CRS-40 great responsibilities upon human, and thus fallible, institutions. For this reason, observers hold that consideration should be given the doubts, reservations, and criticisms of concerned citizens and their organizations. Such consideraton is particularly important for ways and means to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons. Government Responsibilities for Nuclear Safeguards Many Federal, State and local government organizations are presently or may become involved with nuclear safeguards. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, of course, is the lead agency for safeguarding of nuclear materials and facilities of licensees. Next comes the Energy Research and Development Administration, which is independently responsible for safeguards of nuclear materials and facilities in the hands of its operating contractors. So at the moment ERDA is responsible for safeguarding far more enriched uranium and plutonium than is the NRC. The NRC functions through licensing, promulgation of regulations and inspection for compliance with regulations. The ERDA functions by directing its contractors to take specified measures. ERDA and the State Department negotiate agreements with their safeguards provisions. NRC licenses export of nuclear materials and facilities while ERDA approves export of certain nuclear information and technology. Looking beyond NRC and ERDA, the responsibilities for gathering intelligence about possible attempts at theft, diversion or sabotage are shared by Federal, State and local law enforcement agencies with no formally established means of coordination or cooperation. The repelling of an initial CRS-41 overt attack or theft or sabotage is the responsibility of the licensee and the local law enforcement agency. The recovery of stolen materials rests with the Federal Bureau of Investigation assisted by Emergency Action and Coordination Teams of ERDA and the NRC. These arrangements, which the Committee may examine in depth later, suggest that the many possible roads to proliferation are all unpatrolled and that human problems of local pride, bureaucratic isolationism and uncoordinated planning and action may leave embarrassing gaps or weaknesses in defenses against proliferation. In addressing the adequacy of nuclear safeguards at the hearings, the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) observed widespread agreement that current safeguards required by the NRC are inadequate and that the Commission had conceded this in its draft environmental statement of plutonium recycle: "Where there is substantial disagreement is whether an acceptable safeguard scheme can be devised and successfully implemented on the required scale and for long periods."* In the NRDC's judgment such a safeguards system cannot be achieved for several reasons:** (1) Unprecedented and ultimately unworkable demands will be placed on those who operate the safeguards program which must be essentially infallible. NRDC noted that Dr. Alvin Weinberg's call for "unaccustomed vigilance" and "a continuing tradition of meticulous attention to detail" as implies unattainable conditions for effective safeguards. * April-May hearings, p. 785. Accordingly, NRDC CRS-42 argued that, because human institutions are far from infallible, losses of nuclear materials cannot be prevented. (2) U.S. experience with present safeguarding procedures is hardly reassuring. NRDC cites the example of major discrepancies in inventory accounts and possible losses of weapons grades materials by an AEC contractor and a GAO report on inadequate physical security at other AEC contractors. (3) Safeguards measures proposed by NRC have been opposed by the nuclear industry, so much so that industry's response is likely to be inadequate. CRS-43 V. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPORTS The exports of certain information, and technology, materials, components and facilities for nuclear power are subject to a variety of licenses and authorizations by three different Federal departments or agencies, two of them directly controlled by the President and one nominally independent of that control. Dr. Scoville characterized the present U. S. nuclear export policies and organizations as in a state of turmoil. For him, the dissolution of the AEC, the transfer of its regulatory functions to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the transfer of its other activities to the Energy Research and Development Administration have fractionated responsibilities for controlling nuclear exports. This splitting of responsibilities has led to delays in authorizing exports and to uncertainties as to where the basic responsibilities may lie in a specific case.* He proposes greater centralization of responsibility within the executive branch and more efficient utilization of the expertise of ERDA, together with sufficient checks and balances to avoid sacrificing non-proliferation objectives to industrial or foreign policy pressures. Tighter congressional controls over agreements for cooperation would also help check against possible overenthusiasm by the executive branch. ** It should be noted that Congress is giving attention to the division of responsibilities for control of exports for nuclear power technology as well * Cf., statement of Herbert Scoville in July hearings, p. 101. CRS-44 as for materials and facilities. Proposals now before Congress would fur ther modify respective functions of ERDA, NRC and the Department of Commerce for nuclear exports. * There follows a brief discussion of controls over nuclear exports, and recently proposed legislation. Commercial Transactions In the U.S. economic system, exports of nuclear power plants, major components and technology for such plants and fabricated nuclear fuel are made mainly by private companies. Direct Federal action is limited largely to exporting enriched uranium, or providing enrichment services to foreign customers who then may export the enriched uranium directly or indirectly in U. S fabricated nuclear fuel elements. The commercial exports are made within the framework of U.S. agreements for cooperation which the Department of State and the Energy Research and Development Administration negotiate with foreign governments. The authority for these agreements is Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. U.S. companies can also export technology by supplying information and reports, by licensing arrangements, or by joint ventures or through foreign subsidiaries. It is a U.S nuclear company, not ERDA or NRC, that signs a contract with a foreign counterpart, or a foreign utility, or some foreign government organization. Within the terms of export licenses or other approvals, it is the responsibility of the private company to perform, not of the Government. *The Senate Committee on Government Operations has before it S. 1439, |