that, while Spain is not a member of NATO, its indirect contribution through the use by the United States of these facilities is a rather significant support of NATO.

Now, with respect to the Mediterranean and the southern flank, as you know, the Rota Naval Base, in addition to its harboring the nuclear submarines, as it has for some years now, is the base that is used in support of the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Navy places great store by the facilities it enjoys at Rota.

If you put together the total availability that the United States enjoys in Spain, I think it cannot be argued any other way, that we are improving or assisting our strategic interests in the general area, including the Mediterranean.

Mr. SOLARZ. One final question, Mr. Chairman. What would you say, Mr. Ambassador, are the prospects for the admission of Spain to NATO and on what factors does that question hinge?

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. At the present time, I would say they are quite limited. I think myself it will be quite a long period of time yet, relatively long period of time yet, before political attitudes in the capitals in Europe toward Spain change. I think it fair to say that they are changing, for the obvious reason that the regime now-the political regime in Spain is completely different in makeup, and it will have to be that the governments within the alliance will have to mark Spain as acceptable for membership, so it hinges on the attitude of other governments in Europe which, I think, are changing, but have not changed enough so that anyone could say, in any given period of time, that Spain will become a member of NATO.

It has been a matter of U.S. policy to support Spanish membership in NATO for some 10 to 15 years that I am aware of.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Ambassador, Mr. Bingham and I have some questions to ask you, but, with your permission, we would like to interrupt the proceedings to hear one of our witnesses who was scheduled earlier and who was temporarily delayed.

Mr. MCCLOSKEY. Surely.

Mr. FASCELL. You can stay right there, if you like. You don't have to move back.

We would like to call up now one of our distinguished colleagues, the Honorable Bella Abzug from the State of New York, who is the chairperson of the Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights and who has demonstrated a keen interest and considerable leadership in a wide variety of foreign policy and defense matters.

STATEMENT OF HON. BELLA S. ABZUG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

MS. ABZUG. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you, and I hope that this interruption will not cause any inconvenience.

I testified against ratifying this treaty in the Senate, and I would like, Mr. Chairman, to incorporate that testimony in the record. Mr. FASCELL. Without objection, so ordered.

[Ms. Abzug's prepared statement follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. BELLA S. ABZUG, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to testify before you on the proposed American treaty with the Government of Spain.

I strongly believe that support for the treaty would be a hasty step onto uncertain ground. At the very least, we should postpone any immediate action to approve the treaty until the political situation in Spain is resolved in favor of the establishment of a democratic government, both in form and in practice.

We are currently witnessing a critical period in the determination of Spain's political future. As Americans deeply concerned with basic freedoms and civil rights, we should not take any action which might encourage the anti-democratic forces in Spain who wish to preserve the fossilized Franco political structure. Approval of this treaty would send a signal to Franco's heirs that our Government will support Spain no matter how slowly or haltingly democratic reforms are made. Unfortunately, the government of King Juan Carlos remains an oppressive government-shaky at its base, undemocratic and repressive. There is tremendous polarization at all levels. The Christian Science Monitor on May 20th quoted one of Spain's top journalists as saying: "There is no single 'government,' just factions ✶✶✶ (the King, the Interior Minister and the Prime Minister) are each strong on various days. But power vacillates and policy changes. "The government' does not really exist."

Uncertainty is indeed the outstanding characteristic of the Juan Carlos government at this time. There have been promises of reform, but we have yet to witness any lasting qualitative changes in Spain's political system. Two recent examples illustrate the problem.

On May 25, the Spanish Parliament approved a bill which removed the requirement for official authorization of indoor meetings of 20 or more people. Yet authorities retained discretionary powers to ban such meetings nonetheless. On June 10, when several hundred supporters of a general amnesty for political prisoners and exiles planned to gather for a meeting in a Madrid restaurant, police headquarters banned the assembly. According to the New York Times of June 11: "The feeling was created that law or no law, the Government would continue, as in the past, to determine who can meet and who cannot."

The second example concerns political parties. On June 9, a law was passed legalizing political parties. But on June 10, antidemocratic forces in the Parliament managed to obstruct a bill which would have lifted the stiff criminal penalties now in force from the Franco penal code against free political activity. So the issue of whether or not political parties will be entitled to civil liberties remains in doubt.

The political situation in Spain is very fluid. The establishment of authentic democratic institutions is uncertain. That is why I am concerned that approval of the treaty's provisions would imply that the government of Juan Carlos has the support of the United States in whatever it chooses to do *** whether it bans political meetings, retains harsh penalties against the practice of liberty or represses trade unions.

Let us wait and see what develops in Spain before giving uncritical support to the Juan Carlos government. Our friendship must be for the people of Spain and the people have not yet had the opportunity to make their voices heard. I hope this committee will take into account that a democratically elected Government in Spain might wish to negotiate a different treaty than the one now under consideration, or none at all. By approving the treaty now, the Congress would place itself in the position of imposing a pact upon the people of Spain over which they have had no say.

I look forward to the day when I could testify in support of a treaty of true friendship and cooperation because that is what the relationship between the Spanish and American people should be. But that day has not yet come. By delaying action on the administration's proposed treaty, however, I believe we can hasten that day's arrival.

TESTIMONY OF REPRESENTATIVE BELLA ÁBZUG BEFORE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON PROPOSED U.S. TREATY WITH SPAIN, March 24, 1976

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to testify before you on the proposed U.S. treaty with the government of Spain.

We can all appreciate the uniqueness of these hearings. This is the first time in the history of the 23-year direct military relationship between our Government and the Spanish Government that any Americans except for those in the executive branch who wrote, negotiated and signed the previous secret agreements with Spain-have been allowed a voice in determining what the relationship between these two governments should be.

I hope the Senate will use its newly bestowed voice to reject this treaty. At the very least, it should postpone any immediate action to approve the treaty until the political situation, in Spain is resolved in favor of the establishment of a democratic government, both in form and in practice.

It should take into account that a democratically elected government in Spain might wish to negotiate a different treaty than the one now under consideration, or none at all. By ratifying a treaty, with unnecessary haste-because as we know, the current agreement does not expire until September 1976-the Senate would place itself in the position of imposing a pact upon the people of Spain over which they have had no say.

It would be far better to use our voice to let the Spanish population hear from us at last that we will no longer use the wealth, power and military might of the greatest democracy on earth to deprive them of their hope of democracy. It has been a long-deferred hope.

In the 1930's, the American Embargo on aid to the democratically elected Government of Spain when it was under attack by the military forces of General Francisco Franco, with the assistance of Hitler and Mussolini, was one of the most shameful episodes in American foreign policy. That episode was converted into a policy of outright and permanent support for the Franco regime, as it consolidated its power over the people of Spain through total suppression of their liberties.

Political parties were suppressed, unions outlawed, strikers drafted into the army or shot, the opposition press shut down, thousands imprisoned, and living and working conditions kept at abysmal level for the benefit of Franco's party and Spanish-owned and American-owned business and industry.

While other NATO countries refused to enter into any agreement with the Franco dictatorship, the United States Government gave respectability, stature and military support to, the repressive government.

Whatever inclination there may have been among the Spanish population to seek overtly to regain their lost liberties must have been inhibited by their knowledge of the presence in their land of American military bases, nuclear missile submarines and thousands of American military personnel.

Like the people of Chile, Greece and the Nations of Southeast Asia, the Spanish people have learned to see the United States not as a defender of democracy but as a staunch supporter of anti-Democratic governments. The future standing of the United States in a rapidly changing world can only be weakened and undermined by such a continuing perception of the U.S. role in Spain.

The treaty before you is described as a "treaty of friendship and cooperation between the United States of America and Spain," but, in fact, it is a treaty between two governments, and specifically with the oppressive government of King Juan Carlos, the ruler bequeathed to Spain by Franco.

In his testimony before this committee on March 3, Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey referred several times to the "new era” in Spain, cited that country's "progress toward democracy" and said approval of the treaty would be "a clear sign of our moral support for Spain at this time."

What is happening in Spain at this time?

Where Ambassador McCloskey sees "progress," others see only a feeble pretext toward progress. Clearly, the developing Democratic forces in Spain are not deceived by it.

Premier Carlos Arias Navarro remains in control of the hard-line government, while its base of support crumbles and opposition grows.

Recently, riot police sent in by the national government shot down four strikers in the Basque provinces of Northern Spain and used tear gas and brutality to suppress demonstrations by thousands of Basques who shouted, "Down with the Fascist monarchy of Juan Carlos."

It is significant that the workers' demonstrations were supported by the Catholic clergy, who are among the many dissident groups emerging in Spain. Time magazine reported March 15 that in the provincial town of Victoria, "with the clergy's blessing, striking workers met in illgeal assembly in the city's churches to air their demands for higher wages and their conviction that Madrid must yield more authority to local governments."

As recently as March 22, New York Times Correspondent Henry Giniger reported from Madrid that "of seven proposed measures to change the political and social face of Spain, the three-month-old government has acted on four, and only one of those is in effect."

He noted that "Government opponents on the left and in the center are critica! of the whole program because those changes already drawn up contain restrictions and allow the government to exercise arbitrary will; because the measures have been submitted to an essentially anti-reformist parliament where they may languish for months and emerge in a still more restrictive form; and because those changes yet to come are uncertain in nature and timing."

Uncertainty is indeed the outstanding characteristic of the Juan Carlos government at this time. Contrary to Ambassador McCloskey's assertion that ratification of this treaty at this time would encourage and "give positive impetus to the transition now under way in Spain," ratification now would imply that the government of Juan Carlos has the support of the United States in whatever it chooses to do. . . whether it shoots down strikers, represses trade unions, limits the formation of opposition political parties or restricts free speech and a free press.

Others who have appeared before this committee have argued very cogently that maintenance of military bases in Spain are not essential to the security of our country or to our NATO allies.

I fully associate myself with the views expressed by professor William Braasch Watson of Massachusetts Institute of Technology who described in detail why these bases have become technologically obsolete as far as American military interests are concerned. They no longer serve the function of providing base support for U.S. bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and tankers.

This is at least partly acknowledged by the U.S. agreement in this proposed treaty to withdraw its nuclear submarines from the Rota Base by July 1979. It apparently has done so not as a token of interest in limiting the potential of nuclear warfare, but in recognition of the fact that the greatly increased operating range of the Poseidon class submarines obviates the need for forward bases in Spain.

I might add that the hope that the Spanish bases might prove helpful to the United States in the Middle East, and particularly in support of the defense of Israel, was wiped out during the Yom Kippur War when the Spanish government called for a halt to the refueling of aircraft headed for Israel by U.S. aerial tankers based in Spain. In fact, since 1967, the Spanish government has not allowed the U.S. to use the bases for military or civilian activities related to an Arab-Israeli

war.

Although I do not intend to discuss the treaty itself in detail, I would like to call your attention to supplementary agreement number 7 in which the U.S. agrees to "continue to furnish on a grant basis training for personnel of the armed forces of Spain," at a value of $2 million a year or a total of $10 million for the five-year treaty.

I believe the committee should seek to ascertain what the nature of this training has been and will be, and whether the U.S. army will be training the Spanish armed forces in methods of riot control or other forms of forcible suppression that can be used against the Spanish population as they seek to achieve their democratic rights.

Mr. Chairman, the long-term interests of the American people would best be served by rejecting, or at the very least, delaying action on a treaty which provides more than one billion dollars in military and economic aid to a government that was created by dictator Francisco Franco and that remains an enemy of the Spanish people.

The Juan Carlos government is shaky. It is undemocratic. It lacks a popular base of support. Let us wait and see what happens to it instead of seeking to perpetuate it with a treaty of "friendship and cooperation." Our friendship must be for the people of Spain, not for their oppressors.

Ms. ABZUG. I welcome the opportunity to express my views here. I believe that support for the treaty is a hasty step on uncertain ground. This committee and the House should postpone any immediate action to approve funds for the treaty because, I believe, the treaty itself is unwise until the political situation in Spain is resolved in favor of the establishment of a democratic government, both in form and in practice.

Now, I listened to the questions that were asked of Ambassador McCloskey by Mr. Solarz, and I take the view that indeed the ratification of the treaty and the authorization of funds both will be a deterrent to the possible development of a democratic government in Spain.

I go into that in much greater detail in my testimony in the other body, but I will try to bring it up to date.

I said in my previous testimony that there was a tremendous amount of suppression being continued since the death of Franco. Political parties were suppressed, unions were outlawed, strikers drafted into the Army or shot, the opposition press shut down, thousands imprisoned, and living and working conditions kept at a dismal level for a continuation of the original Franco party and Spanish-owned and American-owned business and industry.

And I noted there that other NATO countries had refused to enter into an agreement with the Franco dictatorship, that the United States always gave respectability, stature, and military support to that government.

Now, at this particular moment, I feel that we are witnessing a very critical period in the determination of Spain's political future. As Americans that are deeply concerned with basic freedoms and civil rights, I think that it would be wrong if we took action which would encourage the antidemocratic forces in Spain who wish to preserve the fossilized Franco political structure. The approval of the treaty and the authorization of the funds would send a signal, in my opinion, to Franco's heirs that our Government will continue to support Spain, Franco's kind of Spain, and that, I think, would be a deterrent to development of any kind of democratic reform. There would be no reason to suggest that, if we entered into the treaty, that it would help democratic forces. Quite the contrary. It would be a signal to those forces which still have significant power there to shift any possibility of democratic movement in the other direction.

There is a very critical period which we are presently witnessing in the determination of Spain's political future. I believe that the government of King Juan Carlos remains an oppressive government, shaky at its base, undemocratic, and repressive. There is tremendous polarization at all levels.

The Christian Science Monitor on May 20 quoted one of Spain's top journalists as saying:

There is no single “government," just factions. [The King, the Interior Minister and the Prime Minister] are each strong on various days. But power vacillates and policy changes. "The Government' does not really exist.

Uncertainty is indeed the outstanding characteristic of the Juan Carlos government at this time. There have been promises of reform, but we have yet to witness any lasting qualitative changes in Spain's political system. Two recent examples illustrate the problem.