CRS-5 ownership of all fissionable materials and direct Government operation of safeguards systems within the United States may become necessary. At present, most of the weapons-grade materials in the United States are under safeguards of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) and its contractors, rather than under regulatory controls of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Much has been said about the safeguarding of nuclear materials and facilities from diversion or theft and from attack or sabotage. It was clear in the hearings that no safeguards system can prevent the diversion or theft or clandestine production of fissionable materials. Nor can safeguards absolutely guarantee that every theft or diversion, no matter how small, will always be detected. As the volume of nuclear materials in commerce increases, the chance of undetected diversion or theft will increase. best that can be hoped for is assurance that diversion or theft will be made hard enough to discourage attempts, and that attempted or actual diversion or theft will be detected and announced early enough for effective remedial action. The Proliferation and "peaceful nuclear explosives."--The idea of "peaceful nuclear explosives" has fascinated many engineers. At the moment no nation is using peaceful nuclear explosives (PNE) for civil engineering purposes. The Soviet Union, however, continues to show interest in nuclear explosions for large-scale earth-moving projects. Moreover, the use of PNE devices is made legitimate by the NPT. Article 5 of the Treaty obligates the parties to undertake that "potential benefits from peaceful CRS-6 applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear weapons states Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis" and that the charge to such Parties will be "as low as possible." The article specifies that the benefits of PNES shall be obtained "pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements," and committed NPT Party states to start negotiating such agreements as soon as possible after the Treaty entered into force. These negotiations have been going on since October 1974 but are not yet completed. The emphasis in Article 5 on non-discriminatory supply of PNE services at low cost reflects the optimism of nuclear engineers in the late 1960s that these devices had a promising future, an optimism which has largely disappeared in the United States. Although the prospects for practical use of PNE devices in the United States has declined greatly since the NPT entered into force, the IAEA is preparing future arrangments to govern their use and at some time in the future other nations may approach the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, or perhaps even India, for PNE services. The commercial use of PNES is expected to increase the probability of further proliferation of new types of nuclear weapons, or vertical proliferation, as well as the probability that other nations might start to make so-called peaceful devices. The Government of India in testing a nuclear explosive in May 1974 took the position that it was not contributing to proliferation of nuclear weapons because the device it tested was designed for peaceful uses. Future use of peaceful nuclear explosives can increase the probabilities of proliferation of new weapons by the nuclear weapons CRS-7 The challenge of proliferation. --There is now no way to prevent more countries from acquiring nuclear weapons if they want to. Even if all nuclear materials in the world were gathered up and buried deep in the sea, all nuclear scientists and engineers isolated from society, and all nuclear facilities and mines dismantled, the knowledge of fission in uranium and plutonium is all that other scientists and engineers would need to recreate the situation that exists today. So with less drastic measures, proliferation cannot be stopped. It can be slowed down and made less attractive to nations that might be tempted to make nuclear weapons. Herein lies the challenge of proliferation: How to limit and slow the further spread of the capability to produce nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. The objective is to gain time to create international conditions that can remove or reduce pressures upon nations to opt for nuclear weapons. Control of nuclear exports. --Limiting or preventing the export of plant, equipment and technology for sensitive nuclear fuel facilities (enrichment and reprocessing) is one powerful way to slow the pace of proliferation. The United States has engaged in informal diplomatic efforts to convince world nuclear suppliers to agree upon such limitations, but with limited success. Some nuclear nations still are not agreed to halt export of sensitive nuclear fuel technology and equipment. As for the United States, it has policies and procedures to control such exports. changes appear to be needed. Some policy and organizational Some Members of Congress believe such changes should not reduce the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commis CRS-8 Meanwhile, Leverage from the United States position in the world nuclear market. The United States until recently enjoyed international influence derived from its virtual monopoly of free-world uranium enrichment. That monopoly is breaking up now that the Government's enrichment plants are fully booked and new enrichment capacity cannot be added for many years. some other nations are building their own enrichment facilities. The Soviet Union also has moved into the world enrichment market, although whether it can give good commercial service remains to be seen. Also, the U.S. position is affected as other industrial nations offer improved nuclear powerplants, frequently based upon U.S. technology. The emergence of Canada as an exporter of nuclear power plants that use natural uranium for fuel and the prospects that the United Kingdom may offer such reactors can also diminish the future U. S. share of the world nuclear power market. The weakened market position for the United States would mean both loss of income from foreign sales, and loss of influence over the policies of nations using nuclear power. The international framework for nuclear exports and proliferation. --A well established international framework now exists for U.S. nuclear exports. The United States has a far-flung web of international agreements for cooperation which provides the basis for commercial export orders. The Department of State and the Energy Research and Development Administration negotiate the fundamental agreements for nuclear cooperation. Within these, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of CRS-9 of the most sensitive nuclear power technologies; and the Export-Import Bank finances most of the U.S. exports of nuclear powerplants. This framework exists, however, at the forebearance of other governments and could easily be disrupted. It is not strong enough now to prevent the export of critical nuclear technologies by other countries nor can it support substantial sanctions against those nations that divert nuclear materials from peaceful to military uses. Potential Measures for Limiting Proliferation Many United States initiatives can be proposed to limit further proliferation of the ability to make nuclear weapons and national decisions to do so. Most would require legislation and subsequent oversight to see how well they are carried out. Major approaches to curbing weapons proliferation which emerged from the hearings include the following: Reducing pressures for proliferation. --Diplomatic initiatives could seek to reduce world tensions and to provide for resolution of conflicts between nations without resort to armed force. This would reduce pressures on Conceivably, the International governments to make nuclear weapons. Atomic Energy Agency could also help to persuade nations not to acquire nuclear weapons by supplying them with technical advice and assistance on alternative non-nuclear sources of fuels and energy, and by increasing their confidence that the world community of nations will be informed of diversion of nuclear materials early enough to take remedial action. Fostering nuclear interdependence. --Many nations now see nuclear |