APPENDIX Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, Senate, Executive E, 94th Congress, 2d session... Page 75 Executive Report No. 94-25, report on Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain.. 109 Section 507(a) of Public Law 94-329 to amend the Foreign Assistance Act 119 121 Letter enclosing resolution from Mylio S. Kraja, Director, _National 124 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH SPAIN (Role of Spain in U.S. Defense Planning) TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1976 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C. The committee met at 2:15 p.m. in room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Mr. FASCELL. The subcommittee will come to order. Since the Truman administration first opened negotiations, successive U.S. Presidents have supported continuation of military base arrangements with Spain. In January of this year, the United States and Spain again agreed to continue the base agreement and for the first time decided that the provisions should be embodied in a treaty. The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation With Spain has been submitted to the Senate for ratification. It has been approved by the Committee on Foreign Relations but has not yet been acted on by the full Senate. In the resolution of ratification agreed to by the Senate committee, there is a provision adopted at the urging of the ranking majority member of the House International Relations Committee, the Honorable Clement Zablocki, that specifies that sums referred to shall be made available "through the normal procedures of the Congress, including the process of prior authorization and annual appropriations." This language confirms the view of most members of this committee regarding the essential role which the authorization committees of the House, including the International Relations Committee, should play in the provision of funds to carry out treaty commitments of the United States. Today, the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs initiates hearings which will serve as the basis for action on a bill to provide funds necessary for full implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation With Spain. We will, of course, finally act on such legislation in the House only if the Senate ratifies the treaty. Basic to an understanding of the need for the treaty and implementing legislation is a firm grasp of the political and military considerations which prompted President Ford to agree to the new treaty with Spain. To discuss these considerations, including the role of Spain in both NATO and U.S. defense planning, we are pleased to welcome to the subcommittee Harry E. Bergold, Jr., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, and formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Affairs. In order to answer questions, we also have the following witnesses: L. Bruce Laingen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and Vice Adm. Patrick J. Hannifin, U.S. Navy, who is the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, Department of Defense. Secretary Bergold, you have a prepared statement. Please proceed. STATEMENT OF HARRY E. BERGOLD, JR., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS) Mr. BERGOLD. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to discuss the prospective role of Spain in the United States and the NATO defense planning under the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, and to provide overall U.S. rationale for maintenance of security relationship arrangements with Spain. As you are aware, U.S. cooperation with Spain has evolved since 1953, from simple base rights arrangements to broader relationships covering both military and nonmilitary matters. Inherent in this evolution has been U.S. recognition and support of Spain's desire and potential for increased participation in all aspects of the European community of nations: cultural, economic, and military. The United States has long recognized Spain's potential for contribution to European security, and actively supports closer Spanish military cooperation with NATO and eventually Spanish accession to full membership status in that organization. The new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation does not commit the United States to the defense of Spain. However, it does recognize Spain's contributions to Western security, and it does establish a United States-Spanish defense relationship which will seek to enhance further their own security and that of the Western World. It also commits the two parties to the treaty to work toward development of appropriate coordination with NATO. The United States is, of course, on record as supporting Spain's full membership in NATO. To these ends, under the new treaty, Spain and the United States will seek to develop appropriate plans and coordination between their respective armed forces through a combined military coordination and planning staff. This staff will work under policy guidance from the United StatesSpanish Council, headed on the Spanish side by the Spanish Foreign Minister and the U.S. Secretary of State. This staff will coordinate those military activities in which Spain and the United States cooperate, such as joint exercises. It will also engage in some contingency planning in areas of common interest, which are specified in the treaty, and which include only areas within the NATO Treaty area. The planning will be contingent in nature, subject to review by higher civilian and military authorities within both governments and will, therefore, represent no U.S. commitment to carry out such plans. The planning and coordination will be in the context of a Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe generally and will be designed to develop active roles for Spanish forces to complement existing Western plans and operations. We are presently studying within the executive branch the terms of reference for this staff and plan shortly to complete a draft which will be jointly approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States and Spain, and will have the concurrence of respective national authorities as specified in the treaty. The United States-Spanish combined military coordination and planning staff will further elaborate the role of Spain and the United States, and NATO defense planning. The overall U.S. rationale for maintaining security arrangements with Spain reflects not only U.S. recognition of Spain's potential to contribute actively to Western defense, but also our recognition of the importance of U.S. facilities on Spanish territory. U.S. military forces and activities in Spain directly assist NATO in fulfilling its deterrent and potential wartime roles, and in a limited degree provide the United States with options for unilateral contingency operations in the Mediterranean, subject of course to Spanish acquiescence. The missions of these units are inseparably linked to NATO defense and directly support NATO strategy. A neutral Spain in a NATOWarsaw Pact war would result in the denial of Spanish military facilities to U.S. forces in support of NATO operations. Denial of Spanish facilities would seriously affect the capability of the United States to reinforce NATO. The shrinkage of the NATO basing structure in Malta, Morocco, France and Libya in recent years has greatly increased the strategic importance of Spanish bases relative to the Mediterranean area. Spain commands the sea approaches to the Western Mediterranean through which pass an average of 130 ships per day. Moreover, Spain's northern Atlantic coast is proximate to the southern approach to the English Channel, which sees an average of 280 ships pass per day. Spain's Canary Islands occupy a favorable position with respect to the Atlantic Narrows; virtually all oil shipping from the Persian Gulf to Europe transits those Narrows. Forces operating from modern seaports and good naval and air facilities in Spain could control two major seaways to NATO Europe. Bases in Spain are well buffered by distance from the Warsaw Pact nations and provide a relatively secure staging point for the introduction of reinforcement and resupply. The facilities in Spain also contribute to our European/Mediterranean defense posture by providing support of ballistic missile submarines; tactical fighter aircraft; facilities for strategic air command aircraft; and logistic support for the 6th Fleet. Additionally, facilities in Spain provide an aerial gunnery range to train U.S. Air Forces in Europe tactical fighter units, antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance in the eastern Atlantic and western Mediterranean, munitions and petroleum storage for U.S. Navy and Air Force units, and aerial tanker support for tactical fighter training of U.S. Air Forces in Europe and for Strategic Air Command aircraft in the event they are directed to assume an airborne-alert posture. They further provide for staging of tactical airlift in support of SACEUR requirements, major command, control, and communications in the Mediterranean area, and air and surface facilities on the Mediterranean and Atlantic for sea control and antisubmarine warfare augmentation forces from the continental United States. Transit of Spanish territory and the use of its operational and support facilities are of great importance to NATO. Access to and support for Allied Forces Southern Europe forces are largely dependent on Spain. Use of highly developed U.S. communications, training, logistic, and base structure facilities in Spain would be critical to successful operations in the Allied Forces Southern Europe region. If Spanish base facilities were denied, U.S. Forces would have to relocate elsewhere within Europe or withdraw to the United States. Bases elsewhere in Europe, which are already crowded with peacetime loading, would be overburdened with wartime loading. In any case, relocation within Europe might not be economically, militarily, or politically feasible. Let me go into a little more detail about the particular base facilities in Spain. THE TACTICAL FIGHTER WING AT TORREJON WITH ITS F-4's Torrejon permanently maintains a tactical fighter wing that is assigned a strike mission, which would be launched from Aviano Air Base, Italy, and Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. In peacetime, 12 to 18 aircraft are continually deployed to Incirlik. Relocation of the fighter wing to bases outside of Spain would significantly reduce contingency and wartime deployment flexibility. Aviano Air Base and Incirlik Air Base are not equipped to handle permanent peacetime basing of this unit without extensive construction. Relocation to a base in Germany would limit flexibility for future force changes, and significantly reduce U.S. Force presence on the southern flanks. THE OTHER BASE FACILITIES AT TORREJON Torrejon also serves as a major reinforcement, staging, and logistic airlift base. C-130 squadrons supporting SACEUR's logistic requirements in wartime are planned to operate from Torrejon. The loss of the staging and refueling capability at Torrejon would have an adverse impact on the capability to reinforce and resupply central Europe. Zaragoza. About 70 percent of the air-to-ground and 50 percent of the air-to-air weapons training for U.S. Forces in Europe is conducted in Spain. Alternate range facilities are not now available. |