[PHILLIMORE J. If the doctrine of Cohen v. Mitchell (1) is to be taken as applying right back to the commencement of the bankruptcy it is difficult to see why s. 49 was wanted at all.] 1912 TEALE, BLACKBURN, If the doctrine does apply to transactions between receiving Ex parte. order and adjudication, it does not the less apply because the transactions were between banker and customer: In re Montague. (2) Hansell in reply. The antedating of the receiving order must affect it equally for all purposes. It cannot be treated as having one date for one purpose and another for another purpose. Cur. adv. vult. May 7. The judgment of the COURT (Phillimore and Bray JJ.) was delivered by PHILLIMORE J. This is an appeal from the decision of the county court judge refusing to order the Union of London and Smith's Bank to pay to the trustee in bankruptcy the sum of 2101. representing various sums of money which the bankrupt had paid to the bank between July 22 and October 24, 1910, the first date being that on which the county court registrar ought to have made a receiving order, and the latter being that on which the Divisional Court reversed the decision and made a receiving order, and ordered it to be dated in accordance with the practice back to July 22, the day on which it ought to have been made. If the date of the receiving order is to be deemed for all purposes to be July 22 these payments, and the corresponding payments made by the bank on the bankrupt's cheques, are not protected by s. 49, which relates only to transactions which took place before the date of the receiving order. Nor do they come within the class of dealings had with the bankrupt after adjudication so as to be protected under the doctrine of Cohen v. Mitchell. (1) As regards transactions between receiving order and adjudication there is singularly little authority. We do not mean to decide, as it will not be necessary to decide, whether there is any protection for such transactions, but we incline to think that there is none. And yet it may often happen that the interval of time is considerable. The case of In re Montague (3), where an (1) 25 Q. B. D. 262. (2) (1897) 4 Manson, 1. (3) 4 Manson, 1; 76 L. T. 203. 1912 TEALE, In re. BLACKBURN, application against a bank was refused, might according to the reports appear to be a decision that there is protection for dealings after the receiving order. But in fact, as Mr. Registrar Ex parte. Hope has been good enough to elicit for us, the payments attacked were all made on or after the date of adjudication. The receiving order in that case was on September 25, the adjudication was on October 9, and the three sums paid in were as follows: October 9, 121.; October 12, 2001.; December 4, 4l. Putting this question aside, there are two points to consider: 1. Is the practice of dating back receiving orders a sound one? 2. If so, what is the effect upon third parties? The practice by which the Court of Appeal when it makes the receiving order, which the Court of first instance has refused to make, date back to the date when the Court of first instance should have made it, is well established. It may have been inaugurated by Vaughan Williams and Wright JJ. in In re Raatz, Ex parte Carlhian. (1) It has been followed pretty generally ever since, always under the direction of the Court. A comparatively recent instance where the Court of Appeal has done so is the unreported case of In re O'Shea, where by an order of July 14, 1911, a receiving order was made and dated back to June 15, on which date it ought to have been made. We think it must be taken as sound. If the debtor ought to have had a receiving order made against him by the Court of first instance any conduct of his previous to the date of this order will be punishable or taken into account in considering his discharge, upon the principle that the terminus ad quem in the matter of date shall be the date upon which he ought to have had the receiving order made against him. If there are any cases where those who had previously dealt with the debtor would be affected by the antedating of the order, these cases may have to be considered. Our present judgment does not affect to deal with them. But it is quite another matter when one has to consider the interests of third parties which have accrued in an interval of time which ought never to have come into being, that is between the date when the receiving order ought to have been made by the Court of first instance and that when it was made by the Court of (1) 4 Manson, 50. Appeal. These third parties have done nothing wrong, have not procured this improper interval, and have had no improper dealings. The man with whom they dealt had not had a receiving order made against him when they dealt with him, and the ex post facto determination that there should have been a receiving order was made in a proceeding to which they were not parties and cannot affect them. We think it cannot have been intended that these parties should be affected by the antedating of the order, and that the order should not be read as affecting such parties. Appeal dismissed. Solicitors for the trustee : Rossiter & Odell, for Postlethwaite & Rutherford, Leeds. Solicitors for the bank: Warren, Murton & Miller, for Dunning Kay & Armstrong, Leeds. 1912 TEALE, In re. BLACKBURN, J. F C. DEWAR v. MINTOFT. Vendor and Purchaser-Sale of Land-Contract in Writing-Signature of Purchaser's Name Sufficiency of Description Correspondence referring to Particulars of Sale-Particulars and Conditions of Sale forming one Document Incorporation of Conditions--Repudiation of Liability-Memorandum of Contract-Measure of Damages for Breach of Contract-Statute of Frauds. It is not sufficient, in order to constitute a memorandum of a contract for the sale of land within the meaning of s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, that the name of the purchaser should merely be placed upon the memorandum without any description. It must appear from the memorandum that the name was that of the purchaser of the land. If the particulars of sale and the conditions of sale form one document and a letter signed by the purchaser refers to the particulars, the reference to the particulars will suffice to incorporate the conditions so as to constitute a sufficient memorandum within the section, and oral evidence may be given for the purpose of identifying the particulars referred to in the correspondence. Where there is a repudiation in writing of a contract of sale of land 1912 March 9, 16. 1912 DEWAR v. MINTOFT. by the party to be charged, upon the ground that the facts he sets out in the writing do not render him liable, the repudiation does not prevent the documents from containing a signed note of the verbal contract upon which he will be liable if there is, apart from the repudiation, a sufficient note within the Statute of Frauds. A contract of sale of a farm by auction contained the following condition :-"If the purchaser shall neglect or fail to comply with any of the above conditions his deposit money shall be forfeited to the vendor who may with or without notice resell the premises without previously tendering a conveyance to the defaulter at this sale and any resale may be made by auction or private contract at such time subject to such conditions and in such manner generally as the vendor may think proper and if thereby the vendor shall incur a loss by reason of diminution in price or expenses incurred or both after taking into account the deposit the defaulter at this sale shall pay to the vendor the amount of such loss as liquidated damages and on any such resale by auction the premises may be bought in and all expenses consequent on an unsuccessful attempt to resell shall be forthwith paid to the vendor by the defaulter at this sale." The purchaser, without having paid any deposit, refused to carry out the contract of purchase. The farm was subsequently resold, and the actual damage suffered by the vendor by reason of the breach of contract was less than the sum the purchaser would have deposited if he had carried out the contract. In an action brought by the vendor against the purchaser for damages for breach of the contract: Held, that the condition applied although no deposit had in fact been made, and that the vendor was entitled to recover the amount which would have been deposited by the purchaser if he had performed his contract, and not merely the actual damage suffered by the vendor. FURTHER CONSIDERATION. The action was brought by the plaintiff, Major Dewar, to recover damages for the breach by the defendant of a contract for the purchase of a farm known as Bainton Farm, Stoke Lyne, Oxon. The action was tried before Horridge J. and a common jury at the Oxford Winter Assizes, 1912. The plaintiff had commissioned Messrs. Franklin & Jones, auctioneers, of Oxford, to sell the farm. The sale was advertised to take place at the Roebuck Hotel, Oxford, at 3 o'clock on June 10, 1911. Particulars of sale (which included a plan of the farm) were drawn up, to which were attached conditions of sale and a memorandum of agreement with spaces for signatures, so that the particulars, memorandum, and conditions formed one document. Mr. Mintoft, the defendant, had gone to the Roebuck to partake of refreshment, and had there met the auctioneer, Mr. Jones, with whom he was acquainted. They had some conversation together, but nothing was said about the sale or the farm. Later Mr. Jones went into the sale-room to conduct the sale, and the defendant also went into the room to attend the sale. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining a bid, and after some time the auctioneer said, "Will any of you gentlemen start me at 1500l.?" The defendant replied "Yes, I will," and the farm was quickly knocked down to him. The defendant in his evidence at the trial said that he was confused and thereupon left the room without having paid the deposit or signed any memorandum. After the property was knocked down to the defendant one of the auctioneer's clerks went up to him and inquired his name and address, but there was a conflict of evidence as to whether this happened in the sale-room or outside in the hotel entrance. At the trial the auctioneer produced the copy of the particulars which he had used at the auction and gave evidence to the effect that before the auction he had written upon it, opposite to and on the left of the words "tithe rent-charge " under the heading "Outgoings," the letters £CDDD-this, he said at the trial, meant reserve price 1000l."-and that on knocking down the farm to the defendant he (the auctioneer) wrote, on the right of the words "tithe rentcharge," "Mr. Mintoft 15001.” The cover of the document 66 which contained the particulars, conditions, and memorandum of agreement was indorsed as follows: "By instructions from Major A. W. Dewar. 1912 DEWAR v. MINTOFT. The particulars with the words and letters added by the |