In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake is the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts of equity may properly take into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement with them. While giving weight to these public and private considerations, the courts will require that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance with our May 17, 1954, ruling. Once such a start has been made, the courts may find that additional time is necessary to carry out the ruling in an effective manner. The burden rests upon the defendants to establish that such time is necessary in the public interest and is consistent with good faith compliance at the earliest practicable date. To that end, the courts may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools • See Alexander v. Hillman, 296 U. S. 222, 239. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 321, 329-330. on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system. During this period of transition, the courts will retain jurisdiction of these cases. The judgments below, except that in the Delaware case, are accordingly reversed and the cases are remanded to the District Courts to take such proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases. The judgment in the Delaware case ordering the immediate admission of the plaintiffs to schools previously attended only by white children—is affirmed on the basis of the principles stated in our May 17, 1954, opinion, but the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of Delaware for such further proceedings as that Court may deem necessary in light of this opinion. It is so ordered. No. 279, Misc. GODSBY . MISSISSIPPI. 305 U.S. 925 (1955). Supreme Court of Mississippi. Certiorari denied. Loring B. Moore and William R. Ming, Jr. for petitioner. Reported below: Miss. —. No. 185, Misc. GOLDSBY. MISSISSIPPI. 352 U.S. 944 (1956). Supreme Court of Mississippi. Certiorari denied. Loring B. Moore and William R. Ming, Jr. for petitioner. Joe T. Patterson, Attorney General of Mississippi, for respondent. Reported below:- Miss. 86 So. 2d 27. BOYER et al. v. GARRETT et al. No. 6113. (183 Federal Reporter, 2d Series) United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit Argued June 30, 1950. Decided July 17, 1950. Action by Philip Boyer, and others, against Robert Garrett, and others, to recover damages and to enjoin defendants, as members of the Board of Recreation and Parks of the City of Baltimore, and others, from enforcing a rule providing for the segregation of the races in athletic activities in public parks and playgrounds subject to the control of the Board. The United States Dis trict Court for the District of Maryland at Baltimore, W. Calvin Chesnut, J., rendered a decision, 88 F.Supp. 353, granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Per Curiam, held that the rule did not violate amendments to the Federal Constitution. Affirmed. Constitutional law 217 Rule officially adopted providing for segregation of races in athletic activities in public parks and playgrounds, subject to control of Municipal Board of Recreation and Parks, which did not deny substantially equal facilities and services to the different races, did not violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. Dallas F. Nicholas and I. Duke Avnet, Baltimore, Md. (Edgar Paul Boyko and William H. Murphy, Baltimore, Md., on brief) for appellants. Allen A. Davis, Baltimore, Md. (Thomas N. Biddison and Hugo A. Ricciuti, Baltimore, Md., on brief) for appellees. PER CURIAM. This is an appeal in an action instituted under the Civil Rights Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 43 and 47, against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the members of the Board of Recreation and Parks of that city. Its purpose is to enjoin the enforcement of a rule officially adopted providing for the segregation of races in athletic activities in the public parks and playgrounds subject to the control of the Board and to recover damages alleged to have been sustained because of the enforcement of the rule. The parties entered into a stipulation that for the purposes of this case no contention was made that the facilities and services furnished the different races were not substantially equal. The contention of plaintiffs is that, notwithstanding this equality of treatment, the rule providing for segregation is violative of the provisions of the federal Constitution. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256; and the principal argument made on appeal is that the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson has been so weakened by subsequent decisions that we should no longer consider it as binding. We do not think, however, that we are at liberty thus to disregard a decision of the Supreme Court which that court has not seen fit to overrule and which it expressly refrained from reexamining, although urged to do so, in the very recent case of Sweatt v. Painter, 70 S.Ct. 848. It is for the Supreme Court, not us, to overrule its decisions or to hold them outmoded. We need not consider arguments based on the 1st Amendment or the Charter of the United Nations. The 1st Amendment manifestly has no relation to athletic contests, and there is nothing in the Charter of the United Nations which, if applicable here, is of broader scope than the provisions of the 14th Amendment in forbidding Before PARKER Chief Judge, and SO- racial discrimination. PER and DOBIE, Circuit Judges. Affirmed. WILLIAMS et al. v. YELLOW CAB OO. OF PITTSBURGH, PA, et al. (200 F. 2d 302) Appeal of DARGAN. No. 10700. United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit. Argued Oct. 6, 1952. Decided Dec. 8, 1932. Suit by 41 Negro taxicab drivers against a taxicab company, a labor union and others for an injunction against continuation of discriminatory practices against plaintiffs, a declaratory judgment that certain working regulations were illegal and vold, compensatory damages for conspiracy to discriminate against and segregate plaintiffs, because of their race by means of such regulations, and reinstatement of plaintiffs atcharged for vio lations thereof. From a ddibent of the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing the complaint on defendants' motion for want of jurisdiction, 103 F.Supp. 847, one of plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Maris, Circuit Judge, held that the suit was not within the distric court's jurisdiction as one arising under National Labor Relations Act and that The authority of taxicab drivers' union to act for Negro members thereof in col lective bargaining with taxicab company was derived from their consent, not from section of National Labor Relations Act de claring collective bargaining representative selected by majority of employees in bargaining unit exclusive bargaining representative of all employees therein, so that federal District Court had no jurisdiction of such members' suit against company and union to enjoin racial discrimination against plaintiffs by means of working reg. ulations on ground that suit arose under federal law. 28 U.S.C.A. 1331; National Labor Relations Act, 19(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). 4 Civil Rights Constitutional Law 208, 254 The Fourteenth Amendment to federal Constitution and federal Civil Rights Act enacted to enforce such amendment, are dis rected only to state action, and invasion of individuals' rights by other individuals is not within their parview. 28 U.S.CA. § Chauffeurs, Warèbousemen and Helpers: of 1343; U.S.CA.Const. Amend. 14. & Courts 284 Redress for an indivídual's invasion of another's civil rights must be sought in state courts, not federal courts, under fed eral Civil Rights Act, in absence of diver sity of parties' citizenship. 28 U.S.C.A. 1343. 4 Civil Rights 4-»8 The federal District Court for Western District of Pennsylvania had no jurisdiotion, under federal Civil Rights Act, of suit by Negro members of taxicab drivers' unson against taxicab company and union to a enjoin racial discrimination against plaintiffs by means of working regulations agreed to by company and unida acting un der authority conferred by Jennsylvania Labor Relations Act, as union noted as its members' bargaining agent:ursuant to their consent as union members, not by virtue of any power conferred by statute. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1343(3);-43 P.S.Pa. §§ 211.1 et seq., 211.7(a). Hymen Schlesinger, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellants. Harold E. McCamey, Pittsburgh, Pa. (Richard O'N. Duff and Dickie, McCamey, Chilcote, Reif & Robinson, Pittsburgh, Pa., on the brief), for Yellow Cab Co. of Pittsburgh. Ben Paul Jubelirer, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Union and Charles Weber. 3 America, of which union they werermentbers, and two individuals, oné an officer of the Cab Company and the other an officer of the Union. They charged the Cab Company and the Union, which was their collective bargaining representative, with a conspiracy to discriminate against them and to segregate them because of their race by means of certain working regulations. They sought an injunction restraining the continuation, of the discriminatory, prac tices, a declaratory, judgment that the (working regulations in question were illegal and void, compensatory damages and reine statement of those plaintifs discharged for violations of the regulations. The defend ants filed motions to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the district court had no jurisdiction to entertain it. The court sustained the motions and dismissed the complaint. 103 F.Supp. 847. Thomas H. Dargan, one of the plaintiffs, has appealed. The appellant alleges that the Union was recognized by the Cab Company as the exelusive bargaining agent for all of its taxicab drivers. : Agreements, were negotiated by the Union covering rates of pay and working conditions "between the company and its drivers * * on a uniform and equal basis and without discrimination." In October 1947 the Cab Company established its uptown garage and employed only: Negroes to operate taxicabs from that garage. All these Negro taxicab drivers joined the Union. At a meeting attended by the representatives of the Cab Company, the Union and a committee which represented Before MARIS, KALODNER and the Negro drivers of the uptown garage, HASTIE, Circuit Judges. MARIS, Circuit Judge. The plaintiffs, Negro taxicab drivers now or formerly employed by the Yellow Cab Company of Pittsburgh, an operator of a fleet of taxicabs in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on their own behalf and on behalf of other Negro taxicab driver-employees, against the Cab Company and Tax icab Drivers Local Union No. 128 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 40361 0-59-pt. 4- -27 certain additional working regulations were promulgated. The appellant claims that the defendants conspired by means of these additional working regulations to deprive the plaintiffs of rights equal to those which the white taxicab driver-employees enjoyed by prohibiting them from cruising to pick up passengers; by relegating them to inferior, discriminatory status in picking up passengers; by requiring them to leave a railroad station or stand if another cab driven by a whe driver arrived, by denying them equal rights under a general seniority list in assignments to new taxicabs, |