very important one, in that it establishes the principles: (1) that every company should be compelled to afford to the public, in respect both of goods and of passengers, the full advantage of convenient interchange from one system of railway to another; and (2) that every company should make equal charges under the same circumstances.

This act is faulty, in that the remedy, in case of infraction, lies in an appeal from the injured party to the court of common pleas,

instead of a tribunal specially competent to hear and grant relief, in a more summary manner.

In 1865 a royal commission was appointed, consisting of the Duke of Devonshire and twelve other distingu shed gentlemen, charged with the duty of considering the subject of railway communication, especially the interchange of traffic and the diminution of charges. The report of this commission, presented in 1867, contains a vast amount of evidence relating to these and other railway questions, together with their conclusions; the most important of which are in substance as follows:

That it is not expedient for the government to avail itself of its reserved right to purchase railways.

That parliament should not interfere with the incorporation and financial affairs of railway companies, leaving such matters to be dealt with under the "Joint Stock Companies Act; " limiting its own action to regulating the construction of the line and the relations between the public and the companies so incorporated.

That railway companies should be bound to run at least two trains a day for third-class passengers.

That it would be "inexpedient, even if it were practicable, to adopt any legislation which would abolish the freedom railway companies enjoy of charging what sum they deem expedient within their maximum rates, when properly defined, limited as that freedom is by the Traffic Act."

That railway companies should be required to make stated reports to the Board of Trade in such form as the board may prescribe.

In 1872, another Joint Select Committee on Railway Companies Amalgamations was appointed, consisting of the Marquis of Salisbury, Earl Derby, Earl Cowper, Lord Redesdale, Lord Belper and five eminent members of the House of Commons. The report of this committee deals with the same general questions so often treated of before, and urges with much force the committee's reasons for the following, among other, conclusions:

That past amalgamations have not brought with them the evils which were anticipated.

That competition between railways exists only to a limited extent, and cannot be maintained by legislation.

That combination between railways is increasing, and is likely to increase, whether by amalgamation or otherwise.

That effectual competition by sea should be guarded by preventing railway companies from getting control over public harbors.

That canals are also some reliance for competition; that their facilities for through shipments, whether by other canals or by railways, should be increased, and that no canal should be transferred to, or be placed directly or indirectly under the control of any railway company.

That equal mileage rates are inexpedient.

That there should be publicity of rates and tolls.

That there is need of a new tribunal, consisting of three railway and canal commissioners for a careful and thorough supervision of the transportation interests of the kingdom, with authority to enforce the laws relating to those matters, to hear complaints and settle disputes, and with the further duty of assisting and advising Parliament in railway legislation.

These conclusions were generally approved, and the Railway Commission has been appointed in accordance with the recommendation.

We have been thus full in our account of attempts to settle the railway problem in Great Britain, for the reasons-that the experience of that country has been more extended than that of any other; that the English railway system, if such it can be called, is more like our own; that the habits, spirit and temper of the English people are also similar; and that the whole subject of legislative control of corporations has been so often and so laboriously inquired into by the best minds of that advanced nation.

2. Attempt to solve the railway problem in France.

The French railway system is totally different from those of Great Britain or America-different, indeed, from that of almost any other country. It is neither the system of free and independent companies, on the one hand, nor the system of government railways on the other. Competition is purposely prevented, instead of encouraged.

Up to 1842 but little had been done in the way of construction. In that year, nine great lines were authorized. In 1852 two or three consolidations took place, and they were reduced to six in number; the government assigning to each an extensive district of the empire for its field of operations; and the companies undertaking, as a consideration for this favor of insuring them against compe

tition, to build a net-work of feeders to these main lines. The companies finding this agreement a hard one to fulfil, the government, by laws of 1859 and '63, allowed them to issue bonds, itself guaranteeing 4.65 per cent. interest thereon for 50 years, the 65 p. c. becoming a sinking fund. The receipts from the old or main lines were calculated, and a sum per kilometre definitely proportioned to the income, was fixed, which each company might apply to its operating expenses, interest on bonds, dividends on stock, and any difference the company might have to pay between the interest guaranteed and the interest to be paid. Any excess beyond this fixed sum was applicable to any deficiency arising from the working of the new lines. If after such application of the excess, a deficiency should still exist, the government was to make it good to the extent of its guaranty. Any advance by the government to be treated as a loan, repayable with 4 per cent. simple interest.

The amount of aid which had been given to railway companies up to 1864, is shown below. Considerable further assistance has been given them since that date, but the exact statistics are not at hand:

Totals......

Francs.

Francs.

2,462,867, 2,818,637

Francs.

634,576, 670

187,556, 153 6,405,758 1, 099, 875,548 218,991,009 14,176,976 937,446,391 338,705,803 4,002.275 1.316, 405,652 369, 586, 677 27,009,824 2,233, 455,572 175, 200, 000 390,000 647,946, 887

8,217, 008, 4991, 292, 502,509 54, 803, 470 6,869, 702, 520

The regulations governing rates were the same for all the companies, and the financial arrangements in accordance with a fixed principle. All charters are for 99 years, at the end of which period the government becomes possessed of the roads on condition of paying for the rolling stock and other movable property. It may, indeed, purchase the lines of a company after 15 years from date

of charter, on condition of paying the company an annuity equal to the mean net profit of the most profitable five of the last preceeding seven years; provided that such annuity shall in no case be le s than the net profit of the last year of the seven.

Maximum rates and fares, as well as the classification of freights, are determined with the approval of the government, but much liberty is allowed as to lowering rates and making special tariffs. Publicity of all rates is imperative and no change can be made without a month's notice. Through rates, running powers and other facilities about which there has been so much discussion in England and in this country, are provided for by law. The control of railway matters is with the Central Railway Commission, of which the Minister of Public Works is president.

The surveillance is very extensive and minute, being in the hands of officers who have been thoroughly trained in the great technical schools of the empire.

It has been claimed that the absence of competition results in a falling behind other countries in the matter of improvements, etc., but the system certainly works smoothly and very satisfactorily in all other respects. The Republic appears to have considered it good enough to let alone.

3. The railway problem in Germany.

In Germany the railway system is mixed; some roads being owned and managed by the state, others by chartered companies.

The Prussian government started out in 1838 on the anti-competition principle, enacting that no second railway running in the same direction as the first, and touching the same principal points, should be constructed by any other parties than the company conducting the first railway, within a period of 30 years from the opening of such railway-a law which proved repressive of railway enterprise and often disadvantageous to the public. The same law reserved to the state the right to purchase any railway, for due consideration, within 30 years from date of opening.

Under the Empire all railways in the several states confederated are to be administered as one system, which has been considerably extended in liberality as well as scope, since its inauguration.

As the constitution of the empire lays down the general principles of the system, we here introduce so much of that instrument as relates to railways: