tucky Wagon Co. vs. R. R. Co., 17 S. W. Rep. page 595; Rev. St. of Mo., 1889, Sec. 6806. The motion for a new trial is overruled. I. P. Dana, Attorney for Defendant. CIRCUIT COURT OF COLES COUNTY, ILL., APRIL, 1896. UNREPORTED. FULLER & FULLER VS. CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO & ST. LOUIS RAILWAY CO. The following opinion by Judge F. M. Wright, rendered April 21st, 1896, sustains the right of railroad companies to hold freight for car service charges after allowing forty-eight (48) hours free for unloading. Fuller & Fuller, lumber and coal dealers of Charleston, Illinois, received in July, 1894, and January, 1895, cars 58171 C. C. C. & St. L. and 18460 C. C. C. & St. L., respectively. These cars were placed in the usual manner for unloading and at the expiration of forty-eight (48) hours after arrival, a bill for $1.00 each car service was presented to consignee, who refused payment. In accordance with the rules of the Illinois Car Service Association of which defendant company were members, the cars were then padlocked by the railroad company's agent and held until five ($5.00) and sixteen ($16.00) dollars car service respectively accrued thereon, whereupon consignees replevined the property. The two cases were by consent consolidated and a jury waived. F. K. Dunn, attorney for plaintiffs. Geo. F. McNulty and Neal & Wiley, attorneys for defendant. Judgment for defendant. WRIGHT, J.-The facts in these cases are that the defendant had transported two car loads of hard coal, one of them consigned to the plaintiffs, and the other to the Coles County Coal Company, and afterwards by the Coles County Coal Company transferred to the plaintiffs in Charleston, Illinois. The defendant company had adopted a rule at this station, that after actual notice to the consignee, or his assignee, cars should be unloaded within forty-eight hours after such notice, and upon failure to do so the owner of the property should be subject to a charge of one dollar per day for car service. Plaintiffs were so notified, and failed to comply with such notice, and the defendant thereupon refused to permit them to unload the cars unless such charges were paid, and thereupon plaintiffs replevined the cargo. The question arising under the argument in these cases is whether a railroad company has a lien upon such freight, as is involved in this controversy, for a reasonable charge after an unreasonable delay in unloading the cargo. It is not contended by counsel for plaintiff that the railroad company has not a right to make a reasonable charge for such service, but it is denied that the company has a lien upon the cargo for such charges. Were it not for the decision of the Supreme Court of this State in the Jenkins case, reported in 103 Illinois Reports, the court would have little difficulty in reaching a conclusion. However, the court has arrived at a conclusion which at least is satisfactory to itself. The common law rule in respect to liens is a familiar one, and of wide and varied application. It is a familiar principle of common law that anyone who has bestowed any particular service or care upon any article of property which has been confided to his possession for such purpose, has a lien upon it for any reasonable charge in respect to such service or care. It is difficult to see why the facts in the present case do not call for the application of this familiar principle. It is difficult to imagine why a railroad company having bestowed a care upon property which it is conceded to be entitled to a reasonable charge in that respect should be excepted from the general rule which entitles parties performing such services to a lien upon the property. All, in my judgment, that the Jenkins case determines is, that the consignee is not bound by the rules of the company unless he assents or agrees thereto. This principle is generally true, not only in cases like the present, but in all other cases. It is not denied that the shipper is entitled to a reasonable time to unload the cars before he is subject to any charges. The statute in respect to grain provides that twentyfour hours is a reasonable time. In the cases at bar the rule gives forty-eight hours. It is difficult to see why twenty-four hours in the one case should be a reasonable time and forty-eight hours in the other case should be unreasonable. Therefore, it can hardly be contended that forty-eight hours is an unreasonable time under all the facts and circumstances in the case in view of the express legislative provision in respect to freight which consists of grain. The Legislature has seen proper to pass another statute in this State, which, while it is not upon the express subject involved in these cases, seems to me to have a very pertinent application, and to a certain extent will control the decision of this case. It is the statute relating to unclaimed propery, Chap. 141 of the Revised Statutes. The title of that Act is: "An Act to provide for the sale of personal property by common carriers, warehousemen, innkeepers, and by others having liens thereon." The first section of it, in part, reads as follows: "That whenever any trunk, carpet bag, valise, bundle, package or article of property transported or coming into the possession of any railroad or express company, or any other common carrier, inkeeper or warehouseman or private warehousekeeper, in the course of its, or his business as common carrier, innkeeper, warehouseman or private warehousekeeper shall remain unclaimed and the legal charges thereon unpaid during the space of six months after its arrival at the point to which it shall have been directed, and the owner or person to whom the same is consigned cannot be found, upon diligent inquiry, or being found and notified of the arrival of such article, shall refuse or neglect to receive the same and pay the legal charges thereon for the space of three months, it shall be lawful for such common carrier, warehouseman, innkeeper or private warehousekeeper to sell such article at public auction, after giving such notice as prescribed by the statute." Now, it seems to me that this statute plainly recognizes that railroad companies have a lien upon all personal property transported by them, not only for freights, though that is not the word used by this statute, but for the reasonable charges thereon. It is conceded in these cases that the railroad company has the right to charge for car service after an unreasonable delay on the part of the consignee in unloading the freight. If that be true, then that becomes a legal charge, to the same extent that the freight rate is a legal charge, and this statute, by its title, and by its plain provisions, recognizes that lien and subjects the property, under certain conditions, and after the lapse of a certain time, to be sold to pay those legal charges. This view of the case seems to the court to be more consistent with justice between man and man than the other view of the case contended for, which is, that the railroad company should sue the party for these charges. To recognize a lien existing in favor of a common. carrier is promotive of justice. It avoids litigation, and enables parties to settle these small charges without controversy. The principal object of the rule of the company doubtless is not to secure the small charges made for the use of the cars, but to secure to themselves and to the public the use of the cars. If the courts refused to recognize liens under the facts and circumstances shown in the evidence here, it would not only be a detriment to the railroad company, but it would be disastrous to the public interests in view of the fact that it is necessary both to the railroad company and to the public that the railroad companies at all times have the use of their cars, in order that the public business may be properly transacted. The finding and judgment, therefore, will be for the defendant. CIRCUIT COURT OF ST. LOUIS, MO., JUNE, 1896. NO. 98876. UNREPORTED. THE WABASH R. R. CO. VS. BERRY-HORN COAL CO. This was an action by the Wabash Railroad Company to recover compensation for the detention and use of certain cars by the defendant, to whom the cars loaded with coal were upon consignment delivered by the plaintiff upon defendant's private track at its coal yard in St. Louis. The coal was shipped to be unloaded by the defendant, who was allowed under plaintiff's rules as a reasonable time for unloading, three days or 72 hours on soft coal, two days, or 48 hours on hard coal; counting from 7 a. m. of the next day following the delivery of the cars to the defendant. It was claimed by the plaintiff that it was the defendant's duty to unload the said cars within a reasonable time after delivery. That the time allowed by the car service rules as aforesaid was a reasonable time, and that the defendant having failed to unload said cars within the said time thereby became and was liable to compensate plain |