1. Please provide the NRC views from the Safeguards standpoint on the feasibility of restricting the export of uranium to an enrichment below the point where it could be used in a nuclear explosive.

Discussion:

It is noted, correctly, that there would be an advantage from the
safeguards standpoint if exports of uranium were restricted to
those fuels enriched to a point where they could not be used in a
nuclear explosive. At the same time, some research and test reactors
do require highly enriched uranium to operate.

Nuclear reactor facilities operated for purposes other than the generation of heat and/or electrical power are utilized for either of the following primary purposes:

(1) As a source of neutrons produced in the fission process, or

(2) As a device for education and training in nuclear fundamentals. In general, facilities operating primarily for the first-named purpose require highly enriched uranium to obtain neutron fluxes as high as possible relative to the heat necessarily generated in the fission process. The ultimate objectives in operating such neutron producing "machines" may be pure scientific or applied research, product or process development, materials testing, production of radioactive materials for sale (e.g., for use in radio-pharmaceutical products), or for use as an analytical tool, as in neutron activation analysis. If highly enriched uranium were not available for use in certain of these facilities, their potential usefulness would be substantially decreased to the point where it would no longer be practical to use them for many applications.

For most other education and training purposes, a research reactor can be fueled with low enriched uranium. In fact, a substantial number of such facilities are in current use in the United States and around the world that utilize fuel enriched to less than 20 percent in U-235. However, the use of small quantities of highly enriched uranium in a research reactor, when operated at higher power levels, provides a much greater useful life-span and results in substantial savings in fuel costs. It should also be mentioned that HTGR power reactors are presently designed to use uranium enriched to high concentrations, and could not be accommodated to use lower concentrations without substantial redesign. No HTGR reactors exist outside the United States and there are none on order; thus no export of fuel for this purpose is anticipated.

II-3

Enclosure 1

However, the Federal Republic of Germany has fueled a THTR (Thorium High Temperature Reactor) with high enriched uranium supplied by the United States. Since the THTR involves the same fuel cycle principles as the HTGR, although with different reactor geometry, the same considerations would apply to it with regard to use of reduced levels of uranium enrichment.

Exports of plutonium and highly enriched uranium are reviewed on a case-by-case basis. An important part of this review entails an analysis of physical protection measures employed by recipient countries for the express purpose of assuring that they afford a degree of protection essentially equivalent to those employed in the United States. Recipients of U. S. supplied material are required by the terms of their Agreement for Cooperation with the United States to safeguard material in accordance with procedures acceptable to the U.S., which generally follow the IAFA procedures and recommendations.

2. Provide NRC views on the practicality of various schemes proposed for blending plutonium and uranium oxides to increase the difficulty of fabricating nuclear explosives.

Discussion:

The blending of plutonium and uranium oxides has been proposed by Dr. Karl Puechl and others as a means, if the Commission decides to permit the wide-scale use of recycled plutonium in mixed oxide fuel in light water reactors, of increasing the difficulty of obtaining plutonium in a concentration sufficient to allow fabrication of a nuclear explosive without further processing. The concept presents numerous issues, including optimal means of achieving such blending, the cost of the process, and the degree of difficulty a would-be terrorist would encounter in seeking to separate the plutonium from the mixture. The Commission has taken no position on the feasibility or practicality of blending as a safeguards measure, but careful staff study of the blending concept is presently underway in the context of the draft environmental statement now being prepared on the safeguards aspects of wide-scale use of mixed oxide fuel. That statement will also consider alternative safeguards means, evaluating costs and benefits systematically.

URANIUM

TABLE 1. ANNUAL ENRICHED URANIUM SHIPMENTS FOR
PERIOD 1969 THROUGH 1975 - BY ENRICHMENT

TABLE 2.

MAJOR SHIPMENTS OF URANIUM ENRICHED TO
20% OR GREATER (5 KGS AND ABOVE)

Enclosure 2

1/ This summary reflects shipments for each country, by year, of total uranium (element) and its U-235 (isotope) content for material enriched to 20% and above. Individual shipments are detailed on pages 5 through 10 of this Table.