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cision of the Board of General Appraisers (G. A. 6,414, T. D. 27,544), which affirmed the action of the collector of the port of New York in assessing duty on certain wire.

D. Frank Lloyd, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. (Martin T. Baldwin, Sp. Atty., of counsel), for the United States.

Walden & Webster (Howard T. Walden, of counsel), for importers. Before LACOMBE, COXE, and WARD, Circuit Judges.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The process of manufacture is as follows: A steel or iron rod or wire is pushed through a nickel tube, and the whole is then wire-drawn, which brings it down to the required diameter and welds the nickel to the iron or steel. The result is a core of iron or steel wire with an outer surfacing of nickel permanently affixed thereto. The relevant paragraph in the tariff act of 1897 (Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule C, par. 137, 30 Stat. 161 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1639]) is:

"137. Round iron or steel wire, not smaller than number thirteen wire gauge, one and one-fourth cents per pound; smaller than number thirteen and not smaller than number sixteen wire gauge, one and one-half cents per pound; smaller than number sixteen wire gauge, two cents per pound: Provided, that all the foregoing valued at more than four cents per pound shall pay forty per centum ad valorem. Iron or steel or other wire not specially provided for in this act, including such as is commonly known as hat wire, or bonnet wire, crinoline wire, corset wire, needle wire, piano wire, clock wire, and watch wire, whether flat or otherwise, and corset clasps, corset steels and dress steels, and sheet steel in strips, twenty-five one-thousandths of an inch thick or thinner, any of the foregoing, whether uncovered or covered with cotton, silk, metal, or ⚫ other material, valued at more than four cents per pound, forty-five per cen tum ad valorem: Provided, that articles manufactured from iron, steel, brass, or copper wire, shall pay the rate of duty imposed upon the wire used in the manufacture of such articles, and in addition thereto one and one-fourth cents per pound, except that wire rope and wire strand shall pay the maximum rate of duty which would be imposed upon any wire used in the manufacture thereof, and in addition thereto one cent per pound; and on iron or steel wire coated with zinc, tin, or any other metal, two-tenths of one cent per pound in addition to the rate imposed on the wire from which it is made."

* * *

It will be perceived that by this paragraph one rate of duty is imposed on (1) "iron or steel or other wire, not specially provided for * * * whether uncovered or covered with * * *metal," and a different rate of duty on (2) "iron or steel wire coated with * * * any metal." The collector assessed this wire under the first of these categories; the importer contends it belongs under the second. The use of the words "not specially provided for" in connection. only with the first of these categories would seem to indicate that the correct interpretation of the paragraph is: Such and such a duty shall be laid upon all iron or steel wire, which is covered with cotton, silk, metal, or other material; but, if such wire is coated with zinc, tin, or any other metal, it shall pay at a different rate.

It is not controlling, therefore, that the iron or steel wire is found. to be covered with metal, if such metal covering can fairly be held to be a coating. The covering of many of the varieties of wire which are enumerated in the first category-hat wire, bonnet wire, crinoline wire, corset wire, piano wire-is not the sort that one could properly

call a coating. On the contrary, unless some peculiar and unusual meaning be given to the words "coated with metal," it is difficult to conceive of any article which more aptly illustrates them than the wire now before us. We agree with Judge Holt that it makes no difference by what process the coating is affixed-by welding, by dipping, by electrolytic action, or in any other way. The act refers only to the finished product.

It is further contended that this is not an iron or steel wire coated with nickel, but is really a nickel wire containing iron or steel. Examination of the sample "Illustrative Exhibit 1," where the relative quantities and the disposition of the two metals are clearly displayed, is sufficient to dispose of this suggestion. The other sample is of so small a gauge that the end, which has been pinched off rather than cut off, does not show the line where the two metals come together; but, as the smaller is drawn down from the larger, it may, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be assumed that the relative proportions are the same.

The decision is affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. RICH.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. February 8, 1910.)
No. 148 (5,243).

CUSTOMS DUTIES (§ 44*)—CLASSIFICATION-CONCENTRATED FRUIT JUICE-SIMIL-
ITUDE.

Concentrated fruit juice is dutiable, under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule H, par. 299, 30 Stat. 174 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1655), as fruit juice by similitude under section 7 of said act, 30 Stat. 205 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1693), because it resembles ordinary fruit juice (1) in material, from which it differs only in having had some of its water removed by evaporation, and (2) in use, being applied to the same purposes.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Customs Duties, Dec. Dig. § 44.*]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

For decision below, see 172 Fed. 293, reversing a decision by the Board of United States General Appraisers, which had affirmed the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York on material imported by E. C. Rich.

The merchandise herein involved consists of certain fruit juices. The importer contends that they are dutiable under paragraph 299 of Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule H, 30 Stat. 174 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1655), either directly or by similitude. The collector classified them as a nonenumerated manufactured article. The paragraph reads:

299. Cherry juice and prune juice, or prune wine, and other fruit juices not specially provided for in this act, containing no alcohol or not more than eighteen per centum of alcohol, sixty cents per gallon; if containing more than eighteen per centum of alcohol sixty cents per gallon, and in addition thereto two dollars and seven cents per proof gallon on the alcohol contained therein. For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

D. Frank Lloyd, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. (Charles Duane Baker, 'Asst. Atty., of counsel), for the United States.

Comstock & Washburn (Albert H. Washburn, of counsel), for importer.

Before LACOMBE and WARD, Circuit Judges.

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The Board of General Appraisers state that when the tariff act of 1897 was passed the fruit juice which was being imported was the juice as it was expressed from the fruita thin, watery liquid of not much strength. In some instances such liquid was combined with alcohol as a preservative. The present article differs from the old fruit juice solely by having some of the water removed by evaporation-a process which, of course, increases the strength of the residuum. Nothing else is done to it. It has not even received any alcoholic admixture. We should be inclined to hold that, although more concentrated than the fruit juice of 1897, it has not ceased to be fruit juice. But it is not necessary so to hold. Certainly it is similar to the fruit juice of 1897 in material, being nothing but the expressed juice of fruit, and in use, being applied to the same purposes, viz., flavoring confectionery, jellies, creams, etc.

Smith v. Rheinstrom (Circuit Court of Appeals, 6th Cir.) 65 Fed. 984, 13 C. C. A. 261, mainly relied upon by the government, does not apply, because the concentrated cherry juice in that case had been fortified with so much alcohol as to warrant its classification as an "alcoholic compound" under a separate paragraph of the act of 1890, then under discussion. Being there specifically enumerated, it could not be classified under the similitude clause which covers only nonenumerated articles.

Decision affirmed.

POITEVENT & FAVRE LUMBER CO. v. HONEY ISLAND LAND & TIMBER CO.†

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. March 1, 1910.)

No. 1,923.

1. QUIETING TITLE (§ 12*)-RIGHT OF ACTION-TITLE AND POSSESSION.

A bill to quiet title, alleging ownership and possession in complainant, cannot be maintained, where the proof shows possession in defendant under a claimed title when the suit was commenced.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Quieting Title, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. § 12.*

Necessity of possession in suits to quiet title, see note to Jackson v. Simmons, 39 C. C. A. 522.]

2. TAXATION (§ 804*)-TAX TITLE-VALIDATION-LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION. Const. La. 1898, art. 233, providing that suits to annul tax titles on sales theretofore made shall be brought within three years from the adoption of the Constitution, which as construed by the Supreme Court of the state operates merely as a bar by limitation, is not available to sustain a suit based on such a tax title, where within the three years the land was juFor other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes Rehearing denied April 5, 1910.

dicially sequestered in a succession, and remained in the custody of the court until just prior to the commencement of the suit.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 1590; Dec. Dig. § 804.*]

Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Suit in equity by the Poitevent & Favre Lumber Company against the Honey Island Land & Timber Company. Decree for defendant, and complainant appeals. Affirmed.

B. M. Miller, for appellant.

E. Howard McCaleb, for appellee.

Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. Under the repleading in the Circuit Court, the suit before us is one by Poitevent & Favre Lumber Company, alleging itself to be the owner and in possession of a certain tract of land in St. Tammany parish, La., to remove clouds from title.

The answer denies both ownership and possession. The proof shows only constructive possession by any party up to July 23, 1900, when the land was judicially sequestered in the succession of E. B. Benton, a former owner, and taken into the possession of the TwentySixth judicial district court for the parish of St. Tammany, where it remained until March 16, 1904, when by order of the civil district court for the parish of Orleans, Charles J. Hillard, who purchased for the account and benefit of the Honey Island Land & Timber Company at a judicial sale under executory process issued by that court, was put in possession by the sheriff of St. Tammany parish.

Without showing any divestiture of the Honey Island Land & Timber Company, this suit was brought July 21, 1904, so that at the beginning of this suit it appears that possession under claimed title was in the Honey Island Land & Timber Company. The tax title under which complainant claims was recorded June 14, 1897, and appears to have been voidable, under the then existing laws of the state of Louisiana in relation to tax sales, for defective assessments.

Article 233 of the Constitution of Louisiana of 1898, under which complainant claims a validation of his tax title, provides for a suit to annul as to tax sales theretofore made within three years from the adoption of the Constitution. As the property was judicially sequestered in the year 1900, and remained in the possession of the St. Tammany court until about the time this suit was brought, and as the said article 233 is held by the Supreme Court of Louisiana to be merely a bar by limitation (see Ashley v. Bradford, 109 La. 641, 33 South. 634), it would seem that said article 233 cannot avail complainant in this suit. The judge of the Circuit Court filed no reasons for his decree dismissing the complainant's bill; but, for the above and other reasons. argued at bar, we think his decision was correct, and should be affirmed. And it is so ordered.

For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

STRETTON et al. v. SHAHEEN.

SAME v. SHADDY.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. March 1, 1910.)

Nos. 1,915, 1,916.

HABEAS CORPUS (§ 75*)-RETURN-REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY.

Returns to writs of habeas corpus cbtained on behalf of immigrants upon petitions alleging their illegal detention by an inspector, which allege no facts, but merely as a conclusion of law that the respondent had the right to detain the petitioners, held insufficient.

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[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Habeas Corpus, Dec. Dig. § 75.*]

Appeals from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Proceedings by Sadie Shaheen and Kelly J. Shaddy against Peter H. Stretton and John Clark for writs of habeas corpus. From orders granting the writs, respondents appeal. Affirmed.

Charlton R. Beattie and W. J. Waguespack, for appellant.
Chas. I. Denechaud, for appellees.

Before PARDEE, McCORMICK, and SHELBY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. In neither of these appeals was there any bond given. If intended to be taken by the United States, or at the direction of any department of the government, as provided for in Rev. St. § 1001 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 713), it is not shown by the record.

The return in each case of Peter H. Stretton, "captain and inspector in charge of immigration office at the port of New Orleans," and John Clark, captain of the steamer Chickahominy, sets forth only conclusions of law, and there was no necessity to traverse. In the said returns Stretton claims that by virtue of the authority vested in him as "inspector in charge at the port of New Orleans," he "was fully authorized to appoint, constitute, and qualify the special board of inquiry alleged in the plaintiff's petition," referring to Act Cong. Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, § 24, 34 Stat. 906 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 461).

The returns further allege that the respondent had the right to detain Abdala Shaddy and Georges Shaheen "for examination by the special board of inquiry whenever that board should be legally constituted," but alleged no facts. The Circuit Court examined the matter, and found in favor of the petitioner, and against the sufficiency of the said returns.

As we agree with the Circuit Court in its findings, the judgment of the Circuit Court in each of the above-entitled cases is affirmed.

*For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes

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