* *

The Standard Dictionary definition implies the same thing. By that authority it is "A hard plate with holes of successively diminishing diameters for drawing out metal * wire." Here again it is applied with something added, devoting it to a specific purpose. In every case the material from which drawplate is made is a plate, as defined by the lexicographers, with added processes of manufacture fitting it for a particular use, which when completed give the article a different and distinct name in trade and commerce, to wit, "drawplate."

The testimony in the record perfectly coincides with the lexicographic authorities in emphasizing the fact that "plate," both in common parlance and as understood in trade and commerce, is a separate and distinct article from "drawplate," being the thing out of which "drawplates" are made, rather than a generic term, embracing as a species, "drawplate."

As was stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the previous caseUndoubtedly steel plates were formerly used to draw wires through, and, as is not uncommon, the earlier name clings inappropriately to the later development.

We think that the proper office of paragraph 135 was aptly defined by Judge Hough in United States v. Buehne Steel Wool Co. (154 Fed. Rep., 93), wherein the court states:

It seems to me going too far to describe the articles of steel specifically enumerated in paragraph 135 as "crude" or even "simple," for many of them are of complex design and all presuppose great inventive and mechanical skill, and are finished or completed in the sense that they are ready for the markets of the world. But it is true that as a class they are, though the finished products of the mill, but the raw material for some other metal industry-for the machine shop or the builder. No article there enumerated is ordinarily used by the final consumer, or put to its ultimate use, by the name or in the shape described by the name used in paragraph 135.

It will be noted in passing that this merchandise is in the final shape in which it is delivered to the consumer, and is not the raw material for further manufacture in any metal industry.

What constitutes forgings has likewise been the subject of much discussion in the courts. The highest and perhaps the most satisfactorý deliverance on the subject was by the Supreme Court of the United States in Saltonstall v. Wiebusch (156 U. S., 601). The subject of that decision was scythes and grass hooks made out of flat pieces of metal which were shaped by forging, but which required in addition thereto, in order to make them ready for their intended use, the application of other processes than forging. The question was whether they were dutiable as forgings or as articles of steel partly manufactured. While the statute under consideration by the court differed in language from the present, the terms defined are the The court said:

same.

From the separate enumeration of "forgings of iron and steel" and "forged iron, of whatever shape or in whatever stage of manufacture," it would seem that Congress intended to distinguish between the two and to apply the term "forgings," though perhaps not exclusively, to such articles as are completed by the action of the hammer.

Hence we are not prepared to accept the theory of the Government in this case that the articles in this paragraph are confined to such as are incomplete or in process of manufacture, as there may be many articles which would naturally fall within the designation of "forgings" which are finished and ready for use-such, for example, as ornamental ironwork, wrought iron railings, and grilles, none of which are subjected to any further process of manufacture. This view is strengthened to a certain extent by the separate enumeration in the same schedule of "anvils, anchors or parts thereof, mill irons and mill cranks, of wrought irons and wrought iron for ships, and forgings of iron and steel, for vessels, steam engines, and locomotives, or parts thereof *' Apparently all of these fall within the same category of forgings and apply to completed articles.

But we do not understand the term "forgings" to be applicable to articles which receive treatment of a different kind than hammering before they are complete, such, for example, as grinding, tempering, or polishing, though the witnesses agreed that welding and punching are properly forging processes.

These articles, precisely as imported, are completed and ready for delivery into the hands of the consumer. While it is true that for the consumer's purpose they must be fitted for a particular application by adjusting the smaller orifices of the conical holes to suit the particular size of wire to be made by drawing the wire material through them, nevertheless we do not regard these adjusting processes as other than of those incidental to wortles and drawplates in their everyday use. These operations are such as at frequent intervals during use are applied to all wortles and drawplates for the purpose of adjustment, and not for the purpose of completing the article. That they may be adjusted at the outset by the consumer to fit his purposes, and from time to time as necessity requires, it is necessary that they be placed in the hands of the consumer as imported. These processes are not dissimilar to those applied to various kinds of machinery and implements while in use, adjusting them to the particular purpose of the day, or requirement of the desired product. They are incidents of use rather than of manufacture. Moreover, the record discloses that these very processes, if they may rise to that relative dignity, are essentially forging processes.

For these reasons we find it unnecessary in this case to consider or decide whether or not an incomplete article upon which there have been applied forging processes exclusively should, in order to be classified as a forging, be one upon which the remaining processes necessary to make it a complete article must be forging processes. As imported, we regard this article to all intents and purposes completed. They are forgings, and have had no other than the forging processes applied in their making.

In our view, they are properly dutiable under paragraph 127 as forgings, and not under paragraph 193 as articles of steel, nor under paragraph 135 as plates of steel in all forms and shapes. As between paragraphs 193 and 127, while they might properly fall within either paragraph, the provision "not specially provided for in this act" in

one paragraph neutralizes the equivalent expression in the other paragraph. The terms, therefore, are to be compared without limitation. Articles of steel wholly or partly manufactured include forgings of steel of whatever degree or stage of manufacture and many other articles, whilst forgings of steel constitute but one of the many varieties of articles of steel. The term "forgings of steel," therefore, is the more specific. So, clearly, the phrase "forgings of steel," of whatever degree of manufacture, is more specific than "steel in all forms and shapes." In any event the provisions of paragraphs 135 and 127, extending equally to an imported article, the higher rate of 127 must be applied.

We are of the opinion that the merchandise is properly dutiable as forgings of steel of whatever degree or stage of manufacture under the provisions of paragraph 127. The decision of the Board of General Appraisers is accordingly modified, and as so modified affirmed.·

UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN THERMO-WARE Co. (No. 190).1

1. "OR PARTS THEREOF" IN PARAGRAPH 108, TARIFF ACT OF 1897.

Avoiding what would be a conflict between paragraphs 108 and 109 in the tariff act of 1897, the words "or parts thereof" in the former paragraph must be taken to refer not to spectacles, eyeglasses or goggles, but to the frames for these.

2. OVAL-SHAPED GLASSES USED TO MANUFACTURE AUTOMOBIile Goggles. Oval-shaped glasses suitable for use in the manufacture of automobile goggles were dutiable under paragraphs 101 and 107, tariff act of 1897.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, May 1, 1911.

TRANSFERRED from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, G. A. 6961 (T. D. 30266).

[Affirmed.]

D. Frank Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Edwin R. Wakefield on the brief), for the United States.

Comstock & Washburn (Albert H. Washburn of counsel) for appellee.

Before MONTGOMERY, HUNT, SMITH, BARBER, and DE VRIES, Judges.

SMITH, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

An importation of oval-shaped glasses, suitable for the manufacture of automobile goggles, was classified by the collector of customs at the port of New York as "ground and polished coquille glasses" and assessed for duty under the provisions of paragraph 109 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, which paragraph reads as follows:

109. Lenses of glass or pebble, ground and polished to a spherical, cylindrical, or prismatic form, and ground and polished plano or coquille glasses, wholly or partly manufactured, with the edges unground, forty-five per centum ad valorem; if with their edges ground or beveled, ten cents per dozen pairs and forty-five per centum ad valorem.

1 Reported in T. D. 31571 (20 Treas. Dec., 949).

The importer protested that the goods were not ground and polished coquille glasses, but common window glass, bent, and therefore dutiable under the provisions of paragraphs 101 and 107 of said act, the parts of which paragraphs pertinent to the case are as follows: 101. Unpolished, cylinder, crown, and common window glass, not exceeding ten by fifteen inches square, one and three-eighths cents per pound; * 107. * common window glass * when bent, shall be subject to a duty of five per centum ad valorem in addition to the rates otherwise chargeable thereon.

*

*

* *

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*

The Board of General Appraisers sustained the claim of the importers in this behalf and the Government appealed to the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, which appeal has been transferred to this court for determination in accordance with the provisions of the tariff act of August 5, 1909.

The evidence submitted on the hearing shows without contradiction and the board finds that none of the glasses are ground or polished. As paragraph 109 covers only lenses and plano or coquille glasses which have been ground and polished, it is evident that the classification and assessment made by the collector can not be sustained.

The Government, however, insists that the merchandise is dutiable under paragraph 108, which is as follows:

108. Spectacles, eyeglasses, and goggles, and frames for the same, or parts thereof, finished or unfinished, valued at not over forty cents per dozen, twenty cents per dozen and fifteen per centum ad valorem; valued at over forty cents per dozen and not over one dollar and fifty cents per dozen, forty-five cents per dozen and twenty per centum ad valorem; valued at over one dollar and fifty cents per dozen, fifty per centum ad valorem.

In our opinion, the contention can not be successfully maintained. The glasses imported are not mounted and therefore can not be considered as spectacles, eyeglasses, or goggles, which terms necessarily carry with them the idea of suitably prepared glass or pebble or similar material so fitted to frames that it can be worn as an aid or protection to the eyes. True, the goods imported are admittedly parts of goggles, but then the question arises as to whether paragraph 108 really provides or was intended to provide for parts of the completed article. We think not. The language "or parts thereof" in the paragraph just mentioned does not refer to spectacles, eyeglasses, or goggles, but to the "frames for the same." Had the phrase "or parts thereof" been intended to relate back to all that preceded it, the conjunction "and" would not have been repeated, and that part of the paragraph would have been made to read as follows: "Spectacles, eyeglasses, goggles, and frames for the same, or parts thereof." Indeed, if it had been intended to impose a duty on spectacles, eyeglasses, goggles, and parts thereof, all reference to the frames might well have been omitted, inasmuch as frames are essential parts of the completed articles. Punctuation is not always

a safe guide to the interpretation of laws, as experience shows that they are not infrequently salted and peppered with commas quite at variance with what the lawmaker really intended to say. That "parts thereof" refers to the frames and not to the spectacles, eyeglasses, or goggles themselves, seems to be further borne out by the fact that under the construction urged by the Government paragraphs 108 and 109 would be brought into conflict to some extent; that is to say, ground and polished lenses, plano or coquille glasses, which are constituent parts of spectacles, eyeglasses, and goggles, would become dutiable under paragraph 108 as parts of such articles and under paragraph 109 as ground and polished lenses, plano or coquille glasses. We believe that the insertion of the words "or parts thereof" after "frames for the same" was designed to meet a decision of the Board of General Appraisers holding that side pieces or parts of frames could not be assessed as frames under paragraph 119 of the tariff act of 1890, which made provision for spectacle and eyeglass frames, but not for parts thereof. (T. D. 11374.) True, the amendment was not made in the tariff act immediately succeeding the decision; but, as defects in laws are not always promptly remedied, a failure to amend at the first opportunity scarcely justifies the inference that the defects were not in the legislative mind when, on a subsequent occasion, language was used adequate to remedy them. The decision of the Board of General Appraisers is affirmed.

WOLFF v. UNITED STATES (No. 382).1

JEWELRY AND IMITATION JEWELRY.

Where the importation consists of merchandise in a variety of forms, necklaces, chains, hatpins, etc., made of a variety of materials and some complete, some incomplete, without attempting a comprehensive definition of jewelry or of articles commonly known as jewelry, the appeal here being limited to merchandise represented by enumerated samples, and there being no evidence to controvert the conclusion drawn by the board, the board's decision must be affirmed; the goods were properly assessed, being commonly known as jewelry, under paragraph 434, tariff act of 1897. United States Court of Customs Appeals, May 1, 1911. TRANSFERRED from United States Circuit Court for Southern District of New York, Abstract 22013 (T. D. 30069), Abstract 22048 (T. D. 30086).

[Affirmed.]

Comstock & Washburn (Albert H. Washburn and Geo. J. Puckhafer of counsel) for appellants.

D. Frank Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Charles Duane Baker on the brief), for the United States.

Before MONTGOMERY, HUNT, SMITH, BARBER, and DE VRIES, Judges.

DE VRIES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The decision in this case involves questions of fact, as well as conclusions of law.

1 Reported in T. D. 31572 (20 Treas. Dec., 951).