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copyright of the same book because of alterations or additions apparently was contemplated by section 4959. It says nothing about recopyright, and, instead of a deposit of two copies of the altered work, as required for copyright, requires but one, evidently as a means of identifying it with the original copyrighted book. This view is corroborated by the exception it contains in favor of foreign authors whose books, not copyrightable if published before March 3, 1891, were allowed to be copyrighted if added to or improved after that date. Still, Mr. Justice Clifford at Circuit in the leading case of Lawrence v. Dana, 4 Cliff. 1, Fed. Cas. No. 8,136, while holding that there could be but one copyright, treated subsequent editions with notes or improvements as new books subject to copyright, and held that the notice to be printed in them should be of the date of entry of the improved edition without

any reference to the date of original entry. In that case, which was I for infringement of editions of Wheaton's Elements of International

Law issued in 1836, 1816, 1855, and 1863, it was objected that the contents of the earlier editions had become public property because no notice was given in the later, of the entry for copyright of the earlier, editions. The learned justice said:

“Subsequent editions without alterations or additions should have the same entry, because they find their only protection in the original copyright; but second or subsequent editions, with notes or other improvements, are new books, within the meaning of the copyright acts, and the authors or proprietors of the same are required to 'deposit a printed copy of such book,' and ‘give information of copyright being secured,' as if no prior edition of the work had ever been published; and the term of the copyright as to the notes or improvements is computed from the time of recording the title thereof, and not from the time of recording the title of the original work. Copyrights, like letters patent, afford no protection to what was not in existence at the time when they were granted. Improvements in an invention not made when the original letters patent are issued are not protected by the letters patent, nor are the improvements in a book not made or composed when the printed copy of the book was deposited and the title thereof recorded as required in section 4 of the copyright act. Protection is afforded by virtue of a copyright of a book, if duly granted, to all the matter which the book contained when the printed copy of the same was deposited in the oflice of the clerk of the District Court, as required by section 4 of the copyright act; but new matter made or composed afterwards requires a new copyright, and, if none is taken out, the matter becomes a public property, just as the original book would have become if a copyright for it had never been secured. Publishers may be in the habit of inserting more than one notice in new editions, but there is no act of Congress prescribing any such condition.

"Whenever a renewal is obtained under section 2 of the copyright act, the requirement is that the title of the work so secured shall be a second time recorded, and that the applicant must comply with all the other regulations in regard to original copyrights; but there is nothing in any act of Congress to show that each successive edition must specify the date of the original copy. right, as contended by the respondents. Any tendency to mislead the public cannot be successfully predicated of a copyright in due form of law, where it appears that the party who secured it complied with all the conditions prescribed in the copyright act. This is all that need be remarked in reply to the suggestion of the respondents upon that subject."

This view, obviously more in favor of authors and publishers than of the public, probably caused the practice of the Librarian of Congress to recopyright copyrighted books which have been added to or improved in subsequent editions. Mr. Drone, in his work on Copy

rights (page 270), dissents from Justice Clifford's reasoning, contending that to prevent abandonment the proper practice is to give notice in each new edition of every copyright previously taken out, and many publishers do so.

Section 6 of the act of 1909 (Act March 4, 1909, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1077 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 1291]), which is obviously declaratory, seems to confirm Justice Clifford's view that there is but one copyright of the same book, that additions and improvements make a new book, and that the only notice required is of the date of entry of the last edition. It is as follows:

“Sec. 6. (Compilations, etc., of works in public domain, etc.-subsisting copyrights not affected)—That compilations or abridgements, adaptations, arrangements, dramatizations, translations, or other versions of works in the public domain, or of copyrighted works when produced with the consent of the proprietor of the copyright in such works, or works republished with new matter, shall be regarded as new works subject to copyright under the provi. sions of this Act; but the publication of any such new works shall not affect the force or validity of any subsisting copyright upon the matter employed or any part thereof, or be construed to imply an exclusive right to such use of the original works, or to secure or extend copyright in such original works."

The mere aggregation of the Weekly Reporters into volumes does not in our opinion constitute a new work. But the compilation and rearrangement and reclassification of the syllabi in the digests into new and larger digests do constitute new works entitled to copyright which need only notice of their own entry for copyright. This view seems also to be corroborated by the same section, which provides that compilations, arrangements, and abridgements of matter in the public domain or of copyrighted matter with the proprietor's consent are to be regarded as new works subject to copyright.

Accordingly, we think that the complainant's works, with exceptions not necessary to be considered, are duly covered by copyright of which proper notice has been given.

In this respect we differ with the court below, which was of opinion that the complainant had abandoned a large part of its copyrighted yolumes because of insufficient notice of copyright. It was held that the contents of all earlier digests carried forward into later and larger digests became public property because the later digests contained no notice of copyright of the earlier ones. In coming to this conclusion the learned judge relied largely upon the cases of Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U. S. 82, 19 Sup. Ct. 606, 43 L. Ed. 90t, Mifflin v. White, 190 U. S. 200, 23 Sup. Ct. 169, 47 L. Ed. 1010, and Mifflin v. Dutton, 190 U. S. 265, 23 Sup. Ct. 771, 47 L. Ed. 1013. But these were all cases of the abandonment of the same work as the result of an earlier publication without copyright or with insufficient copyright. They do not apply to later digests regarded as new books entitled to copyright and needing only notice of their own entry in accordance with the views we have above expressed.

Rev. St. U. S. 4970 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3416), gives the Circuit Courts power to grant injunctions to prevent the violation of copyrights “according to the course and principles of courts of equity on such terms as the court may deem reasonable." This brings us to a consideration of the question as to what is a fair use of the complain

ant's copyrighted works. Obviously it would not be fair for any publisher of reports of the same cases or of digests of them to copy lists of cases or to copy or paraphrase syllabi from the complainant's publications whether by so doing he merely saved mechanical labor or literary work. This would be true of any publication similar to a former copyrighted publication. But a fair use of copyrighted material in a different publication may be broader. Suppose one were to issue a map of Kansas showing the annual amount and value of the chief products of each county. Could not a person writing a history of Kansas take those amounts and values bodily into his text? May not one reprint out of a copyrighted compilation of English love songs open to the public one or more for use in a work on English literature? We think there is a great difference between text-books and volumes of reported cases or digests of those cases. The encyclopedias under consideration are really collections of text-books. The headnotes of reported cases are a digest of the law and facts of those cases, and digests of headnotes of various cases constitute collections and classified arrangements of decisions. On the other hand, a text-book states the principles of law and refers generally in footnotes to cases supporting or illustrating the propositions in the text. A poem or a novel or a history or a directory or a dictionary or a scientific treatise is intended to please, interest, instruct, or satisfy the reader, so to speak, in itself; but a digest considered by itself is nothing. Its purpose is as a tool to enable judges to write their opinions, lawyers to write their briefs, and authors to write their text-books. Such persons may cut out parts of the digests to assist them in running down the cases and copy lists of cases from the digests, as many of the defendant's writers have done. Such a use of the digests seems to us, differing in this respect from the court below, to fall directly within the purpose for which they are sold, and to be fair. On the other hand, extensive copying or paraphrasing of the language of the syllabi would not, we think, be a fair use.

The complainant knew at least as early as 1893 that its syllabi were being paraphrased or copied by the defendant's writers, or some of them. Its conduct shows that it must have considered this to have been a fair use of its publications because it did not begin this action until the defendant, after 16 years of labor and immense outlay of money, had published almost its entire work. The laches of the complainant and the hardship upon the defendant are such that we think the trial judge, "according to the course and principles of courts of equity," was right in refusing an injunction and accounting of profits. But we also think that the court can give damages in this case by way of compensation. Because Rev. St. U. S. § 4921 (U. S. Comp. St. p. 3395), entitles complainants in equity suits arising out of patents “to recover in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant the damages the complaint has sustained” by the infringement, and there is no similar provision as to equity suits arising out of copyrights, it is sometimes said that damages cannot be awarded in the latter. We think this a misunderstanding of the statute. It applies to all patent causes without distinction and permits damages to be assessed when equitable relief is granted in addition to profits. This should not be construed to impair the power of courts of equity to do justice by al

lowing the complainant compensation in damages where equitable relief, though it might be given, is for some satisfactory reason withheld. In such a case the damages are not given in addition to profits as provided by section 4921. It does not seem to us right to turn the complainant over to a court of law after over 5,000 pages of testimony have been taken in this cause, showing that its rights have been violated to some extent, especially considering that a jury trial would not furnish an adequate remedy in the sense of being adapted to determining the amount of the copying and paraphrasing. The bill asks for an injunction and for damages as well as for an accounting. This court, having obtained jurisdiction of the cause and having the power to grant an injunction, has the right to do justice between the parties and to dispose of it finally, even if this involves withholding injunctive relief and awarding damages. Masson's Appeal, 70 Pa. 26; Valentine v. Richardt, 126 N. Y, 272, 27 N. E. 255; Waite v. O'Neil, 76 Fed. 408,22 C. C. A. 248, 34 L. R. A. 550; Andrus v. Berkshire Power Co., 147 Fed. 76, 77 C. C. A. 248; New York City v. Pine, 185 U. S. 93, 22 Sup. Ct. 592, 46 L. Ed. 820.

The decree of the Circuit Court, therefore, will be modified by the direction to refer the cause to a master for the purpose of determining what damages the complainant has sustained, or at the option of the complainant the decree may be affirmed, with costs of this court, without prejudice to its right to proceed at law.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. Although my individual opinion is in entire accord with the decision of this court in West Publishing Company v. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 79 Fed. 756, 25 C. C. A. 648, 35 L. R. A. 400, I accede to the proposition that the law for this circuit is settled in the later decision of the same court in Edward Thompson Company v. American Law Book Company, 122 Fed. 922, 59 C. C. A. 148, 62 L. R. A. 607.

Therefore I concur in the conclusion of the majority.

On Petition for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM. The petition for rehearing is denied.

The order for the mandate shall provide that the decree of the Circuit Court be modified, without costs of this court to either party, so that said decree shall not dismiss the bill of complaint upon the merits, but shall deny the injunction and accounting of profits, and shall provide that the complainant recover its damages without costs of the Circuit Court accruing prior to the entry of the decree; the cause to be referred to a master to take proofs and report the same with his findings as to the amount of the damages.

Or in case the complainant shall, by writing filed with the clerk of this court within five days from the date hereof, so elect, the order shall provide for the affirmance of the decree of the Circuit Court, with the costs of this court to be paid by the complainant.

BROCKENBROUGH V. CHAMPION FIBRE CO.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. March 9, 1910.)

No. 945.

1. SALES ($ 128*)–CONTRACT-RESCISSION.

Defendant having contracted to purchase certain pulp wood from plaintiff, deliverable from year to year beginning July, 1908, without objection postponed the delivery until October 1, 1908, and on October 14th sug. gested that plaintiff defer shipments until spring because of the congested condition of its yards. Plaintiff made no reply to this, but immediately requested cars from a railroad company to "test the matter," which cars were refused because defendant had placed an embargo on shipments of wood which continued only from October 1st to 28th. When plaintiff ordered the cars, he had made no preparation to cut or haul any wood, nor did he own any timber in the territory to which he was limited by the contract, nor had he made any effort to buy any such wood from others. Held, that defendant's embargo and suggestion to delay shipments did not constitute a total repudiation of the contract.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. $ 318; Dec. Dig. $

128.*) 2. APPEAL AND ERROR ($ 171*)-THEORY OF CAUSE-CHANGE-REVERSAL.

Where, in a suit for breach of a contract to purchase pulp wood, plaintiff based his whole case as pleaded on defendant's total repudiation and termination of the contract, on which theory he was defeated, he was not entitled to a reversal on the theory that he was entitled to recover damages for defendant's delaying plaintiff's execution of the contract so far as first year's deliveries were concerned.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. $$ 10031061 ; Dec. Dig. § 171.*] In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.

Action by Edward H. Brockenbrough against the Champion Fibre Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

This was an action at law instituted in the superior court of McDowell county, N. C., by Edward H. Brockenbrough, a citizen of Virginia, against the Champion Fibre Company, an Ohio corporation, operating a wood fiber, pulp, and extract plant at Canton, N. C.

The complaint sets forth the execution of a contract whereby the plaintiff was to deliver from a certain defined territory in that state to defendant company at Canton, during a term of five years, not less than 3,000 nor more than 8,000 cords each year of chestnut and other woods in accord with specifications set forth, for which he was to receive $4.50 per cord if minimum amount was furnished the first year, and 25 cents additional per cord each succeeding year upon the same conditions as well as fixed bonuses each year after the first. This contract, dated February 15, 1908, provided that shipments under it should commence July 1st following, and should be subject to "delays beyond control of the parties, as to forwarding and receipt." The complaint alleges, in effect, that, at the request of defendant, the date of commencement of shipments was postponed until October 1, 1908, at which time plaintiff was in all respects ready, able, willing, and anxious to commence shipments and comply with said contract to the maximum limit, but that the Southern Railway afforded the only means of transportation, and, when he applied to this company for cars, he was informed that the defendant had on October 1, 1908, placed an embargo on all chestnut wood consigned to it at Canton, in conse: quence of which the railway company would receive no chestnut wood for

*For other cases see same topic & S NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

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