respected them as men, or as citizens of the state; whether in their public or private relations; whether it related to the rights of persons, or property, of the whole people of a state or of any individual within it, and whose operation was within the territorial limits of the state, and upon the persons and things within its jurisdiction. But we will endeavor to illustrate our meaning rather by exemplification than by definition. No one will deny that a state has a right to punish any individual found within its jurisdiction, who shall have committed an offence within its jurisdiction against its criminal laws. We speak not here of foreign ambassadors, as to whom the doctrines of public law apply. We suppose it to be equally clear, that a state has as much right to guard, by anticipation, against the commission of an offence against its laws, as to inflict punishment upon an offender after it shall have been committed. The right to punish or prevent crime does in no degree depend upon the citizenship of the party who is obnoxious to the law. The alien who shall just have set his foot upon the soil of the state, is just as subject to the operation of the law as one who is a native citizen.” There can be no doubt that Congress possesses the power to determine who may, or may not, make contracts, and prescribe the manner of their enforcement, in the District of Columbia, and in all other places where the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction; but we deny the power and authority of Congress to determine who shall make contracts or the manner of enforcing them in the several states. Nor is there any doubt that Congress may provide for the punishment of those who violate the laws of Congress; but we utterly deny the power of Congress to regulate, control, or in any manner to interfere with the states in determining what shall constitute crimes against the laws of the state, or the manner or extent of the punishment of persons charged and convicted with the violation of the criminal laws of a sovereign state. In this State marriage is treated as a civil contract, but it is more than a mere civil contract. It is a public institution established by God himself, is recognized in all Christian and civilized nations, and is essential to the peace, happiness, and well-being of society. In fact, society could not exist without the institution of marriage, for upon it all the social and domestic relations are based. The right, in the states, to regulate and control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing, and Christianizing institution is of inestimable importance, and cannot be surrendered, nor can the states suffer or permit any interference therewith. If the federal government can determine who may marry in a state, there is no limit to its power. It can legislate upon all subjects connected with, or growing out of this relation. It can determine the rights, duties, and obligations of husband and wife, parent and child, guardian and ward. It may pass laws regulating the granting of divorces. It may assume, exercise, and absorb all the powers of a local and domestic character. This would result in the destruction of the states. The federal government cannot exist without the states, but the states could exist without the federal government, as they did before its creation. There is no necessity for the destruction of either. The authority of the federal government begins where the authority of the state ceases. The state government controls all matters of a local and domestic character. The federal government regulates matters between the states and with foreign governments. There is, and can be no conflict between the state and federal governments, if each will act within the sphere assigned to each. The necessity for states and local self-government is shown by the character of our people. The customs, habits. and thoughts of the people in one state differ widely from those of the people in another state, and this results in different laws. The laws of this state provide that males of the age of seventeen, and females of the age of fourteen years, not within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity, are capable of entering into the contract of marriage. The statute provides that the following marriages are void: when one of the parties is a white person, and the other possessed of one-eighth or more of negro blood; and when either party is insane or idiotic, at the time of the marriage. Under the police power possessed by the states, they undoubtedly have the power to pass such laws. The people of this State have declared that they are opposed to the intermixture of races and all amalgamation. If the people of other states desire to permit a corruption of blood, and a mixture of races, they have the power to adopt such a policy. When the legislature of the State shall declare such policy by positive enactment, we will enforce it, but until thus required we shall not give such policy our sanction. This subject is discussed with great ability, clearness, and force, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the recent case of The Philadelphia and West Chester R. R. Co. v. Miles, 2 Am. Law Rev. 358, wherein it said: "The right to separate, being clear in proper cases, and it being the subject of sound regulation, the question remaining to be considered is whether there is such a difference between the white and black races within this State, resulting from nature, law, and custom, as makes it a reasonable ground of separation. The question is one of difference, not of superiority or inferiority. Why the Creator made one black and the other white, we do not know, but the fact is apparent, and the races are distinct, each producing its own kind, and following the peculiar law of its constitution. Conceding equality, with natures as perfect, and rights as sacred, yet God has made them dissimilar, with those natural instincts and feelings which He always imparts to His creatures, when He intends that they shall not overstep the natural boundaries He has assigned to them. The natural law which forbids their intermarriage and that social amalgamation which leads to a corruption of races, is as clearly divine as that which imparted to them different natures. The tendency of intimate social intermixture is to amalgamation, contrary to the law of races. The separation of the white and black races upon the surface of the globe is a fact equally apparent. Why this is so, it is not neces sary to speculate; but the fact of a distribution of men by race and color is as visible in the providential arrangement of the earth as that of heat and cold. The natural separation of the races is therefore an undeniable fact, and all social organizations which lead to their amalgamation are repugnant to the law of nature. From social amalgamation it is but a step to illicit intercourse, and but another to intermarriage. But to assert separateness is not to declare inferiority in either; it is not to declare one a slave and the other a freeman; that would be to draw the illogical sequence of inferiority from difference only. It is simply to say, that, following the order of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel these widely separate races to intermix. The right of such to be free from social contact is as clear as to be free from intermarriage. The former may be less repulsive as a condition, but no less entitled to protection as a right. When, therefore; we declare a right to maintain separate relations, as far as reasonably practicable, but in a spirit of kindness and charity, and with due regard to equality of rights, it is not prejudice, nor caste, nor injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to follow the law of races established by the Creator himself, and not to compel them to intermix contrary to their instincts." We fully concur in, and indorse the doctrine above enunciated. It is quite clear to us, that neither the fourteenth amendment nor the civil rights bill has impaired or abrogated the laws of this State on the subject of marriage of whites and negroes. The court erred in quashing the indictment. The judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded, with directions to the court below to overrule the motion to quash the indictment, and to place the appellee upon his trial for the crime charged in said indictment. B. W. Hanna, Attorney General, and W. P. Hargrave, for the State. A. L. Robinson, for appellee. STATE EX REL., GARNES V. JOHN | Tapping, Mandamus 319; Moses, Mandamus W. MCCANN ET AL. (21 Ohio St. 199 (1871)) December Term, 1871. Where, under the 31st section of the act of Mandamus. 147; Lewis v. Henley, 2 Ind. 332. 3. The relator has a right to ask that the writ shall issue on his application. He is entitled to it. He resides in the subdistrict of which respondents are directors. There is no other school kept in the subdistrict. His children are of the proper age; and the sole reason that they are debarred the privi leges of the school is that they are colored. Under the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, this is not a valid ground for exclusion. Section 1. of the amendment (15 U. S. Stat. at L. 706) reads as follows: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." There is no longer in this country, or in any state in this country, as there once was, an intermediate class of people standing half way between citizens and allens born in the country, and yet not of the country, whose position is undefined and whose rights are doubtful and undetermined. The relator is a citizen of the United States. As to what are the rights and privileges of citizens, see 1 Bosw. 64: Dred Scott v. Sandford, [60 U. S.] 19 How. [393] 404; Amy, v. Smith, [11 Ky.] 1 Litt. [326] 333, The case is stated in the opinion of the 334; Powell's Analysis of Am. Law 120. court. Mitchell & Watson, for the relator: 1. The respondents are the proper parties against whom the writ of mandamus should issue. S. & C. 1348. 2. Mandamus is the proper remedy. Nourse v. Merriam. [199] [62 Mass.] 8 Cush. 11; Our school law discriminates against colored children. The statute (8. & 8. 705) providing for the classification of school children according to color, or at least that part of it which would, as in this instance, compel colored children to go outside of the limits of the subdistrict in which they reside to attend school, ard, in certain contingencies, debar them from the privileges of common schools altogether, Cited, as supporting propositions as follows: There being a lawful classification of schools, só that colored children have their own schools, and the provision for colored schools being in proper proportion to the number of colored pupils, the court cannot interfere with the classification, in favor of a colored pupil living |