357, ch. 291. Ohio: Laws 1902, p. 96, H. B. 334. Oklahoma: Sess. Laws 1903, p. 249, ch. 30, Oregon: B. & C. Comp. p. 1479, ch. 7. Tennessee: Acts 1901, p. 234, ch. 133. Utah: Laws 1901, p. 67, ch. 67. Virginia: Act approved January 2, 1904: Acts 1902-04, p. 884, ch. 554 (Va. Code 1904, p. 1217, § 2460a). Washington: Laws 1901, p. 222, ch. 109. Wisconsin: Laws 1901, p. 684, ch. 463. A statute with the same object attained by a similar remedy has been held valid by the highest courts in Massachusetts, Connecticut, Tennessee and Washington. J. P. Squires & Co. v. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18, 69 N. E. Rep. 312, 102 Am. St. Rep. 322; Walp v. Mooar, 76 Conn. 515, 57 Atl. Rep. 277: Neas v. Borches, 109 Tenn. 398, 71 S. W. Rep. 50, 97 Am. St. Rep. 851; McDaniels v. J. J. Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. Rep. 37, 60 L. R. A. 947, 94 Am. St. Rep. 889. An act declaring such sales presumptively fraudulent was assumed to be valid by the courts of last resort in Wisconsin and Maryland. Fisher v. Herrmann, 118 Wis. 424, 95 N. W. Rep. 392; Hart v. Roney, 93 Md. 432, 49 Atl. Rep. 661. On the other hand, a statute with more exacting conditions was held unconstitutional in Ohio (Miller v. Crawford, 70 Ohio, 207, 71 N. E. Rep. 631), and a similar act met the same fate in Utah, where a violation of the statute was made a crime. Block v. Schwartz, 27 Utah, 387, 76 Pac. Rep. 22. The weight of authority, thus far announced, is in favor of the validity of such legislation. The general grounds upon which it has been sustained are well illustrated by the following extract from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts: 'A purchaser, to be safe, has only to see that the vendor's creditors are provided for. The vendor may sell freely, without regard to the statute, if he pays his debts. The legislature, when contemplating this legislation, had occasion to consider and balance against each other the general right of property owners to make contracts and dispose of their property and the general right of creditors to be paid and to have reasonable opportunities secured to them for the collection of their debts. That this is within a class of legislation for which there is constitutional authority is too plain for question. The object of it is like that of our numerous statutory provisions which authorize attachments on mesne process and establish courts with all the necessary machinery for the collection of debts. The statute requires of the vendor nothing that cannot be done with reasonable effort. If he is unable or unwilling to pay his debts, it puts a substantial obstacle in his way when he wants to dispose of his stock of merchandise in bulk and to receive payment for himself. But, under such circumstances, the property in most cases ought not to be sold in bulk without first giving creditors an opportunity to consider what ought to be done with it.' J. P. Squires & Co. v. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18, 20.

The question before us is one of power, not of policy. Courts may pass upon the power of the legislature, but not upon its policy. Statutes, whether wise or unwise, are equally binding upon us, provided no provision of either constitution is molested. According to the general rule, unless there is a plain conflict between a statute and the constitution, the statute stands, for every presumption is in its favor. The respect due to a co-ordinate branch of the government will not permit mere judicial doubt to undermine a statute, for there must be clear judicial conviction that it violates the constitution before the courts can set it aside. The legislature, with all the power of legislation there is, may pass any law upon any subject, unless it is expressly or impliedly for

bidden by the supreme law of the state or of the United States. There is a power beneath the constitution, but not superior to it, unwritten, not fully defined, necessary, resting on the sovereignty of the state, which exists because the state cannot exist without it, and which must be considered in connection with the constitution. That power, known as the 'police power,' aims to promote the public welfare by compulsion and restraint, and it is under the exclusive control of the legislature. The executive department can exert it only as authorized by the legislature. The courts can neither exercise it, nor prevent its exercise, but they can determine whether a statute is a constitutional use of the power. We cannot overturn a statute because we do not like it; for our likes and dislikes affect us as citizens, not as judges. We greatly prefer the amended act to the original, because, although effective, it is not so harsh; but that has nothing to do with the validity of either.

Starting always with the presumption that the statute, although challenged, is valid, we study it in connection with the constitution, to see whether there is such a conflict as to divest the legislature of jurisdiction. If purporting to be passed in the exercise of the police power, we endeavor to see, first, whether there was an evil to be remedied, and, second, whether the remedy prescribed is 'calculated, intended, convenient, or appropriate' to suppress it, and not designed to trespass upon personal rights 'under the guise of a police regulation.' If 'the act has a fair, just, and reasonable relation to the general welfare,' it may so regulate the 'conduct of an individual and the use of property' as to 'interfere to some extent with the freedom of the one and the enjoyment of the other.' If it violates no express command of the constitution, and tends 'in a degree that is perceptible and clear towards the preservation of the lives, the health, the morals, or the welfare of the community, as those words have been used and construed in many cases heretofore decided,' and is not passed ostensibly in favor of the promotion of some such object, while really it is an evasion thereof and for a distinct and totally different purpose,' it comes within the jurisdiction of the legislature, and the courts are bound to sustain it. The police power cannot be arbitrarily exercised, so as to deprive the citizen of his liberty or property, but a statute does not work such a deprivation, in the constitutional sense, simply because it imposes burdens or abridges freedom of action, or regulates occupations, or subjects individuals or property to restraints in matters indifferent, except as they affect public interests or the rights of others. Legislation under the police power infringes the constitutional guaranty only when it is extended to subjects not within its scope and purview, as that power was defined and understood when the constitution was adopted.' Liberty under the constitution does not mean natural liberty, or the right to act as one pleases, subject only to the laws of nature: for society cannot exist on that basis. Constitutional liberty is the right to act without restraint upon person or property, except such as is necessary or expedient for the general advantage of the pulic. Matter of Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 2 N. E. Rep. 29, 52 Am. Rep. 34; People v. Arensberg, 105 N. Y. 123, 11 N. E. Rep. 277, 59 Am. Rep. 483; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. Rep. 343, 4 Am. St. Rep. 465; People v. Budd, 117 N. Y. 1, 22 N. E. Rep. 670, 682, 5 L. R. A. 559, 15 Am. St. Rep. 460; Health Dept. of New York v. Rector, etc., Trinity

Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. Rep. 833, 45 Am. St. Rep. 579; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. Ed. 394; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, 28 L. Ed. 923; Gas Co. v. Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252, 29 L. Ed. 516.

The legislation under consideration was intended to suppress a deep-seated evil, common in sales of a certain kind. The existence of the evil is admitted, and the right of the legislature to provide a remedy is also admitted; but it is insisted that the remedy provided is so unreasonable that it violates the primary guaranties of the constitution. The same claim was made when a maximum price was fixed for doing a certain kind of work; but it was rejected, because the work was done in a business affected with a public interest. People v. Budd, supra. The same position was taken when one state absolutely prohibited sales on margain and another options to buy or sell at a future time, contracts which were previously valid; but both provisions were sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, because they tended to prevent gambling. Booth v. Illinois, supra, and Otis v. Parker, supra. While many contracts of the kind prohibited were free from wrong, as so many were made for the purpose of gambling, all were swept away, the good and the bad alike. Is gambling a worse evil than fraud? Does it affect commerce more seriously? Is freedom of contract interfered with more by requiring notice to creditors before certain sales are made than by forbidding certain other sales altogether? The statute is intended to interfere only with those who buy and sell in bad faith toward the creditors of the vendor. It doubtless interferes with some who act in good faith, but so do the other statutes referred to. In order to prevent injustice and fraud, legislation for time out of mind has placed some restraint upon commercial transactions, and where the legislature has jurisdiction to act the method of suppressing the evil is wholly within its sound discretion.

The right to pass laws to prevent fraud being conceded, what principle is to guide us in drawing a line to separate the act before us from those considered in the cases cited! How can we declare this statute void and the others valid? It has no ulterior purpose. No attempt is made to protect some favored interest from injurious competition. Its object is not, as in the Gillson Case, to interfere with a lawful business, but to prevent one man from keeping property which equitably belongs to others. It seeks to maintain justice, which is one of the leading features of the public welfare. The protection of creditors has always been a primary function in the administration of justice. Why should the constitution require courts to be maintained to punish fraud and yet deprive the legislature of power to prevent fraud by requiring notice to a class apt to be defrauded? As it is known that dishonest merchants abuse freedom of contract by secretly selling out in such a way as to defeat the claims of creditors, may not the legislature surround the right with some safeguards, such as an inventory and notice thereof? When the end sought is within the domain of legislation, and the form of the remedy proposed is fairly adapted to that end, the courts have no power to interfere. When jurisdiction exists, the details are within the exclusive control of the legislature. While a merchant, owing debts, has an absolute constitutional right to sell his stock of goods, he may properly be required to do something for the protection of his creditors, and what he shall do is for the legislature to prescribe. With power to act upon the subject, it may pass a foolish statute or a wise one;

and we cannot overturn the one unless we can the other. It is only when there is a want of power to legislate that the courts can declare a statute void.

It is insisted, and the argument is not without force, that while the provisions of the act, so far as they relate to the vendor, may be valid, the restraint upon the purchaser is so severe as to impinge on the right of liberty and property. What is required of the purchaser? To some extent he must look after the interests of creditors, if there are any. He must either see that they are paid or notify them in advance of what is to be sold, the price paid and to be paid, and must ask the seller who his creditors are. If there are no creditors, the statute does not apply. If the inquiry, when carefully made, discloses no creditors, and the purchaser knows of none, he may buy in safety without the inconvenience of inventory or notice. If there are creditors, the risk is in proportion to the amount of their claims, and, whether it is large or small, they bave rights which need protection from a sale made in bad faith; and it is at such sales that the statute strikes. The purchaser may be buying property in which the seller has less real interest than his creditors, and it is reasonable to charge both seller and purchaser with the exercise of some care toward them, in the interest of justice and the general welfare. The inconvenience to purchasers is an evil, as it hampers commerce to some extent: but the injury to commerce from fraudulent sales is a much greater evil, so that on the whole commerce is not harmed, but helped. The legislature had the right to balance these evils, and to promote the common good by trying to do away with the greater. The everyday business of the seller and buyer is not touched, for that is outside of the statute; but when an extraordinary sale is made, such as can occur but few times in the life of a merchant, certain conditions and restraints are imposed, not to hamper business, but to prevent secret sales in bulk of property usually bought on credit and generally unpaid for when the sale is made. The remedy provided tends to furnish the protection needed by creditors, without any interference whatever with ordinary business, and without disturbing freedom of contract in the rare and irregular cases to which the act applies any more than was within the power of the legislature according to the principles laid down by repeated adjudications in this court and in the Supreme Court of the United States. Purchasers who complain of the act as a violation of their constitutional rights are themselves protected by legislation equally drastic; for they could not purchase in safety, were it not for the acts in relation to chattel mortgages and conditional sales. They might purchase and pay in good faith, and yet have the property taken away from them under a lien they knew nothing about and which they could not discover. As the legislature passed these acts, it can repeal them; and in that event purchasers, however careful, might not get a good title, while now, even with the act under consideration in full force, they can get a good title if they only take pains. They cannot, therefore, consistently object to such a statute. They cannot in fairness assert that interference with an unlimited right of contract is constitutional when it operates in their favor, but unconstitutional when it operates in favor of creditors and against themselves.

It is also claimed that an unreasonable burden is imposed upon a limited class of debtors for the benefit of a limited class, consisting of their creditors. A statute which is uniform in its effect upon all persons o whom it applies is not invalid because it applies to

a limited number. This act applies to all the people of the state who carry on a certain kind of business which presents special temptations and opportunities for the commission of fraud. The classification is not arbitrary, but is founded on a 'reasonable and just difference between the persons affected and all others.' The difference is seen in the nature of a business conducted largely on credit, which, as shown by the records of our courts, furnishes peculiar facilities for the perpetration of a characteristic fraud. As was by said Mr. Justice Brewer in a late case: 'It is within the undoubted power of the government to restrain some individuals from all contracts as well as all individuals from some contracts.' Frisbie v. United States, 157 U. S. 160, 165, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 586, 588, 39 L. Ed. 657. And by Mr. Justice Field in an earlier case: 'Special burdens burdens are often necessary for general benefits. *** Regulations for these purposes may press with more or less weight upon one than upon another, but they are designed not to impose unequal or unnecessary restrictions upon any one, but to promote, with as little individual inconvenience as possible, the general good. Though in many respects necessarily special in their character, they do not furnish just ground of complaint if they operate alike upon all persons and property under the same circumstances and conditions." Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 31, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, 359, 360, 28 L. Ed. 923. The discriminations which are open to objection are those where persons engaged in the same business are subjected to different restrictions or are held entitled to different privileges under the same conditions.' Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 709, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730, 733, 28 L. Ed. 1145. The constitution means 'that no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and under like circumstances.' Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. Ed. 989; Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673, 678, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179, 181, 40 L. Ed. 391.

I close my review by repeating as applicable generally to the case before us the words of the Supreme Court of the United States in a decision of great importance: "The power which the legislature has to promote the general welfare is very great, and the discretion which that department of the government has in the employment of means to that end is very large. While both its power and its discretion must be so exercised as not to impair the fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, * * yet in many cases of mere administration the responsibility is purely political; no appeal lying except to the ultimate tribunal of the public judgment, exercised either in the pressure of public opinion or by means of the suffrage.' Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 685, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 992, 996, 32 L. Ed. 253, citing Yick Wov. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 370, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220."

CORRESPONDENCE.

JURISDICTION OF SUITS AGAINST A FOREIGN CORPORATION BY NON-RESIDENTS ON CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING IN ANOTHER STATE.

Editor of the Central Law Journal:

May I take the liberty, in the interests of jurisprudence, cf saying a word in regard to the note in your issue of March 17th, 1905 (Vol. 60, No. 11, p. 211),

commenting on the decision in Reaves v. Southern Ry. Co., Supreme Court of Georgia (decided January 27th, 1905), 60 Cent. L. J., p. 209? The head note is, "Note-Jurisdiction of Suits Against a Foreign Corporation by Non-Residents on Causes of Action Arising in Another State."

I would not, in an ordinary case, make any comment on an editorial note of your valuable journal, but it is because your influence is so great and farreaching, that I ask whether you have not inadvertently been led into error? I have recently had a case in the Supreme Court of Louisiana in which I had occasion to refer to Cooper v. Ferguson, 113 U. S. 727, 739 (28 Lawyers' Edition 1137, bottom paging), where it was held that the making, in Colorado, of a contract by an Ohio corporation, whereby it agreed to build and deliver, in Ohio, machinery which the Colorado party agreed to pay for, did not constitute a carrying on of business in Colorado.

In this case it is clearly set forth, especially in the concurring opinions, that Colorado, by her constitution and laws, could not authorize by substituted service the impleadment of a foreign corporation, on a cause of action which arose in another state, where the contract was to be executed, and that the enactments of Colorado, if so construed, would be in violation of the interstate commerce clause of the constitution of the United States. The reasoning, of course, did not apply to insurance contracts.

We are all to liable to err, but as far as I can judge, the Georgia decision, and the note in your journal are in conflict with the decision in Cooper v. Ferguson, which has been recognized and followed in states, the decisions being referred to in United States Supreme Court Reports (Lawyers' Edition, Vol. 28, p. 1137), being Rose's notes on said decision.

Will you kindly let me know at your convenience, why no reference is made to the case of Cooper v. Ferguson, in your note above referred to?

New Orleans, La.

S. S. PRENTISS.

[We thank our correspondent for his kind words of appreciation and have given careful attention to his criticism of our position in the annotation referred to. We acknowledge that there are two sides to this controversy as there are to so many questions of jurisprudence, but after a careful re-examination of the question referred to in his criticism, we are not yet convinced that our position in the aforesaid annotation is untenable.

The simple question is, "Can a foreign corporation be sued in a state other than that of its incorporation by a non-resident of the state where suit is commenced?" Suppose, for instance, a corporation in Chicago which has an office in St. Louis makes a contract with a man in Arkansas. Can the man in Arkansas sue the Chicago corporation in St. Louis? The affirmative of this proposition is the one we maintained and cited cases to show that it is sustained by the weight of authority. We cannot see where the state of Missouri in permitting a citizen of Arkansas to sue a Chicago corporation in its courts violates any right of congress in its exclusive control of interstate commerce. The only point decided in the Cooper case, cited by our correspondent, is that a foreign corporation cannot be said to be "carrying on business" in another state where it contracts to sell to a citizen of such state a single article of commerce; and that, therefore, the failure of such corporation to take out a license in such state did not prohibit it from suing to recover on the contract it had made. To so prohibit it would have been an interference

with interstate commerce. It can hardly be contended that this is an authority for saying that a foreign corporation cannot be impleaded in a foreign state by a non-resident of such state, provided such nonresident obtains proper service on the corporation, either by serving a proper officer of the corporation, as he is passing through the state or by service on some agent of the corporation, duly authorized by the corporation to accept service of process. Jurisdiction is merely a question of finding; and what is true of personal defendants should also be true of corporation defendants. It is true the earlier authorities did not permit a foreign corporation to be sued outside the jurisdiction which incorporated it, but modern commercial enterprises centering so largely in the corporation form of doing business, makes it a practical necessity to extend the rule and compel corporation defendants to be subject to the same rules as personal defendants, so far as regards the question of service of process. If a corporation does not want to be sued in a foreign state, let it keep out of that state. Of course, a state cannot authorize the impleadment of a corporation on substituted service, except possibly, as to property having a situs in such state, but service on the president of a corporation as he is passing through a state or service on an agent duly appointed to accept service of process is not substituted service. Nor is there any good reason for denying to non-residents of a state the same privileges as to the commencement of actions against foreign corporations, that are permitted to resident plaintiffs. The question, however, is a new question, and the decisions are conflicting, so that it cannot be said that we have uttered the last word as to its final and proper solution. Editor].

BOOK REVIEW.

COOLEY'S BRIEFS ON INSURANCE.

Not since we examined for review the recent work of Prof. Wigmore on the Law of Evidence has our examination of any recently published law text book been so great a delight, as our perusal of the recent work of Mr. Roger W. Cooley, entitled "Briefs on the Law of Insurance." What is specially attractive about this new work is its novelty of arrangements, the freshness and peculiar clearness of its style and its absolute accuracy of statement and citation. A word first as to its arrangements. It is not a treatise in the ordinary acceptation of that term. It is, as its name implies, a series of briefs on all the important and difficult questions of the law of insurance, arranged in a logical sequence as to subject-matter. The thing that distinguishes this form of law text book from the ordinary kind is, that while it discusses every case from original principle, it wastes not space nor time in the study of purely academic and historical features of the law. It also avoids long dis cussions of elementary principles and presumes that the lawyer is fully acquainted with such principles. It is evident from this brief statement that this work is prepared rather for the active practitioner than for the law student. Its five volumes of careful text and exhaustive citation of authorities is not padded and wasted with the discussion of questions which no lawyer in the course of an active practice would have occasion to investigate. It is rather a series of briefs on live topics of the law, minutely subdivided, and each minute subdivision so exhaustively treated as to be

a complete brief on that particular point. Herein lies the greatest value of this new work. The second point of excellence to be observed is its freshness and peculiar clearness of style. There is an absence of all the usual conventionalities of legal diction; the style is rather that of the advocate than the judge. It is not ponderous, but rather has a sharpness and zest that enables it to engage the attention of the reader while it thrusts in deep and firm the point it seeks to prove. There is no ambiguity. To fail to understand the style of this work is to acknowledge incompetency to understand the English language. The third point of superiority, to which we have already called attention, is the accuracy with which the author carefully frames the statements of his general principles of law and its absolute exhaustiveness and accuracy of citation. In every legal text book both these points are always of supreme importance. One without the other detracts seriously from the merits of the work from a practitioner's standpoint. A legal work on which a practitioner is expected to rely, must have all the cases in order to give the attorney complete confidence. But of even greater importance is it that the citations should be accurate. There have been many law books whose authors have prided themselves on the fact that they cited so many thousands of citations more than any other work, without at the same time offering a guarantee to the profession that every citation is directly in point. Of what value is a hundred cases cited to a given proposition, when the first one examined is found to be undecisive of the point of law to which it applies and the confidence of the practitioner is shaken in the rest of the 99 citations. On this point, however, the author of the work under review offers the following guarantee: "There has been a conscientious endeavor to exhaust the cases. To this end not only have the cases cited by the courts in their opinions been examined to determine the origin of the principle or exception, but the subsequent history of each case has been traced by means of tables of cases cited, distinguished and overruled. Great care has been exercised to cite only cases which are directly in point with the proposition under consideration. Instead of relying on the citations of the text books, cyclopedias or digests, the author has satisfied himself by careful examination and analysis of the opinions, that each case cited to a proposition involves the particular principle under discussion." Altogether, our examination of every feature of this work has convinced us that it is the greatest and most important work on the subject of insurance ever published, and as such we commend it to the profession.

Printed in five large volumes, bound in law sheep and published by the West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minu.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Cases on Quasi-Contracts. Edited with Notes and References. By James Brown Scott, Professor of Law in Columbia University. New York. Baker, Voorhis & Company, 1905. Canvas, pp. 788. Price $3.50. Review will follow.

An Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence, Illustrated by Numerous Cases, by the Late William Wills, Esq., Justice of the Peace. Edited by his son, Sir Alfred Wills, Knt., one of his Majesty's Judges of the High Court of Justice. Fifth English

Edition (1902). With American Notes, by George E. Beers, of the New Haven Bar, of the Faculty o the Yale Law School; and Arthur L. Corbin, of the Faculty of the Yale Law School. Boston, Mass. The Boston Book Company, Law Publishers, 1905 Sheep, pp. 461. Price $5.00. Review will follow.

HUMOR OF THE LAW.

When Senator "Joe" Blackburn went into the office of a celebrated lawyer of Kentucky to study law he was surprised by the absence of a library.

"Where's the library?" he asked.

"Now, Joe, if you want to study law don't begin by asking questions," the old lawyer told him. "There isn't any library. You see that book. That's the statutes of Kentucky and it's all the library any lawyer needs. Don't get a library if you want to become a lawyer; it will only worry you."

"I've found that advice was the best I ever received, too," the Senator added.

UNITED STATES D. C..

WASHINGTON......

1. ABATEMENT AND

4, 15, 17, 19, 37, 92, 140, 141, 142 4, 10, 33, 78, 103, 104, 106, 118 REVIVAL-Time for Revival.Under Kirby's Dig., §§ 6314, 6315, where more than a year has elapsed since the order to revive might have first been made a motion to dismiss the appeal must be sustained.-Anglin v. Cravens, Ark., 88 S. W. Rep. 833.

2. ABSENTEES-Jurisdiction -The mere fact that, in an action against two defendants domiciled beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court of first instance, jurisdiction is acquired as to one, held not to authorize the bringing of the other into court by the appointment and motion of a curator ad hoc.-West v. Lehmer, La., 38 So. Rep. 969.

3. ABSENTEES-Seizure of Property.-Absentees can be brought into court on a demand for a money judgment only by an actual seizure of property in the suit in which the demand is made.-Levy v. Collins, La., 38 So. Rep. 966.

4. ACTION-Misjoinder of Causes.-The husband's right of action for funeral expenses paid by him on the wrongful death of his wife cannot be joined with an action on behalf of the minor child of the husband and wife for the death of his mother. -Johnson v. Seattle Electric Co., Wash., 81 Pac. Rep. 705.

5. ADVERSE POSSESSION-Unincorporated Religious Society. Where an unincorporated religious society had claimed and occupied land in controversy for more than 30 years, it would be presumed that the lost deed, under which it claimed title, conveyed the land to trustees for the society's benefit.-Penny v. Central Coal & Coke Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 138 Fed. Rep. 769.

Where

6. APPEAL AND ERROR-Bill of Exceptions. charges are copied in the reord, but neither the charges nor rulings thereon are shown by the bill of exceptions, the court's action upon the charges cannot be reviewed.-Milner Coal & R. Co. v. Wiggins, Ala., 38 So. Rep. 1010.

7. APPEAL AND ERROR-Failure to Give Instructions.Complaint cannot be made of a failure to give instructions on the burden of proof and credibility of witnesses, when no request was made therefor.-Carpenter v. Jones, Ark., 88 S. W. Rep. 871.

8. APPEAL AND ERROR-Record.-On appeal from a judgment without a statement or bill of exceptions, nothing belongs to the record outside of the judgment roll.-Williams v. Boise Basin Mining & Development Co., Idaho, 74 N. E. Rep. 646.

9. APPEAL AND ERROR-Right of Appeal.-No appeal can be prosecuted, unless such right is shown by statute. -Cain v. State, Ind., 74 N. E. Rep. 1102.

10. APPEAL AND ERROR-Trial De Novo.-A suit in equity is before the supreme court on appeal for examination de novo.-Mack v. Mack, Wash., 81 Pac. Rep. 707.

11. ATTACHMENT-Redelivery Bond.-Where a redelivery bond in attachment was executed to the receiver of a corporation, his successors and assigns, a termination of the receivership did not discharge the surety from liability on the bond.-American Surety Co. v. Campbell & Zell Co., U. S. C. C. of App., First Circuit, 138 Fed. Rep. 531.

12. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-Compensation.-In an action on an alleged contract to give plaintiffs certain stock in payment for legal services, any error in permitting recovery on the basis of a certain capitalization held harmless as to defendant.-Werner v. Knowlton, 94 N. Y. Supp. 1054.

13. BANKRUPTCY - Buildings on Leased Ground. Where a bankrupt constructed an addition to a building on leased ground, whether the building was a fixture as against the landlord could not be determined, in advance of a sale of the bankrupt's assets and an attempt to sever.-In re Gorwood, U. S. D. C., M. D. Pa., 138 Fed. Rep. 844.

14. BANKRUPTCY-Discharge.-Under Bankr. Act 1898, ch. 541, § 7, a bankrupt held absolutely required to attend the hearing of objections to his application for a discharge before the referee on the demand of the objecting creditors.-In re Shanker, U. S. D. C., M. D. Pa., 138 Fed. Rep. 862.

15. BANKRUPTCY-Legal Services Where Trustee is an Attorney.-A trustee of a bankrupt, though an attorney, is not bound to perform legal services; but, if he does so, he cannot have additional compensation therefor from the estate.-In re McKenna, U. S. D. C., N. D. N. Y., 137 Fed. Rep. 611.

16. BANKRUPTCY-Mortgaged Property.-A bankrupt's trustee held entitled to refuse to take possession of mortgaged property, if its value did not exceed the lien, or sell the same for the benfit of general creditors after satisfying such lien.-In re Jersey Island Packing Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Ninth Circuit, 138 Fed. Rep. 625.

17. BANKRUPTCY-Petition to Review Order of Distribution.-A petition of a creditor to review a referee's