Gambar halaman
[ocr errors]

of location. He may wait in line in the cafeteria and there stand and talk with his fellow students, but while he eats he must remain apart.

These restrictions were obviously imposed in order to j1 comply, as nearly as could be, with the statutory require

ments of Oklahoma. But they signify that the State, in administering the facilities it affords for professional and graduate study, sets McLaurin apart from the other students. The result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession.

Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case represents, perhaps, the epitome of that need, for he is attempting to obtain an advanced degree in education, to become, by definition, a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come under his guidance and influence must be directly affected by the education he receives. Their own education and development will necessarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal to that of his classmates. State-imposed restrictions which produce such inequalities cannot be sustained.

It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position when these restrictions are removed, for he may still be set apart by his fellow students. This we think irrelevant. There is a vast differencea Constitutional difference between restrictions imposed by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the state presents no such bar. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 13–14 (1948). The removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily abate individual and group predilections, prejudices and choices. But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appellant of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students on his own merits.

We conclude that the conditions under which this appellant is required to receive his education deprive him of his personal and present right to the equal protection of the laws. See Sweatt v. Painter, ante, p. 629. We hold that under these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes differences in treatment by the state based upon race. Appellant, having been admitted to a state-supported graduate school, must receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as students of other races. The judgment is



(341 U.S. 651 (1950))



No. 217. Argued January 8-9, 1951.-Decided June 4, 1951.

A complaint in an action to recover damages under 8 U.S. C. § 47 (3)

alleged that the plaintiffs were members of a political club which planned a meeting to adopt a resolution opposing the Marshall Plan; that defendants conspired to deprive plaintiffs of their rights as citizens of the United States peaceably to assemble and to equal privileges and immunities under the laws of the United States; that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, defendants proceeded to plaintiffs' meeting place and, by threats and violence, broke up the meeting, thus interfering with the right of plaintiffs to petition the Government for redress of grievances; and that defendants did not interfere or conspire to interfere with meetings of other groups with whose opinions defendants agreed. There was no averment that defendants were state officers or acted under color of state law. Held: The complaint did not state a cause of action under 8 U. S. C. § 47 (3). Pp. 652-663.

(a) Assuming, without deciding, that the facts alleged show that defendants deprived plaintiffs “of having and exercising” a federal right, the facts alleged did not show that the conspiracy was “for the purpose of depriving (them) of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws"; and therefore, in this case, a cause of action under 8 U. S. C. $ 47 (3) was not stated. Pp. 660-663.

(b) Section 47 (3) does not attempt to reach a conspiracy to deprive one of rights, unless it is a deprivation of equality, of "equal protection of the law" or of "equal privileges and immunities under the law.” Pp. 660-661.

(c) The fact that the defendants broke up plaintiffs' meeting but did not interfere with the meetings of those who shared defendants' views is not inequality before the law unless there is some manipulation of the law or its agencies to give sanction or sanctuary for doing so. P. 661.

(d) Although plaintiffs' rights were invaded, disregarded and lawlessly violated, neither their rights nor their equality of rights under the law have been, or were intended to be, denied or

impaired. Pp. 661-662. 183 F. 2d 308, reversed.

In an action brought by respondents against petitioners to recover damages under 8 U. S. C. § 47 (3), the District Court dismissed the complaint. 80 F. Supp. 501. The Court of Appeals reversed. 183 F. 2d 308. This Court granted certiorari. 340 U. S. 809. Reversed, p. 663.

Aubrey N. Irwin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.

A. L. Wirin and Loren Miller argued the cause for respondents. With Mr. Wirin on the brief were Fred Okrand, William Egan Colby, Edward J. Ennis, Osmond K. Fraenkel, Will Maslow, Joseph B. Robison and Clore Warne.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris for the Congress of Industrial Organizations; and Loren Miller and Thurgood Marshall for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

This controversy arises under 8 U.S. C. $ 47 (3), which provides civil remedies for certain conspiracies. A motion to dismiss the amended complaint raises the issue of its sufficiency and, of course, requires us to accept well-pleaded facts as the hypothesis for decision.


1 17 Stat. 13,8 U.S.C. 47 (3) reads:

"If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any

Its essential allegations are that plaintiffs are citizens of the United States, residents of California, and members or officers of a voluntary association or political club organized for the purpose of participating in the election of officers of the United States, petitioning the national government for redress of grievances, and engaging in public meetings for the discussion of national public issues. It planned a public meeting for November 14, 1947, on the subject, “The Cominform and the Marshall Plan," at which it was intended to adopt a resolution opposing said Marshall Plan, to be forwarded, by way of a petition for the redress of grievances, to appropriate federal officials.

The conspiracy charged as being within the Act is that defendants, with knowledge of the meeting and its pur

citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.”

This paragraph should be read in the context of other paragraphs of the same section, and note should also be taken of 8 U.S. C. $ 43, which reads:

“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."

« SebelumnyaLanjutkan »