primary importance. In that ascertainment the Supreme Court of the United States has laid down as one of the canons of construction the following:

Again, another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is designed to remedy, and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body. Holy Trinity Church v. United States (143 U. S., 457, 463); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (166 U. S., 290).

What, then, was the situation "as it existed," and what, with reference to this matter, "was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body"?

It appears from the record that at the time of the enactment of the tariff act of August 5, 1909, the attention of the Congress was called to the fact that caviar was not specifically provided for in any of the provisions of the tariff act of 1897, and that it had been held by the court in Menzel v. United States (142 Fed. Rep., 1038; T. D. 27118), February 1, 1906, that when imported in tin packages it was dutiable by similitude as fish in tin packages at the rate of 30 per cent ad valorem; that that was true also when imported in packages of less than 100 pounds; but when imported in packages of 100 pounds or over it paid a specific duty of three-fourths of 1 cent per pound, the equivalent of eighty-five one-hundredths of 1 per cent.

In the presence of this "situation as it existed," and "the attention of the legislative body" being directed thereto, as indisputably appears by this record, the express provision for caviar in paragraph 270 was inserted in the tariff act of 1909 and became the law.

While this status legally informs the court of facts from which an intention to make caviar dutiable is manifestly shown, that intent alone can not be held to constitute the law unless the language actually employed by Congress to that end legally and fairly effects this manifest intent and purpose. Jones v. Guaranty, etc., Co. (101 U. S., 622, 626); Holy Trinity Church v. United States (143 U. S., 457, 463); Smythe v. Fiske (23 Wall., 374, 380); United States v. Babbit (1 Black., 55, 61); Raymond v. Thomas (91 U. S., 712, 715); Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co., v. Horst (93 U. S., 291, 300); Hawaii v. Mankichi (190 U. S., 197, 212); Postmaster General v. Early et al. (12 Wheat., 135, 152).

That caviar is expressly designated in the dutiable section of the law establishes that it was the intent of Congress to make caviar dutiable, and that being established as the intent of Congress, the inquiry is, Is the language adopted for that purpose sufficient or insuffi- ̈ cient? Has the employment by the Congress in this provision of the words "other preserved" necessarily defeated that intent? We think not.

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There are two well-settled rules of interpretation applicable to the word "other" as used in this statute. The one applies its modifying force to that which precedes it which would include the word caviar; the other applies its modifying force to the subjects following. It is.the duty of the court in such cases to adopt that rule of construction which will give effect to the intention of Congress as ascertained, and not give effect to that rule of interpretation which would defeat the manifest purpose of the lawmakers. Each of these rules of application is supported by abundant authority, but the principle determining which and when each shall be applicable according to the ascertained intent of the lawmakers is a well-settled and uniform rule. Thus, in United States v. Cohn (2 Ind. Ter., 474, 493, 494), the United States Court of Appeals had before it for construction the words "other intoxicating drinks" in an act of Congress prohibiting the sale of any "vinous, malt, or fermented liquor or of any other intoxicating drinks whatsoever." The court stated:

It is contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that the words "and other intoxicating drinks," used after the language prohibiting the manufacture, sale, giving away, etc., of any vinous, malt, or fermented liquors, are to be taken as words limiting and explaining the meaning of those words which precede them to be that the articles thus named are intoxicating also. We think that this is not necessarily the only construction that can be given to the words. We have already seen that the legislature, in the exercise of the police powers of the Government, may, acting upon a subject within its powers, designate even a harmless article as being hurtful, and that such designation is binding on the courts. So in this case we think that the statute is subject to the construction that Congress intended to say that vinous, malt, and fermented liquors were intoxicating, and then, because a large class of intoxicants such as whiskies, brandies, gin, and all other ardent and spirituous liquors had not been named in the statute, the words "all other intoxicating liquors" were intended to cover them. And whatever may be the exact grammatical construction of the language courts are not always bound to follow it. If by other methods allowed by the law it can be determined that Congress otherwise intended, the court will give such construction to the statute by lawful methods it may find Congress actually intended. The intent of the statute is law.

So the Supreme Court of the State of Massachusetts, in the case of Hubbard v. City of Taunton (140 Mass., 467), having before it for interpretation the phrase "for armories, for the celebration of holidays, and for other public purposes," said:

The word "other" implies that the celebration of holidays is a public purpose within the meaning of the act, and indicates that purposes which are public only in that sense are included within its scope, although they look rather more obviously to increasing the picturesqueness and interest of life than to the satisfaction of rudimentary wants, which alone we generally recognize as necessary. We know of no simple and merely logical test by which the limit can be fixed. It must be determined by practical considerations. The question is one of degree. But, in reply to the petitioner's argument, we may say that, if the purpose is within the act, we do not see why the city council may not create the occasion. Taking into account the history and language of the act, the safeguards attached to the exercise of the power, the smallness

of the sum allowed to be expended, and the fact that it has long been assumed to be within the power of cities to give such concerts in the open air, we are not prepared to say that a case is presented for an injunction.

The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, in Kelly v. People (132 Ill., 363), applied the rule in a criminal case wherein the language of the statute was "larceny or any other felony," declaring:

We therefore conclude that the words "or other felony," in section 23, were intended to designate such other offenses besides murder, rape, mayhem, robbery, and larceny as amount to felonies, and that they were not intended to limit the offense of assault with intent to commit larceny to assault with intent to commit that higher grade of larceny which is defined to be felony.

The doctrine was announced by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin in a similar criminal statute speaking of larceny "or other felony," the court stating:

We are unable to give the statute the construction contended for. The statute must be read as though instead of the words "or other felony” it had been written "or any other offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable, by law, to be punished by imprisonment in the State prison." (Nichols v. The State, 35 Wis., 308.) We think the term "or other felony" is not a limitation on what preceded, but is inserted to extend the scope of the section to other offenses not specifically named therein. Thus, an intent to commit arson or mayhem or to inflict upon some person great bodily harm, and doubtless other offenses, are brought within the section by the use of that term.

The application of the doctrine, as justified by the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, is properly applicable to customs revenue cases to give effect to the manifest intent of the Congress by the use of such phrases by way of extension.

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Whether the word "preserved" before the word "other" takes import from the word "caviar" as following and influenced by that word is not here necessary of decision. The whole sentence might be held a legislative determination that that which constitutes preserved roe of fish" shall be deemed to be a condition of fish roe resembling conditions or degrees of preservation represented by caviar. Nor do we deem it necessary to consider whether or not the status or degree of preservation of "preserved roe of fish" following the word "caviar" legislatively fixes the status or degree of preservation of caviar in order to bring it within the statute. Without deciding or giving weight to any of these latter suggestions we think the unmistakable intent of the Congress was to make all caviar dutiable at 30 per cent ad valorem, and since that intent can be made effective by applying the well-settled rule of interpretation in the manner considered to the language here employed by Congress it is our duty to so do. It follows that the Board of General Appraisers erred in its conclusion.

The decision of the Board of General Appraisers is therefore reversed.'

RHODES v. UNITED STATES (No. 585).1

DIRECT SHIPMENT FROM THE PHILIPPINES.

The importation was of sponges, and these, it appears, were dispatched, freight prepaid, from Zamboanga via Hongkong and Tacoma, Wash., to Chicago. They were delivered by the agents on board a vessel lying in or off the port of Hongkong. The evidence to this effect makes a prima facie showing that the goods were shipped direct, and there being no evidence to show there was any delay in the course of the shipment, the consignment was entitled to free entry under section 5, tariff act of 1909, governing articles the growth or product of the Philippine Islands.-United States v. United Cigar Stores Co. (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 450; T. D. 31505).

United States Court of Customs Appeals, May 22, 1911.

APPEAL from Board of United States General Appraisers, Abstract 24523 (T. D. 31182). [Reversed.]

Lester C. Childs for appellant.

D. Frank Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, for the United States.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, DE VRIES, and MARTIN, Judges. MONTGOMERY, Presiding Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The importation in question consisted of 33 bales of sponges shipped to James H. Rhodes & Co., at Chicago, Ill., from Zamboanga, Moro Province, P. I., via Hongkong and Tacoma, Wash., per steamer Changsha.

The goods were assessed for duty at 20 per cent ad valorem and are claimed to be free of duty under section 5 of the act of August 5, 1909, as "articles the growth or product of * * * the Philippine Islands," and that they come within the proviso of that section, which reads as follows:

And provided further, That the free admission, herein provided of such articles the growth, product, or manufacture of the United States, into the Philippine Islands, or of the growth, product, or manufacture, as herein before defined, of the Philippine Islands into the United States, shall be conditioned upon the direct shipment thereof from the country of origin to the country of destination.

The board overruled the protest on the ground that the direct shipment from Zamboanga to Chicago with transshipment at Hongkong was not proved. The basis of this ruling was that certificate of origin was deemed by the board to have been too late, as it was made long after the importation. But it bears date the 27th of September, 1909, and as the shipment had been made before that date, and as the certificate of origin was made almost immediately after the regulation requiring it was prescribed, we think this criticism is not justified.

The case is therefore not distinguishable from United States v. United Cigar Stores Co. (1 Ct. Cust. Appls., 450; T. D. 31505), if there is evidence in the record which justifies us in holding that the goods were shipped by vessel to be transshipped at Hongkong and were there transshipped.

1 Reported in T. D. 31637 (20 Treas. Dec., 1113).

The consular invoice states that the goods were sold to the consignees and dispatched from Zamboanga via Hongkong and Tacoma, Wash., per steamship Changsha. At Hongkong the bill of lading shows, "Shipped or delivered for shipment in apparent good order by Butterfield & Swire, as agents, on board the steamship Ning-chow, lying in or off the port of Hongkong * * *"" the goods in question, "ex Changsha a Zamboanga," and notes "Freight paid in Zamboanga."

We think this sufficient prima facie to show that the goods were shipped direct and without any intention of delaying shipment in the port of Hongkong, and there is nothing in the record to show that they were so delayed. The case falls within United States v. United Cigar Stores Co., supra.

The decision of the Board of General Appraisers is reversed.

UNITED STATES V. HARPER (No. 482).1

FANS COMPOSED OF WOOD AND SILK.

The principle is recognized that, when it clearly appears from the language and context of a proviso it is intended to apply to other subjects than those stated in the paragraph of which it is a part or that it is intended to apply generally to other parts of an act, the proviso must, so far as possible, be given full effect; but this principle will not be applied ex industria to bring an article within the operation of the proviso. Each case must be determined on the facts of that case; and though the question here is not entirely free from doubt, resolving this doubt, as is proper, in the importer's favor, fans composed of silk and wood and embroidered with silk were dutiable under paragraph 427, tariff act of 1897, which specifically names for duty "fans of all kinds, except common palm leaf fans."-Lai Ming v. United States (T. D. 30770) distinguished.

United States Court of Customs Appeals, May 29, 1911.

APPEAL from United States Circuit Court, Northern District of California, G. A. 5235 (T. D. 24073).

[Affirmed.]

D. Frank Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Martin T. Baldwin on the brief), for the United States.

Stanley Jackson for the appellee.

Before MONTGOMERY, SMITH, BARBER, and MARTIN, Judges.

BARBER, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue here is whether fans composed of wood and silk, and embroidered with silk, are dutiable at the rate of 50 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 427 of the tariff act of July 24, 1897, which reads as follows:

427. Fans of all kinds, except common palm leaf fans, fifty per centum ad valorem. or at the rate of 60 per cent ad valorem under the provisions of paragraphs 390 and 339 of the same act, the pertinent parts of which are as follows:

390. Laces, * * embroideries and articles embroidered by hand or machinery, * * * all of the above-named articles made of silk, or of which silk is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for in this Act, sixty per centum ad valorem:

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1 Reported in T. D. 31655 (20 Treas. Dec., 1155).

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