Burchard v. Hubbard et al. extended to the center of the river, and, computing the quantity of land between low-water mark and the center of the river, there is then more than sufficient to make up the number of acres called for by the agreement. In the case of Gavit v. Chambers, 3 Ohio, 495, it is said: "In Ohio, owners of land situated on the banks of navigable streams, running through the state, are also owners of the beds of the river to the middle of the stream, as at common law, subject only to the easement of navigation." This is undoubtedly correct; and in Benner's Lessee v. Platter et al., 6 Ohio, 504, it is said a call for a stream, not navigable, is a call for the main branch of such stream, and the boundary is the middle of the stream. But, nevertheless, it is certain, in the computation of the number of acres in a survey, for that purpose, the stream, at low-water mark, is the boundary. This result requires of the respondent, to satisfy the terms of his agreement, to convey to the complainant, from the two out-lots, sufficient to make up the deficiency in the alluvion, and a decree may be so entered. Decree for complainant. 316] *SARDIS Burchard v. PlINY HUBBARD, GEORGE F. WHITAKER, AND BENEDICT BROOKS. A tax title is invalid when the land has been listed, forfeited, and sold, “as one hundred and twenty acres in the Whitaker reserve," there being one thousand two hundred and eighty acres in the reserve. Where a person, without title, conveys by deed of warranty, and afterward receives title as trustee from the rightful owner, for the purpose of transmitting it to a bona fide purchaser, the doctrine of estoppel does not defeat the trust estate. THIS was a bill in chancery from the county of Sandusky. In November, 1822, a patent issued to Elizabeth Whitaker for 1,280 acres of land, being the "Whitaker reserve," in Sandusky county. On June 3, 1823, Elizabeth Whitaker conveyed the entire reserve to George F. Whitaker, in fee; and on October 10, 1823, George F. conveyed in fee 190 acres, in which was included the land here in controversy, to Isaac Whitaker. Burchard v. Hubbard et al. On October 12, 1823, Isaac mortgaged his tract of 190 acres to James Whitaker, to secure the payment, on August 12, 1832, of $400, with annual interest. The taxes being unpaid in December, 1831, part of the land was sold at a tax sale to R. Dickinson, who received a tax deed. The auditor's deed recites a sale of 120 acres, and purports to convey "140 acres of land in the Whitaker reserve," without any other description. Shortly after his purchase, Dickinson agreed to hold the land for the benefit of Isaac, and reconvey to him upon reimbursement of the amount paid and expenses. But Dickinson, having some transactions by which, on settlement, he fell in debt to George F. Whitaker, transferred to George F. this tax title, by deed dated January 15, 1834, to be held upon the same terms as it had been by Dickinson. *In June, 1834, the complainant, Burchard, talked of pur. [317 chasing the tract of 190 acres, and with a view to effect a sale of the property to satisfy the mortgage, and the tax incumbrance, and to secure the residue to the benefit of Isaac, James executed and deposited with his agent, Dickinson, a release of the mortgago, leaving a blank for the name of the grantee, to be filled up when an arrangement should be effected. In March, 1835, Burchard agreed to purchase this tract of 190 acres, of George F. Whitaker, for $800, with Dickinson's assent, but upon condition that the sale should be approved by James and Isaac. It was approved of, with the understanding that $200 should be invested in wild lands for Isaac's benefit. Dickinson, being a lawyer, was consulted as to the best mode of transferring the title. He advised that, instead of conveying directly to the complainant Burchard, Isaac should make a deed to George F., in whom it was supposed the tax title was already vested, and that George F. Whitaker should then convey to Burchard, who would thus derive a perfect and unincumbered title. On April 12, 1835, a deed to George F. was made by Isaac, and left in Dickinson's hands, by whom it was retained until July, 1835, when it, together with a release of the mortgage by James, was delivered to the complainant Burchard, and they were by him, on the 14th of August, handed over for record. On the 3d of November following, George F. Whitaker executed a deed, in fee, for the land, to the complainant. But, in the meantime, George F. Whitaker, on July 15, 1834, Burchard v. Hubbard et al. had sold this same tract of land, for $700, to the defendant, Pliny Hubbard, to whom, on June 24, 1835, having received the whole. purchase money, he made a deed in fee for 150 acres off the west part of the 190 acres. This deed was recorded, June 26, 1835. In 1838, Hubbard sold and conveyed to Brooks. 318] *Neither Hubbard nor Brooks had any actual notice of the transactions of George F. Whitaker with the complainant, but they were informed and believed that George F. had a perfect title. The complainant had no notice of the transaction between George F. and Hubbard. This bill is filed by Burchard, setting forth his title, and praying to be quieted therein. The defendants, Hubbard and Brooks, answer, denying all notice of Burchard's interest, and claim that they are bona fide purchasers, and have an equity prior to the complainant's, for which they claim protection. C. L. BOALT, for complainant: Under the pleadings in this case, the defendant can not rely on being a bona fide purchaser, without notice for a full consideration. If the defendant would rely on this character to protect a disclosure, he should mako his defense by plea, Story's Eq. Pl. 463, 465; and if he answers, at all, he must answer fully every allegation that bears upon the question of notice; and a general answer is not sufficient. Id 654. The tax title, which is the only one that connects George F. with the legal estate, prior to the conveyance by George F. to Hubbard, is defective, and can not be relied on for any purpose. There are several adjudged cases, in our reports, in point. 5 Ohio, 458; 2 Ohio, 287; 6 Ohio, 391; 10 Ohio, 556. The subsequent passing of the title through George F. Whitaker, will not inure to invest Hubbard with any better title than George F. then had. The law of estoppel could only apply between George F. and Hubbard, in a court of law. It could not be extended to the complainant. No one is bound by an estoppel who can not take advantage of it. It is mutual in its application. Here Hubbard and Burchard derived their titles from different sources. The assertion of title by George F. Whitaker was adverse to the inter319] ests of James and Isaac. They could not stand together. Neither is the complainant's conscience bound in equity. If the act of George F., in attempting to convey without title, could Burchard v. Hubbard et al. have any effect on him, it was equally a fraud on him as on Hubbard; and how can an equity arise against him out of such a state of facts? In the course of transmitting this title to effect another object, it was passed through George F., but Hubbard was not affected by it, or misled as to George F.'s rights. The mischief which affected him was already done. Had he been injured by that act, he might have some reason to complain; but such was not the case. Here George F. was made use of as a mere conductor, to transmit the title to another; and as dower will not attach in favor of the wife, where the estate is passed through the husband, and a mortgage taken back to secure the purchase money, on the completing a purchase, so, here, it will not inure to vest any better estate in the grantee than George F. had. The complainant had the better equity in the estate, and Hubbard was chargeable with notice. If Hubbard had no legal estate by virtue of the tax title, he can not rely on the plea of bona fide purchaser. If he had, he was chargeable with notice by the record, and by the adverse possession, or both. If chargeable with notice by the record, he must be taken to be advised of all they contain; but the records do not disclose the fact that George F. held the tax title as a lien for his advances only, and if that title is valid to convey a legal estate, he would still be without notice of the latent equity. This is not the case, however, in respect to his negligence to prosecute inquiries of the person in possession. As an inquiry, in that quarter, would have led to a knowledge of all the rights of Isaac and complainant, the notice will operate commensurate with the right, both as to the trust attaching to the tax title, and also as to the outstanding recorded title. We rely, also with confidence, on our objections to the tax title; and, in either case, if notice was 'conveyed, Hubbard will, himself, stand in no better position, in respect to the rights of the complainant than if the estate had passed through *Hubbard, instead of George F. Such [320 being the case, as the trust had attached in favor of the complainant, from whom the consideration moved, before the deed was executed to George F., Hubbard would be held, in equity, subject to the same remedies with George F. In order for Hubbard, being himself chargeable with notice, to set up title by virtue of VOL. XI-18 273 Burchard v. Hubbard et al. the deed from George F., he is compelled to take the position, that George himself was a bona fide purchaser for a full consideration. The notice that affected Hubbard, at the time of his purchase and advance of consideration, takes away all the merit which he might otherwise claim, in respect to his own conduct. It is such as places him along side of George F. himself, as a participator in his attempt to commit a fraud on the complainant, or, rather, he is seeking to avail himself of an advantage as the consequence of that fraud. But the complainant's superior equity must prevail. I can not understand how the doctrine of estoppel, as admitted in a court of law, can have any effect in a court of chancery, under circumstances like these. What equity is there, in Hubbard, to claim an estate that he purchased (and paid for) of a person who had no title, being chargeable with notice that the title to that estate was outstanding in a third person, of whom the complainant purchased it, and to whom he paid the consideration? The mere fact that it became convenient, afterward, in transmitting the title to the complainant, to pass it through the person of whom Hubbard purchased, can not affect the merits of the question, one way or the other. This view of the case is strongly fortified, and we are willing to trust the decision of the case upon it. We have the right of being substituted in the place of the holder of the mortgage, which was then a lien on the land, and which we have paid off. Here, the mortgage being a subsisting lien when Hubbard purchased, he is no worse off than he was at the date of his purchase, if we, who have paid it off, are allowed to assert it. It would be unjust to allow Hubbard to have the benefit of that payment, for he was chargeable with notice that it was a valid incumbrance on the land when he bought. 321] *This equity is but the claim of a familiar principle in favor of the complainant. PETER HITCHCOCK, on the same side: In the consideration of the case I shall treat it as if the controversy was between Burchard, the complainant, and Hubbard, one of the defendants; for although the defendant, Brooks, has purchased of Hubbard and paid the consideration money for the land, he can not claim under his purchase any better right than was vested in his vendor. And it may be further remarked, that at the |