Additionally, C-130 aircraft are programed to operate from Zaragoza in support of SACEUR in wartime, as are special operations aircraft.

Moron. Moron is programed to receive C-130 squadrons in sup port of SACEUR during wartime.

LOGISTIC AND COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN SPAIN

Munitions and petroleum stocks for U.S. Navy Forces in the Mediterranean are stored in Spain, as well as petroleum for the U.S. Air Forces in Europe.

Assuming availability of real estate, relocation of these stocks would require extensive construction which would be very costly. Further concentration of stocks, a serious problem anyway throughout Europe, would reduce operational flexibility and increase both political and military vulnerability.

Miscellaneous sites.-Five tropospheric scatter sites are located in Spain. These sites provide long haul, high-density communications support to U.S. Forces and Government activities in the Mediterranean, Middle East, and Africa.

They are a major part of protected mainline routes to southern Italy, Greece, and Turkey, forming a route not proximate to the Warsaw Pact countries. This route connects to the trans-Alpine route in Italy. Loss of these sites would reduce flexibility and increase vulnerability of command and control communications. There are no suitable alternatives.

Similarly, relocation of the Navy weapons maintenance facility supporting patrol aircraft covering the eastern Atlantic and western Mediterranean would result in degraded flexibility and responsiveness in employment of these weapon systems.

Loss of the loran C station would incapacitate the loran C system in the western basin of the Mediterranean. Finally, the transmitter site for naval communications station for Spain is located at Moron. Without this facility naval communications would be degraded.

Gentlemen, this concludes my statement. I hope that it has added to your appreciation of the importance the new treaty has for maintaining our defensive capabilities in Europe, for promoting the integration of Spain in the European community, and for improving United States-Spanish relations. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. The lights up there mean that we have a vote in the House which will be followed immediately by four more votes. The first vote will be concluded in 15 minutes, and the other four votes will be each 5 minutes thereafter. We will stand in informal recess until we get finished with the votes. Then we will come back and ask you some questions.

One of the things that occurs to me, which you might be thinking about while we are gone is whether you have any information as to what a denial of this treaty might cost the United States financially. I think that this would add to our understanding. Another question is what the political ramifications would be of such a denial.

We will stand in informal recess until after the last vote.

[A short recess was taken.]

Mr. FASCELL. Let us get back on the record.

Mr. Secretary, would you like to discuss the two aspects of the matter that I left with you when we recessed?

Mr. BERGOLD. I was very struck, Mr. Chairman, with your including the political and economic implications in our basing structure in Spain, because I think that this is a very important dimension.

One of the things it does for you, I think, is to add a kind of three dimension complexity into any assessment that we try to make of relocation costs. What are the economics of getting out of Spain.

If you just take a simple scenario of moving those things which could be done in Spain, elsewhere in Europe where they also could be done, and not doing the things that are uniquely able to be done in Spain because of geography, you come to a figure that is in excess of $200 million. That in itself is not a realistic figure because it is very doubtful, both politically and economically, or perhaps logistically is the right word, that the absorptive capacity exists in, let us say, the Federal Republic of Germany or the United Kingdom to take some of the units that we have in Spain.

Therefore, you would probably have to, in the real world situation, return some of those activities to the United States where their operations would be even more costly than the figure that I suggested.

Perhaps most important are the things that you could not do anywhere else in Europe. I would point particularly there to our air-to-ground and air-to-air training facilities for aircraft at the Bardenas Reales range outside of Zaragoza.

There is no place, having lost Wheelus in Libya, there is no place in Europe with the combination of space and fair weather conditions to reproduce the kind of facilities we have at Bardenas Reales.

To handle that kind of a training problem would probably require the redeployment, on a temporary basis, of those training units to the United States, and indeed the Southwestern part of the United States. That would, obviously, be at a much bigger cost than is true with the Spanish facility.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Secretary, I don't suppose that an actual breakdown really exists, based on the kind of scenario you have given us. Mr. BERGOLD. Not in detail, but we have provided to the staff of the subcommittee, when Ambassador McCloskey and I were before you, some details on this. It is a very complex one to try and set down on paper, and I don't think that we have much more than we gave you then. If we do, we would be very, very happy to supply it for the record.1

Mr. FASCELL. What about the political aspects of this matter, assuming that there were no treaty?

Mr. BERGOLD. Certainly, I will defer to Mr. Laingen on this, but I would say, from my own personal experience of having lived in Spain for 5 years and having been there frequently since, the latest time being the week before last, that clearly the implications of not ratifying this treaty, not approving this agreement, would be very serious for the present Spanish Government.

It would, I think, amount to a vote of no confidence in that Government. It would be seen, not only by Spaniards, but by Europeans in general, as an indication that the United States did not have a great degree of confidence and trust that this Government can see the Span

1 The information is classified and will be retained in subcommittee files.

ish State through the post-Franco period. That is probably the consequences that this would have.

STATEMENT OF L. BRUCE LAINGEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. LAINGEN. I certainly would agree with that, Mr. Chairman. It would be a vote of no confidence as to the capacity of that Government to continue in its present course, encouraging the process of political revolution. This is not to say that we are trying to tie this treaty entirely to that process. That would be wrong too.

The objective that we share very broadly, as far as Spain is concerned, is to encourage a trend toward associating Spain more closely with institutions of the Atlantic community, and particularly NATO. There is also, of course, the adverse impact that that kind of situation would have for our broader interests in Spain, going well beyond purely the defense and political, including our economic interests in Spain. These also could be adversely affected by that kind of situation.

Mr. FASCELL. What does the treaty provide, if anything, with respect to the use of facilities in the event of an outbreak in the Middle East, particularly with respect to the logistical supply of Israel by the United States?

Mr. BERGOLD. Although the treaty is silent on this matter, we would be clearly obligated to consult with the Spanish and get their approval, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. That is the same position that we were in the last time.

Mr. BERGOLD. Yes, and perhaps more explicit.

Mr. FASCELL. What does that mean? We did not have anything in the agreement the last time.

Mr. BERGOLD. We were obligated to a process of consultation, which was, I think, sufficiently flexible that we did not have to be too specific.

I think, just in realistic terms, not just what the treaty says, but the politics of the situation, the committee should simply assume that in the future Spanish acquiescence to such a move would be required. Mr. FASCELL. Why is this agreement now, for the first time, in treaty form? Is that a response to a congressional initiative or was it a Spanish request? Is this just politics by the administration?

Mr. LAINGEN. I can assure you that it is not politics by the administration. It is the product, I think, of mutual understanding on the part of ourselves and the Spanish, and particularly an expressed desire on the part of the Spanish Government, that this kind of overall broad relationship in a variety of fields, defense, economic, cultural, be incorporated this time at a higher level in terms of a formal treaty between our two Governments.

I would say, with specific reference to your question, that the principal initiative has come from the Spanish Government.

Mr. BERGOLD. On the defense side of that, the inclusion of a joint planning staff which I discussed at some length in my statement, along with several other aspects, give clear evidence that this is an enriched kind of relationship between the United States and Spain.

It is a fuller and broader kind of relationship in the defense area as well as in other areas than the ones we have had before. I think that the administration for that reason, too, thought it appropriate to elevate it to the level of a treaty.

Mr. FASCELL. Thank you.

Mr. Winn, any questions?

Mr. WINN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Last week, when the King was here, there was a luncheon with members of the International Relations Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the King was pretty positive in the attitude toward NATO, that they would hope to be a full member, is the way that he put it, within 3 years.

I just wondered if that opinion was shared by the NATO countries. Are they proceeding in that direction also?

Mr. BERGOLD. I have talked to a good many of our officials in the Governments of our NATO allies, Mr. Winn, over the past 8 or 9 months on this issue, most recently with some of them in Oslo at the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council a few weeks ago.

I would say that there is clearly a much more extensive sympathy toward Spain and toward its eventual incorporation in both the European communities and in NATO. The Spanish themselves have been discussing this with Europeans, and there has been a good deal of interchange on the subject since the new government took over, including a broad range of travels by the Spanish Foreign Minister to NATO capitals.

The Spanish have talked in the same time frame that you have mentioned, Mr. Winn, and there is, I think, a general feeling on the part of Europeans that that kind of time frame is reasonable. Many Europeans look for Spanish accession to the European communities, perhaps, as a first step, and NATO as a second step, but that is only a matter of phasing.

So, I think that the answer to your question is, yes, there is increased sympathy.

Mr. WINN. The reason I asked that, of course, is that the Vatican and the European community both delayed any discussions or agreements with Franco last year, or as late as last year. I just wondered, because of the change in the government, if that attitude had changed. What about the Vatican, have you had any communication with them, or do you know what their attitude is toward Spain now? Mr. BERGOLD. Is that on the Concordat?

Mr. LAINGEN. I don't know that we have any particular indication, other than the general sense of sympathy and the positive approach, obviously, of the Vatican toward the evolution in Spain.

The church, of course, in Spain had become much more politically involved, if you will, well before the Franco departure, and in large part because of the Franco regime. So I think that that increased interest, that positive attitude on the part of the church in Spain toward the prospect of political evolution, closer integration of Spain with NATO would also be reflected, or is also reflected in the attitude of the Vatican toward Spain.

Of course, the Foreign Minister has recently been in Italy, and has had talks with the Pope. Discussions as to the future of the Concordat between the two governments, the Vatican and Spain, are still going

on. I would not predict at this time just what that is going to be. There will be change, but it will certainly take place over a period of time. It is not something that we expect to be concluded over the next several months.

Mr. WINN. Every time we meet, and several of us have been to Rota, each time we meet with the Spanish, we talk about Rota and our subs there. They have apparently been included in the SALT talks.

I just wondered in my own mind, trying to get it straight, what relationship is there between SALT, this treaty, and NATO and U.S. needs. Can you kind of review that as far as

STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. PATRICK J. HANNIFIN, U.S. NAVY, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR PLANS, POLICY, AND OPERATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Admiral HANNIFIN. Mr. Winn, I don't believe that there is a direct relationship between SALT talks and the presence of our Poseidon submarines in Rota. The SALT talks have been involved in numbers rather than in specific locations.

As far as our ability to continue to carry out our commitments of both to our own strategic deterrence and to that of NATO, whether we are in Rota or not in Rota, it will not change it. We will continue to be able to carry out the commitments with the Poseidon submarines there.

The Spanish, really, were not concerned, nor did we get into discussions with them as to how those submarines from Rota related to our discussions with the Soviets, and so on.

Mr. WINN. Did any of you give the total number of U.S. military personnel in Spain, on our three bases?

Admiral HANNIFIN. There are about 10,000 of them. We have probably 15,000 dependents, and about 10,000 military overall in all of Spain. The 15,000 dependents is by use of 1.5 dependents per military. Mr. BERGOLD. We can be precise for the record.1

Mr. WINN. That would be fine.

It is my understanding that a poll taken by the Spanish people, I don't know what percentage answered the poll and usually this has a bearing on it, half of them do not want us to keep our bases there.

The King, being relatively new, and some people already think on shaky ground, that is pretty tough opposition when approximately half the people, or half the people polled because we all know that this is a big difference, might not want us there. That is kind of tough competition.

Mr. BERGOLD. As you suggest, Mr. Winn, the real issue is, or the real question is: Is there significant opposition in Spanish public opinion to U.S. presence in Spain? I would suggest that this Government, which is very sensitive to the political realities with which it must grapple internally and which clearly puts the highest priority on those realities as opposed to external ones at the moment, would not conclude an agreement which it thought was so unpopular with the Spanish public that it would determine the political position of that Gov

ernment.

1 The material is classified and will be retained in the subcommittee files.