of the money paid by the purchasers of tickets went towards 1912 the purchase of the bicycle, but that the bicycle was bona fide BARTLETT given by the Rudge-Whitworth Company. The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the justices upon the above statement of facts came to a correct determination in point of law. Simey, for the appellant. The respondents Parker and Elswood were guilty of selling tickets in a lottery contrary to s. 41 of the Lotteries Act, 1823, and the respondent Young of publishing a proposal or scheme for the sale of tickets in the lottery contrary to the section. Although the bicycle was given by a third party the chance of winning it as a prize was paid for by each purchaser of a ticket. The only question is whether the persons buying the tickets were purchasing a chance: Hall v. MacWilliam (1); Willis v. Young and Stembridge. (2) The fact that the prize was given by a third person is immaterial. The essence of a lottery consists in the inducement held out to the public by the chance of obtaining a great deal more for their money than they have in truth paid for. The object of the Legislature was to protect the purchaser, and not merely to penalize the proprietors of lotteries. The chance of obtaining the prize was held out by the promoters of the dance with the object of inducing as many persons as possible to enter the field. If payment is made for a chance there is a lottery: Morris v. Blackman (3); Taylor v. Smetten. (4) As to the respondent Cornelius, it must be admitted that the information does not sufficiently allege that the field was his place so as to constitute an offence under s. 2 of the Gaming Act, 1802. (5) The respondents did not appear. (1) (1901) 65 J. P. 742. (2) [1907] 1 K. B. 448. (3) (1864) 2 H. & C. 912. (4) (1883) 11 Q. B. D. 207. (5) Gaming Act, 1802 (42 Geo. 3, c. 119), s. 2: "No person or persons whatsoever shall publicly or privately keep any office or place to exercise, keep open, show, or expose to be played, drawn, or thrown at or in, either by dice, lots, cards, balls, or by numbers or figures, or by any Lotteries Act, 1823 (4 Geo. 4, v. PARKER. 1912 RIDLEY J. In this case the question which we have to decide BARTLETT is whether the justices acted properly in dismissing the informa tions laid against the respondents Parsons, Elswood, and Young under the Lotteries Act, 1823. Parsons and Elswood were charged under s. 41 of the Lotteries Act, 1823, with having sold tickets or chances in a lottery, and Young was charged with having published a scheme for the sale of tickets in a lottery. The facts appear to be that certain tickets were sold by Parsons and Elswood, and an advertisement was published by Young relating to a raffle or presentation of a bicycle which had been furnished to the fête committee as a prize for the person who should win the lottery which was to be held in connection with a dance and al fresco concert at Chard on August 19, 1911. After the tickets had been sold they were drawn at a meeting of the committee in the field where the dance took place and the winner was declared. In these circumstances informations were laid against the respondents, but the justices held that they must be dismissed, the point having been taken on behalf of the respondents that the bicycle, which had been given by the Rudge-Whitworth Cycle Company as an advertisement, had not been purchased with any of the money subscribed by the persons who purchased tickets for the dance. This case therefore raises the question whether it is an offence under s. 41 of the Lotteries Act, 1823, to sell tickets in a lottery each of which gives the purchaser a chance of winning a prize, notwithstanding that the prize which is going to the purchaser of the winning ticket has been presented, and is not c. 60), s. 41, provides that if any By the Vagrancy Act, 1824 1912 PARKER. Ridley J. to be purchased with the money subscribed. In my opinion that is not material to the offence. The Act of 1823 says that "if any BARTLETT person or persons shall sell any ticket or tickets, chance or chances . . . . in any lottery" he shall be guilty of an offence. I am unable to see how the fact that no part of the money which was paid for tickets went for the purchase of the prize, which was presented by the Rudge-Whitworth Cycle Company, makes any difference. I think a lottery is held whenever there is a sale of tickets which gives the holders of them the chance of winning a prize. It is selling a chance where one ticket, by chance, entitles the holder to a prize. It seems to me, therefore, that both Parsons and Elswood were guilty of the offence under s. 41 of the Lotteries Act, 1823, of selling tickets in a lottery, and that Young was guilty under the same section of the offence of publishing a proposal with regard to the sale of tickets in a lottery. The appeal must therefore be allowed and the case remitted to the justices with directions to convict these three respondents. A. T. LAWRENCE J. I have come to the same conclusion, although I have felt some doubt with regard to the matter because the facts do not seem to me to come quite up to the level of the mischief aimed at by the Lotteries Act, 1823, but that is not a sufficient answer if the words of the statute are wide enough to cover this case, which I think they are. This was a lottery determined by chance. The destination of the prizethe winner of it-was determined by chance, and the winner obtained the prize by purchasing a ticket with a particular number upon it. I cannot see sufficient grounds for differing from the rest of the Court in thinking that all the elements of the offence created by the statute were present in this case. PICKFORD J. I agree. Appeal allowed. Case remitted to the justices with Solicitors for appellant: Young & Co., for F. W. Bishop, Bridgwater. J. E. A. 1912 April 25. LONDON COUNTY COUNCIL v. JONES. London-Buildings—Dangerous Structures-Power of London County Council to shore up-Ruinous and Neglected Structures—Liability of OwnerLondon Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), s. 106; 8. 107, sub-s. 1; 8. 115, sub-8. 1. The fact that the London County Council has in pursuance of the power given to it by s. 106 of the London Building Act, 1894, temporarily shored up a structure certified by the district surveyor to be in a dangerous state does not prevent the structure from still being in a dangerous state within the meaning of that section, s. 103, and s. 107, sub-s. 1, of the Act; and the owner still remains liable, in proceedings taken against him under those sections in a petty sessional court, to an order to take down, repair, or otherwise secure to the satisfaction of the district surveyor the structure or such part thereof as appears to the Court to be in a dangerous state. An order made by a petty sessional court under s. 115 of the Act of 1894, in respect of a ruinous and neglected structure, requiring the owner to carry out specified work upon the structure is no bar to subsequent proceedings in the petty sessional court under s. 107, sub-s. 1, of the Act against the owner of the structure for non-compliance with a notice to take down, secure, or repair the same served on him under s. 106 of the Act. In order that a house may be dangerous within the meaning of s. 103, s. 106, and s. 107, sub-s. 1, of the Act it is not necessary that it should be dangerous to inmates or to the public passing along the adjacent highway. It is sufficient if there is an apprehension of danger or injury to adjoining houses or to their inhabitants, or even to trespassers. CASE stated by a metropolitan magistrate. On October 11, 1911, two summonses issued on the complaint of the appellants, the London County Council, directed to the respondents, Matthew Jones and John L. Jones (trading as Matthew Jones & Co.), as owners of Nos. 5 and 54, Queensland Road, Islington, in the county of London, were heard by the magistrate sitting at the North London Police Court. The summonses were issued under the provisions of the London Building Act, 1894, Part IX. (1), relating to dangerous and (1) London Building Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. ccxiii.), Part IX., s. 103:(1.) Where it is made known to the council that any structure is in a dangerous state the council shall require a survey of such neglected structures, and were each in a similar form. The first summons (omitting immaterial portions) was as follows: "To the owner of the structure known as 52, Queensland Road, Islington. Whereas the London County Council having had it made known to them that the said structure was in a dangerous state duly required a survey to be made of the same by the district surveyor who certified to the said council his opinion that the same was in a dangerous state and the said council thereupon in pursuance of section 106 of the London Building Act 1894 caused a notice to be served upon" the respondents "requiring" them "to take down or secure the building especially the front and back corners where the brickwork has been torn away also the centre of the building where the partition has been removed and to take down the whole of the defective ceilings throughout the house and" the respondents "having failed to structure to be made by the district surveyor or by some other competent surveyor." Sect. 105: "Upon completion of his survey the district surveyor employed shall certify to the council his opinion as to the state of the structure." Sect. 106: "If the certificate is to the effect that the structure . . . . is in a dangerous state the council may cause the same to be shored up or otherwise secured and a proper hoard or fence to be put up for the protection of passengers and shall cause notice to be served on the owner or occupier of the structure requiring him forthwith to take down secure or repair the same as the case requires." Sect. 107: "(1.) If the owner or occupier on whom the notice is served fail to comply as speedily as the nature of the case permits with the notice a petty sessional court on complaint by the council may order the owner to take down repair or otherwise secure to the satisfaction of the district surveyor the structure Provided that if the owner of the structure dispute the necessity of any of the requisitions comprised in the notice he may by notice in writing to the council within seven days from the service of the notice upon himself require that the subject shall be referred to arbitration." Sect. 115: "(1.) Where a structure is ruinous or so far dilapidated as thereby to have become and to be unfit for use or occupation.... a petty sessional court on complaint by the council may order the owner to take down or repair or rebuild such structure (in this Act referred to as a neglected structure) or any part thereof. . . . within a reasonable time to be fixed by the order and may also make an order for the costs incurred up to the time of the hearing." 1912 LONDON COUNCIL v. JONES. |