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It is apparent that, if this complaint meets the requirements of this Act, it raises constitutional problems of the first magnitude that, in the light of history, are not without difficulty. These would include issues as to congressional power under and apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, the reserved power of the States, the content of rights derived from national as distinguished from state citizenship, and the question of separability of the Act in its application to those two classes of rights. The latter question was long ago decided adversely to the plaintiffs. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678. Before we embark upon such a constitutional inquiry, it is necessary to satisfy ourselves that the attempt to allege a cause of action within the purview of the statute has been successful.

The section under which this action is brought falls into two divisions. The forepart defines conspiracies that may become the basis of liability, and the latter portion defines overt acts necessary to consummate the conspiracy as an actionable wrong. While a mere unlawful agreement or conspiracy may be made a federal crime, as it was at common law," this statute does not make the mere agreement or understanding for concerted action. which constitutes the forbidden conspiracy an actionable wrong unless it matures into some action that inflicts injury. That, we think, is the significance of the second division of the section.

The provision with reference to the overt act will bear repeating, with emphasis supplied: ". . . [I]n any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby an

14 Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 378; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U. S. 150, 252.

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other is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages

In the light of the dictum in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552, we assume, without deciding, that the facts pleaded show that defendants did deprive plaintiffs "of having and exercising" a federal right which, provided the defendants were engaged in a "conspiracy set forth in this section," would bring the case within the Act.

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The "conspiracy" required is differently stated from the required overt act and we think the difference is not accidental but significant. Its essentials, with emphasis supplied, are that two or more persons must conspire (1) for the purpose of depriving any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the law; or (2) for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities from giving or securing to all persons the equal protection of the laws; or (3) to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen entitled to vote from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner toward election of an elector for President or a member of Congress; or (4) to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy. There is no claim that any allegation brings this case within the provisions that we have numbered (2), (3), and (4), so we may eliminate any consideration of those categories. The complaint is within the statute only if it alleges a conspiracy of the first described class. It is apparent that this part of the Act defines conspiracies of a very limited character. They must, we repeat, be "for the purpose of depriving of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws." (Italics supplied.)

Passing the argument, fully developed in the Civil Rights Cases, that an individual or group of individuals not in office cannot deprive anybody of constitutional rights, though they may invade or violate those rights, it is clear that this statute does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to deprive one of rights, unless it is a deprivation of equality, of "equal protection of the law," or of "equal privileges and immunities under the law." That accords with the purpose of the Act to put the lately freed Negro on an equal footing before the law with his former master. The Act apparently deemed that adequate and went no further.

What we have here is not a conspiracy to affect in any way these plaintiffs' equality of protection by the law, or their equality of privileges and immunities under the law. There is not the slightest allegation that defendants were conscious of or trying to influence the law, or were endeavoring to obstruct or interfere with it. The only inequality suggested is that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting and did not break up meetings of others with whose sentiments they agreed. To be sure, this is not equal injury, but it is no more a deprivation of “equal protection" or of "equal privileges and immunities" than it would be for one to assault one neighbor without assaulting them all, or to libel some persons without mention of others. Such private discrimination is not inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so. Plaintiffs' rights were certainly invaded, disregarded and lawlessly violated, but neither their rights nor their equality of rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or impaired. Their rights under the laws and to protection of the laws remain untouched and equal to the rights of every other Californian, and may be vindicated in the same way and with the same effect as

those of any other citizen who suffers violence at the hands of a mob.

We do not say that no conspiracy by private individuals could be of such magnitude and effect as to work a deprivation of equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under laws. Indeed, the postCivil War Ku Klux Klan, against which this Act was fashioned, may have, or may reasonably have been thought to have, done so. It is estimated to have had a membership of around 550,000, and thus to have included "nearly the entire adult male white population of the South.” 15 It may well be that a conspiracy, so far-flung and embracing such numbers, with a purpose to dominate and set at naught the "carpetbag" and "scalawag" governments of the day, was able effectively to deprive Negroes of their legal rights and to close all avenues of redress or vindication, in view of the then disparity of position, education and opportunity between them and those who made up the Ku Klux Klan. We do not know. But here nothing of that sort appears. We have a case of a lawless political brawl, precipitated by a handful of white citizens against other white citizens. California courts are open to plaintiffs and its laws offer redress for their injury and vindication for their rights.

We say nothing of the power of Congress to authorize such civil actions as respondents have commenced or otherwise to redress such grievances as they assert. We think that Congress has not, in the narrow class of conspiracies defined by this statute, included the conspiracy charged here. We therefore reach no constitutional questions. The facts alleged fall short of a conspiracy to alter, impair or deny equality of rights under the law, though they do show a lawless invasion of rights for which

15 8 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 606, 607.

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It is not for

there are remedies in the law of California. this Court to compete with Congress or attempt to replace it as the Nation's law-making body.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is



I cannot agree that the respondents in their complaint have failed to state a cause of action under R. S. § 1980 (3), 8 U. S. C. § 47 (3).

The right alleged to have been violated is the right to petition the Federal Government for a redress of grievances. This right is expressly recognized by the First Amendment and this Court has said that "The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances." United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552, and see In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U. S. 532, 535. The source of the right in this case is not the Fourteenth Amendment. The complaint alleges that petitioners "knowingly" did not interfere with the "many public meetings" whose objectives they agreed with, but that they did conspire to break up respondents' meeting because petitioners were opposed to respondents' views, which were expected to be there expressed. Such conduct does not differ materially from the specific conspiracies which the Court recognizes that the statute was intended to reach.

The language of the statute refutes the suggestion that action under color of state law is a necessary ingredient of the cause of action which it recognizes. R. S. § 1980 (3) speaks of "two or more persons in any State or Territory" conspiring. That clause is not limited to state

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