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S. Res. 221. --On July 26, 1975, Senator Pastore introduced Senate Resolution 221.* Its purpose was to convey the sense of the Senate that

the President should:

(1) Seek immediate international consideration of strengthening the effectiveness of the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency and intensified cooperation of nuclear supplier nations to insure that the most stringent safeguards are applied to the transfer of nuclear equipment and technology;

(2) Seek an intensive cooperative international effort to strengthen and improve the scope, comprehensiveness and effectiveness of the international safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities so that there will be a substantial and immediate reduction in the risk of diversion; or theft of plutonium and other special nuclear materials to military or other uses that would jeopardize world peace and security; and

(3) Seek restraint by nuclear supplier nations in their exports of nuclear technology, and their cooperation in assuring that such equipment and technology only is transferred to other nations under the most rigorous, prudent and safeguarded conditions designed to assure that the technology itself is not employed for the production of nuclear explosives. **

The resolution passed the Senate on December 12, 1975.

Reorganization of nuclear export licensing. --The concept of reorganizing and centralizing the export licensing functions of the Federal Government

For himself and for Senators Mondale, Inouye and Montoya.

** Cf., U. S. Congress. Senate. International Safeguards of Nuclear Ma

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for nuclear materials, technology and facilities is embodied in S. 1439. The bill's sponsors believe that centralization of the Federal Government export functions for nuclear materials would improve the decision-making and permit closer oversight for such exports.

The latest version of S. 1439, dated January 8, 1976, would make five functional changes, expand congressional participation, make four procedural changes and require two studies for Congress. The bill would make the following functional changes:

(1) Consolidate licensing for all peaceful nuclear exports in the NRC. These export control functions would include those now exercised by ERDA and the Department of Commerce for technology and components.

(2) Transfer to the NRC the functions of the Transportation Department relating to the transportation of radioactive materials.

(3) Designate the State Department as the lead agency for negotiating, renegotiating and administering agreements for nuclear cooperation, with close cooperation and technical assistance of ERDA.

(4) Require the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to prepare and submit Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements to the NRC, State Department and Congress for all U.S. nuclear agreements and subsequent agreements with other countries and for all strategically significant nuclearexport license applications.

(5) Require ERDA to establish a safeguards training program for na

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(6) Expand congressional participation.

Under the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954 as amended, agreements for nuclear cooperation after they have been approved by the President must lie before Congress for specified numbers of days. For the more sensitive agreements, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy must report its views and recommendations to Congress, together with an accompanying proposed concurrent resolution stating whether or not Congress favors the proposed agreement. If Congress passes a resolution stating that it does not favor an agreement, the agreement cannot become effective. *

S. 1439 would provide a substantial new function for Congress for certain nuclear export licenses. It would permit the NRC to submit to Congress the final determination on approving a nuclear export application that raises substantial foreign policy considerations that the NRC cannot adequately re

solve.

S. 1439 as revised would mandate the following procedural changes for licensing of nuclear exports:

(1) Require the State Department to take into full consideration the recommendations and policies of the NRC concerning the licensing and authorization of exports, before negotiating or renegotiating nuclear agreements and subsequent arrangements under these agreements.

(2) Require the State Department to furnish NRC with all executive branch data and recommendations that are required by the NRC to make its nuclear export licensing decisions.

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(3) Require the NRC to take into account the adequacy of safeguards in the recipient country against nuclear diversion, theft or sabotage. This consideration would be part of the NRC's statutory determination whether a nuclear export would be inimical to the common defense and security and public health and safety of the United States.

The bill would require two studies for Congress:

(1) A study of the feasibility of internationalizing all strategically significant parts of the nuclear fuel cycle, to be done by the State Department with assistance from ERDA; and

(2) A study of the differences and interactions between nuclear safeguards as applied by the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to be done by the NRC.

A five-year moratorium on export licenses for nuclear power plants. The proposed Nuclear Power Reappraisal Act of 1975, S. 1826, would require the NRC both to cease granting licenses for the export of nuclear fission power plants and to cease granting licenses for the construction of domestic nuclear power plants. During a five-year licensing moratorium the Office of Technology Assessment would undertake a comprehensive study of the nuclear fuel cycle with particular emphasis on the potential consequences of the proliferation of nuclear fission power plants in the United States and elsewhere. The resumption of the licensing of domestic construction, and the export of nuclear powerplants would be dependent upon a congressional determination that the nuclear fuel cycle poses no extraordinary threat to public health and safety and is economically viable, and passage of legislation to authorize resumption of export and construction licensing.

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Prohibition of nuclear exports without congressional approval. --H. R. 622 would prohibit the transfer of atomic technology to foreign powers without the express approval of Congress. This proposal builds upon the work of the 93d Congress in expanding the congressional power to disapprove of international nuclear cooperation agreements. (Public Law 93-485.)

Prohibition of the transfer of nuclear materials to non-NPT nations.-The ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a condition for export of nuclear materials to a given country is embodied in several of the nuclear export control bills introduced in the 94th Congress. This criteria probably reflects one or both of the following: an endorsement of the value of the NPT and the ability of its safeguards requirements to check nuclear proliferation; and a means of pushing non-NPT nations to sign the treaty in return for access to U.S. nuclear technology, materials, and financing. H. R. 6082 and its identical bill H. R. 7223 would prohibit the sale, shipment, transfer, or exchange, direct or indirect, of enriched uranium, plutonium, any source of special fissionable material, equipment for processing, use or production of source or special fissionable material, and scientific or technical information to any country which has not ratified the NPT. The only exceptions would be in cases where the President determines that the sale, shipment, transfer, or exchange is essential to the national security of the United States and reports this determination to Congress, and Congress by concurrent resolution, approves the sale, shipment, transfer or exchange.

The language in H. R. 6082 indicates that its authors were concerned