unable to agree. It is not questioned that the meaning of this clause is that the carriers may provide sleeping cars, dining cars and chair cars exclusively for white persons and provide no similar accommodations for negroes. The reasoning is that there may not be enough persons of African descent seeking these accommodations to warrant the outlay in providing them. Thus, the Attorney General of the State, in the brief filed by him in support of the law, urges that "the plaintiffs must show that their own travel is in such quantity and of such kind as to actually afford the roads the same profits, not per man, but per car, as does the white traffic, or, sufficient profit to justify the furnishing of the facility, and that in such case they are not supplied with separate cars containing the same. This they have not attempted. What vexes the plaintiffs is the limited market value they offer for such accommodations. Defendants are not by law compelled to furnish chair cars, diners nor sleepers, except when the market offered reasonably demands the facility." And in the brief of counsel for the appellees, it is stated that the members of the legislature "were undoubtedly familiar with the character and extent of travel of persons of African descent in the State of Oklahoma and were of the opinion that there was no substantial demand for Pullman car and dining car service for persons of the African race in the intrastate travel" in that State. This argument with respect to volume of traffic seems to us to be without merit. It makes the constitutional right depend upon the number of persons who may be discriminated against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right is that it is a personal one. Whether or not particular facilities shall be provided may doubtless be conditioned upon there being a reasonable demand therefor, but, if facilities are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions. cannot be refused. It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which under substantially the same circumstances is furnished to another traveler, he may properly complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded. There is, however, an insuperable obstacle to the granting of the relief sought by this bill. It was filed, as we have seen, by five persons against five railroad corporations to restrain them from complying with the state statute. The suit had been brought before the law went into effect and this amended bill was filed very shortly after. It contains some general allegations as to discriminations in the supply of facilities and as to the hardships which will ensue. It states that there will be 'a multiplicity of suits,' there being at least 'fifty thousand persons of the negro race in the State of Oklahoma' who will be injured and deprived of their civil rights. But we are dealing here with the case of the complainants, and nothing is shown to entitle them to an injunction. It is an elementary principle that, in order to justify the granting of this extraordinary relief, the complainant's need of it, and the absence of an adequate remedy at law, must clearly appear. The complainant cannot succeed because someone else may be hurt. Nor does it make any difference that other persons, who may be injured are persons of the same race or occupation. It is the fact, clearly established, of injury to the complainant-not to otherswhich justifies judicial intervention. Williams v. Hagood, 98 U. S. 72, 74, 75; Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 325, 328, 329; Tyler v. Judges, 179 U. S. 405, 406; Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 60; Davis & Farnum v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 220; Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415, 419; Braxton County Court v. West Virginia, 208 U. S. 192; 197; Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288, 295, 296. The allegations of the amended bill, so far as they pur port to show discriminations in the conduct of these carriers, are these: "That notwithstanding the terms of said Act of Congress and of the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma, the said above named defendants and each of them are making distinctions in the civil rights of your orators and of all other persons of the negro race and persons of the white race in the conduct and operation of its trains and passenger service in the State of Oklahoma, in this, to wit: that equal comforts, conveniences and accommodations will not be provided for your orators and other persons of the negro race; that said passenger coaches are not constructed or maintained so as to enable persons of the negro race to be provided with separate and equal toilet and waiting rooms for male and female passengers of said negro race, nor have equal smoking car accommodations, nor separate and equal chair cars, sleeping cars and dining car accommodations by providing for your orators and other persons of the negro race who may become passengers on said railroad, that separate waiting rooms with equal comforts and conveniences have been or are bound to be constructed by said defendants and each of them for your orators and other persons of the negro race desiring to become passengers on said railroad, and that said orators are not being and will not be provided with equal accommodations with the white race under the provisions of said act." We agree with the court below that these allegations are altogether too vague and indefinite to warrant the relief sought by these complainants. It is not alleged that any one of the complainants has ever traveled on any one of the five railroads, or has ever requested transportation on any of them; or that any one of the complainants has ever requested that accommodations be furnished to him in any sleeping cars, dining cars or chair cars; or that any of these five companies has ever notified any one of these complainants that such accommodations would not be furnished to him, when furnished to others, upon reasonable request and payment of the customary charge. Nor is there anything to show that in case any of these complainants offers himself as a passenger on any of these roads and is refused accommodations equal to those afforded to others on a like journey, he will not have an adequate remedy at law. The desire to obtain a sweeping injunction cannot be accepted as a substitute for compliance with the general rule that the complainant must present facts sufficient to show that his individual need requires the remedy for which he asks. The bill is wholly destitute of any sufficient ground for injunction and unless we are to ignore settled principles governing equitable relief, the decree must be affirmed. Decree affirmed. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES, MR. JUSTICE LAMAR and MR. JUSTICE MCREYNOLDS Concur in the result. LOUISIANA RAILWAY & NAVIGATION COMPANY v. BEHRMAN, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA. No. 49. Argued November 4, 5, 1914.-Decided November 30, 1914. While the jurisdiction of this court under § 237, Judicial Code, may not attach where the state court gave no effect to the state enactment claimed to have impaired the obligation of a contract, where the State does give effect to later legislation which does impair the obligation of a contract, if one exists, this court has jurisdiction to, and must, determine for itself whether there is an existing contract, even though the state court may have put its decision upon the ground GUINN AND BEAL v. UNITED STATES. CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. No. 96. Argued October 17, 1913.-Decided June 21, 1915. The so-called Grandfather Clause of the amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma of 1910 is void because it violates the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The Grandfather Clause being unconstitutional and not being separable from the remainder of the amendment to the constitution of Oklahoma of 1910, that amendment as a whole is invalid. The Fifteenth Amendment does not, in a general sense, take from the States the power over suffrage possessed by the States from the beginning, but it does restrict the power of the United States or the States to abridge or deny the right of a citizen of the United States to vote on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. While the Fifteenth Amendment gives no right of suffrage, as its command is self-executing, rights of suffrage may be enjoyed by reason of the striking out of discriminations against the exercise of the right. A provision in a state constitution recurring to conditions existing before the adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment and the continuance of which conditions that amendment prohibited, and making those conditions the test of the right to the suffrage is in conflict with, and void under, the Fifteenth Amendment. The establishment of a literacy test for exercising the suffrage is an exercise by the State of a lawful power vested in it not subject to the supervision of the Federal courts. Whether a provision in a suffrage statute may be valid under the Federal Constitution, if it is so connected with other provisions that are invalid, as to make the whole statute unconstitutional, is a ques |