State of Ohio, etc. v. Trustees of Section 29, etc. But before any claim can be made upon the trustees, the sect claiming must have formed themselves into a society, and must have given themselves a name. It is not enough that there are individuals who are members of Christian churches, residing within the township. A society must be actually formed, and known by name. A religious society is made up of individuals associated together for religious purposes. As to the particular mode or manner of constituting or forming this society, it is immaterial. Each denomination of Christians may form their societies according to the usual practice or custom of their sect. But the society must be formed, and must have a name. The society thus formed, must appoint an agent. This can not be done by the individual members of the society, by subscribing a paper constituting an individual an agent; but it must be done by vote of the society, as a collective body. This agent must be furnished with a certified list of the number and names of the members of the society, residing within the - township, over the age of fifteen years. The society having been thus formed, and having appointed their agent, are entitled to a share of the fund, in proportion to their numbers, upon the production by the agent to the trustees, of the certified list of numbers and names. [29 Before the trustees can be justified in distributing any portion of this fund to any agent, they must have satisfactory *evi dence that a society has been organized, and has a name, and that an agent has been appointed. The proof of the appointment of the agent should be verified by something more than his own statement. Such we understand to be the law upon this subject, and it remains to apply it to the case before us. The first reason assigned by the defendants for not obeying the alternative mandamus is, that there is no such religious society in their township as the "Roman Catholic Society of Delhi township," regularly organized and having that name. Much testimony has been introduced upon this point by both parties. Without recapitulating it, it is sufficient to say that it is altogether vague, and of such a character as to satisfy us that there never has been any organized society of that name in the township. There are many Catholics in the township, and efforts have been made to effect an organization, not for religious wor State of Ohio, etc. v. Trustees of Section 29, etc. ship, but for procuring a portion of this fund. But the law has not been complied with. Three persons have been examined to prove an organization. The first of these is Philip Owens, the principal relator. He states, among other things, as follows: "We organized, as well as I remember, in the year 1834, a Roman Catholic Society in Delhi township, for the purpose of becoming a body of people, and to receive our proportion of the ministerial fund." When inquired of as to the name of the society, he says it was the "Roman Catholic Society of Delhi township." James Cahill speaks of a society organized; and when inquired of as to the name, he says it was "Catholic." Anthony Hannah, another witness, says that in January, 1839, he was at the formation of a society of Catholics in Delhi township, and that the name was the "Roman Catholic Society." He afterward says that the society had been previously formed, but that he had never before attended. These are the only persons who know anything about the formation of a society, which is said to consist of about one hundred and fifty members; and it is, at least, a little singular that no two of them agree as to the name. When called upon for 30] their books, or other written evidence of the formation or existence of a society, none were produced; and when the defendants called at the place where they were informed such documents could be found, they were not there; but it was said they had been carried away to town to be fixed. As yet, however, they have never been exhibited. This testimony falls far short of satisfying our minds of the existence of such a society as is claimed; and might be well rejected by the trustees, as not furnishing such proof. The second cause alleged why the mandamus was not obeyed is, that the defendants did not refuse to pay over the money to the Roman Catholic Society, but only required proof of the formation of such society, of the appointment of an agent, and of the correctness of the list, and proffered, if such proof was given, to pay over the money; but no such proof was exhibited. This allegation is sustained by the evidence. The only testimony to contradict is, that three instruments of writing were produced to the trustees, all of which are of similar purport. One of these instruments of writing is as follows, to wit: "We, the undersigned, citizens of the township of Delhi, Hamilton county, Ohio, composing the Society of Roman Catholics of said town Watkins v. Collins et al. ship, claiming to have the benefit of the ministerial appropriation for said township, for the year 1838, do appoint Philip Owens our agent, to receive our proportions of said fund, and receipt for the same accordingly. As witness our hands, this December 23, 1838." Then follow the names of ninety-seven individuals, after which the following certificate: "Certified by Philip Owens, agent for the society." The entire document, signatures and all, was proven to be in the handwriting of Philip Owens. And, in addition to this, there was the testimony of one witness, that he had heard that there was a Roman Catholic Society in Delhi. This evidence was not sufficient to prove the existence of the society, nor the appointment of the agent who made the application, without which proof the trustees could not have been justified in paying over the money. Besides, it was suspicious upon the face of it. And these suspicions were increased by the [31 testimony of a witness, who stated that Owens went about among the people, with a paper similar to the foregoing, to get names. subscribed to it, and that he procured one person, at least, to subscribe to it, who was not of the Catholic faith, by assuring him that that would make no difference; and, by assuring him further, that the money, when procured, should be distributed in equal proportions to those whose names appeared on the paper. Taking the whole case into consideration, the court are of opinion that the return is sufficient in law, and that the facts therein stated are true. Judgment will therefore be entered for the defendants. Judgment for the defendants. H. C. WATKINS v. JAMES COLLINS ET AL. The chancellor often refuses to aid in the execution of contracts which he would not rescind. THIS is a bill of review from the county of Hamilton. The present defendants were the original plaintiffs, and were the heirs of Elizabeth Merritt. The original bill was brought to set aside an exchange of part of a lot in Cincinnati, with Watkins, for a leasehold interest in another lot, which they aver was of Watkins v. Collins et al. grossly unequal value, and brought about by a fraudulent combination of Watkins and Harwood. The fraud is denied by an swer. WRIGHT, WALKER and MINER, for the plaintiff: The single question is, whether the bargain between Watkins and Mrs. Merritt was made out by the proof to be fraudulent on the part of Watkins? 32] *1. Watkins never negotiated with. Mrs Merritt, but refused to do so. It can not therefore be said that he took advantage of a woman. 2. Harwood was the friend and stepfather of Mrs. M.; had often acted for the family before; had no interest in the matter; and did not collude with Watkins. He carried on the negotiation for Mrs. M., and fully understood the whole matter. On him no deception could have been practiced, and none was attempted. 3. Mrs. M., although feeble in health, when she executed the deed, perfectly understood what she was about, and afterward attended to business herself. Her mind was as good as over. 4. If she misunderstood the nature of the lease, it was not the fault of Watkins, for he first read the lease to Harwood, and then gave it to him to examine. He took it home, and says he explained it to Mrs. M. To us, however, this is immaterial. She chose Harwood as her agent, and we dealt with him. 5. There was, then, no actual deception, or misrepresentation. Watkins dealt fairly and openly. He offered to refer the matter to disinterested men; but Harwood and Mrs. M. preferred taking his offer. 6. If, then, there be any ground for annulling the bargain, it must be mere inadequacy of consideration. And the doctrine is, that this must be so gross and palpable as to shock the conscience. Then it affords a violent presumption of fraud. Knobb v. Lindsay, 5 Ohio, 468; Steele v. Worthington, 2 Ohio, 182; Gregor v. Duncan, 2 Des. 636; 1 Story on Equity, 249. 7. The case, then, is reduced to a mere question of fact, and requires a brief discussion of the evidence, an abstract of which is given in the bill of review. The transactions took place in August, 1834. Mrs. M.'s land was unimproved, and she was in want of money. The leasehold property was improved, and would yield income. Just previous to the bargain, she had offered to Watkins v. Collins et al. sell the best part of her lot to William Holliday, at ten dol lars per foot, by the advice of Harwood and one Allen, who *now swears it was worth twenty-five dollars. At this rate [33 her whole lot would only have brought $1,030. But taking the average of estimates by the eight witnesses, who testify as to its value, viz., Holliday, Allen, Wilder, Pancoast, Paris, Bonsall, Hathaway, and Loring, it did not, in 1834, exceed $2,300; and in return for this, she was to receive $400 in cash, and the leasehold property. The buildings on this, taking the average of three witnesses, viz., Avery, Loring, and Broaddus, were worth $1,600. This, then, was a consideration of $2,000, for what was worth, at most, $2,300, but which Mrs. M. herself would have sold for $1,030. The lease was to expire in 1838; but there was a privilege of purchasing at sixteen dollars per foot, when Loring swears it would have been worth twenty dollars. But supposing it was only worth sixteen dollars, there would still be a consideration of $2,000 for $2,300, But this is not all: Mrs. M. needed money, and got it. The lowest estimate of rent she would receive would considerably more than pay the ground rent, which was eighty-two dollars per annum. Watkins was to give six dollars per month, or seventy-two dollars per year, for the smaller building. Sup pose the larger to yield no more, there would have been $144 per year, or a surplus of sixty-two dollars per year. In any view, therefore, of the case, there is no such inadequacy of consideration as would justify the inference of fraud by a court of equity, especially in the absence of all proof of deception by Watkins. We feel well convinced that if the court will but carefully examine the evidence in this case, the decision heretofore had will be reversed. STORER, for the defendant, insisted that the inadequacy of prico was so great as to shock the moral sense, and is, therefore, per se, evidence of fraud. LANE, C. J. It is a well established equitable principle that the chancellor would not, in many cases, rescind contracts, which he would not aid to execute. It is equally well established that mere inadequacy of price is not a sufficient ground to rescind, [34 unless it be so gross as to carry evidence of fraud. The plaintiffs |