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of their natural result are obnoxious to public policy, or which, in themselves, are by necessary effect inimical to the public welfare. Practically the same construction has been placed upon the anti-trust laws of other states which, though clothed in different verbiage contain substantially the same ideas, and are designed to attain the same end. Thus the Supreme Court of Montana in a very recent case in discussing the constitutional and statutory provisions of that state relating to this matter, says: The constitution "deals generally with the rights and powers of corporations and associations of persons exercising any of the powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and their duties and purposes. It is prohibitory and restrictive in its general scope and purpose, the design of the convention in adopting its provisions being to prevent combinations to restrict or repress competition in all industrial pursuits, and to protect the people in general, and the employees of a certain class, against both the legislature and combinations of capital from unjust impositions." And after showing that certain consolidations, such as that of competing railroads, telegraph and telephone companies and the like, are absolutely prohibited "as having a necessary tendency to restrict competition," the court proceeds to a discussion of the anti-trust statute: "Apart from these wholesome restrictions and prohibitions, the right of the people to accumulate property and to hold and enjoy it, either by individual effort or by means of associations of natural or artificial persons, is not restricted. Section 20 prohibits any combination or contract which has a particular purpose, to wit: "fixing the price or regulating the production of any article of commerce, or of the product of the soil, for consumption by the people." The terms "combine" and "form a trust" were evidently intended to be read in connection with the expression "for the purpose, etc., clearly implying that in order to subject offenders to the severe penalties which the legislature might impose, there must be shown a specific intent to do the prohibited act, or that the association or combination necessarily tends to accomplish the same result. That this is the meaning is clear from the enumeration of persons who may not do the prohibited acts. Corporations, stock companies, natural persons or partnerships are all included. If the criminal intent is not a necessary ingredient of the evil denounced, then all sorts of combin

ations are to be deemed prohibited, even ordinary copartnerships, as coming within the letter or the prohibition. For the terms "combine" and "form a trust" are of equal dignity. If the former is to be regarded as modified and explained by the clause "for the purpose," etc., by the same rule must the latter also. The term "trust" is assigned the meaning given to it by the text-writers (Cook on Corporations, Sec. 503 a; Spelling on Trusts, Sec. 121), includes any form of combination between corporations, or corporations and natural persons, for the purpose of regulating production and repressing competition by means of the power thus centralized." And after showing that the term was first used in a narrower sense and applied only to transfer of stock by several corporations to trustees with power to vote, the Court continues: "If it be construed as equivalent to the term "combination" or "consolidation" the meaning of the section is perfectly clear. If used in the sense of the definition given it by the text-writers, it is none the less clear, though it involves a repetition of the same idea, since the definition includes the idea of criminal purpose, and makes it a necessary ingredient of the offense denounced. The section of the statute quoted involves the same idea and demands the same construction, though it is more specific in its provisions, and extends to and includes combinations in restraint of competition in transportation. It denounces every form of combination or contract which has for its purpose, directly or indirectly, the restraint of production or trade in any way or manner, or the control of the price of any article of consumption by the people. It was not the purpose of the convention, or the legislature, to limit either the term used in the Constitution, or in the Statute, by any narrow definition, but to leave it to the courts to look beneath the surface, and, from the methods employed in the conduct of the business, to determine whether the association or combination in question, no matter what its particular form should chance to be, or what might be its constituent elements, is taking advantage of the public in an unlawful way. Harding vs. Am. Glucose Co., 182 Ills. 551. In each case, therefore, under these provisions, the nature of the arrangement or combination is a question of fact to be determined by the Court from the evidence before it, or from the vice which inheres in the contract itself." McGinnis vs. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & Sil

ver Min. Co., 75 P. 94; Ceballos vs. Munson S. S. Line, 93 Hun. 595 and cases cited.

Nor is the rule of construction different when applied to the federal anti-trust statute. "It is now settled (says the Circuit Court of Appeals) by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court that the test of the validity of a contract, combination or conspiracy challenged under the anti-trust law is the direct effect of such a contract or combination upon competition in commerce among the states. If its necessary effect is to stifle competition, or to directly and substantially restrict it, it is void. But if it promotes, or only incidentally or indirectly restricts, competition in commerce among the states, while its main purpose and chief effect are to foster the trade or enhance the business of those who make it, it does not constitute a restraint of interstate commerce within the meaning of that law and is not obnoxious to its provisions. This Act of Congress must have a reasonable construction. It was not its purpose to prohibit or to render illegal the ordinary contracts or combinations of manufacturers, merchants, and traders, or the usual devices to which they resort to promote the success of their business, to enhance their trade, and to make their occupations gainful, so long as those combinations and devices do not necessarily have a direct and substantial effect to restrict competition in commerce among the states." Phillips vs. Iola Portland Cement Co., 125 F. 594.

And for an exhaustive and very lucid discussion of the same subject, in which the same result is reached, see the elaborate opinion in Whitewell vs. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 F. 454, supported by numerous extracts from opinions of the United States Supreme Court.

As the latest authoritative utterance upon this subject we quote from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Northern Securities Company vs. United States, 193 U. S. 43 L. Ed. 698, where among other propositions which it is announced are plainly deducible from previous decisions of that Court, which are reviewed, are the following, which embrace the case at bar:

"That the natural effect of competition is to increase commerce and an agreement whose direct effect is to pre

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vent this play of competition restrains instead of promoting trade and commerce;

"That to vitiate a combination such as the act of congress condemns, it need not be shown that the combination, in fact, results or will result, in a total suppression of trade or in a complete monopoly, but it is only essential to show that, by its necessary operation, it tends to restrain interstate or international trade or commerce or tends to create a monopoly in such trade or commerce and to deprive the public of the advantages that flow from free competition."

Justice Brewer in his concurring opinion in that case, also speaking of the federal anti-trust statute says: "That act as appears from its title was leveled at only unlawful restraints and monopolies." Congress did not intend to reach and destroy those minor contracts in partial restraint of trade which the long course of decisions at common law had affirmed were reasonable and ought to be upheld. The purpose rather was to place a statutory prohibition, with prescribed penalties and remedies, upon those contracts which were in direct restraint of trade, unreasonable and against public policy. Whenever a departure from common law rules and definitions is claimed, the purpose to make the departure should be clearly shown. Such a purpose does not appear, and such a departure was not intended.

Further, the general language of the act is also limited by the power which each individual has to manage his own property and determine the place and manner of its investment. Freedom of action in these respects is among the inalienable rights of every citizen."

By parity of reasoning we think these observations strikingly applicable to our own statute. The object of the federal anti-trust statute is to preserve to the people of the entire nation the benefits arising from competition in business by preventing monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade in regard to commerce among the states; the object of the state legislation is to preserve to the people of the state the identical benefits by preventing monopolies and contracts in restraint of trade in regard to domestic commerce. To vitiate a combination such as the statute con

demns, it is essential to show that by its necessary operation it tends to restrain trade or commerce, or tends to create a monopoly in such trade or commerce, and to deprive the public of the advantages that flow from free competition. The trade or commerce so affected being domestic or interstate or foreign, according to whether the state or federal statute is invoked. But to vitiate the combination the effect must be detrimental to the interests of the public under either statute. An approved statement of the rule is this: "Combination for business purposes is legal. Combinations are beneficial as well as injurious, according to the motives or aims, with which they are formed. It is therefore impossible to prohibit all combinations. The prohibition must rest upon the objectionable character of the objects of the combinations." Tiedeman Limitations Police Power, Sec. 244.

We adopt this announcement as accurate with the additional proviso, that if the effect of the combination be evil, it will be condemned no matter how praiseworthy its object may have been.

We cannot convict the legislature of having intended to prohibit the very many and constantly increasing number of perfectly legitimate contracts or combinations to which the growth of business, or the exigencies of commerce give rise, and which are constantly multiplied by new avenues continually being opened by the thrift, progress and invention of this era of complex business enterprises. Keeping in mind the clear statement before quoted from Insurance Co. vs. State supra, that only such combinations are forbidden as may have the effect of injuring the public or some part thereof, or some corporation or private individual, the meaning of the statute and of the paragraphs particularly in question becomes perfectly plain and the plan inaugurated by the legislature stands out in bold relief in all its details.

With this interpretation of the statute we pass to the consideration of the question whether or not the Louisiana Car Service Association, as disclosed by this record, comes within the condemnation of any of the provisions of the anti-trust law as the same now exists in our state. It is not contended that a car service association does anything to diminish the benefits arising from competition in business