prevent the suggested evasion of the Act. In Rouch v. Hall (1) Field J. was dealing with the procedure under another and different section.

AVORY J. In my opinion s. 14 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875, means that the notification required to be given by the person purchasing an article may be given either to the seller or to the particular agent who has sold the article. The question in this case is whether that notification was given either to the seller or to his agent who in fact sold it. I think that there was evidence upon which the magistrate could properly come to the conclusion that the servant or the son of the appellant was his agent. There being evidence upon which the magistrate could come to the conclusion that the servant was an agent of the appellant and was in the shop to attend to customers if required, I am of opinion that the magistrate was right in holding that the required notification was given to the seller because it was given to his agent. The contention of the appellant would require that, in every case where an agent has sold, the notification shall be given to that agent. I cannot see anything in the words of the section which requires such a construction to be put upon it; such a construction would enable any one easily to defeat the objects of the Act. I think that the conviction was right and the appeal must be dismissed.

PICKFORD J. I regret that I must differ. I think that in this case a notification was not given as required by s. 14. Here the article in question was in fact sold by the appellant's wife and was sold to an agent of the inspector. The inspector's agent went out of the shop, and then the inspector and his agent went into the shop and gave the required notification to the son and a servant of the appellant. I quite agree that the servant was an agent of the appellant, and, if s. 14 were couched in such language as to make a notification to any agent of the seller sufficient, then this notification would be sufficient. But the words of the section are "to the seller or his agent selling the article," and I think that those words mean either to the seller (1) 6 Q. B. D. 17.

himself or to one particular class of agent, that is, an agent who sells the article, and that a notification to another agent is not sufficient. If this construction would create any difficulty in applying the Act, I think that is a matter for the Legislature to remedy and is no ground for construing this section otherwise than in the way in which I think it ought to be construed.

LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. I am of opinion that this appeal fails. The contention of the appellant must go to the length of saying that, for the purposes of s. 14, the seller can have but one agent. I think that contention cannot be right. By a long series of decisions it has been established that both principal and agent are liable to conviction under the Act, and in the present case either might have been made liable to conviction. Therefore, in my opinion, it is impossible to hold that, because the agent who sold was absent from the shop, the other persons who were in the shop as agents of the seller were not agents to receive the prescribed notification. The magistrate has found as a fact that the son or the servant was an agent of the appellant, and there was evidence upon which he could rightly come to that conclusion. In my opinion, unless we can hold that the only agent to whom the notification can be given under s. 14 is the agent who sells, we cannot allow this appeal, and I think that we cannot so hold. For these reasons I am of opinion that this appeal must be dismissed.

Solicitor for appellant: John T. Lewis.
Solicitor for respondent: A. M. Bramali.

Appeal dismissed.

J. H. W.

1911

Nor. 28.

COOKE AND OTHERS v. COOPER AND OTHERS (JUSTICES OF
BOLTON, LANCASHIRE).

Licensing Acts-Licence-Refusal to renew- -Appeal-Death of Licensee-Right
of Representatives to maintain Appeal-Persons aggrieved-Owners of
Licensed Premises Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910 (10 Edw. 7 &
1 Geo. 5, c. 24), s. 29.

Justices at a general annual licensing meeting refused to renew a licence to sell intoxicating liquors at a certain house on the grounds that the house had not been well conducted and that the fitness of the licence holder was unsatisfactory. The licence holder appealed to the quarter sessions. The owners of the house also appealed as being persons thinking themselves aggrieved by the refusal within the meaning of s. 29 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910. Before the hearing of the appeal the licence holder died, and letters of administration were granted to his widow::

Held, that the widow of the licence holder was entitled to maintain the appeal.

McDonald v. Hughes [1902] 1 K. B. 94, applied.

Held, also, that the owners of the house were "persons thinking themselves aggrieved by the refusal " within the meaning of s. 29 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910.

CASE stated by the quarter sessions for the Salford Hundred division of the county of Lancaster held at Manchester.

1. The appellant Cooke was formerly occupier and licensee of certain licensed premises situate at Mealhouse Lane in the county borough of Bolton, and known as the Central Hotel. The appellants the Manchester Brewery Company, Limited, were and are owners of the same premises.

2. The appellants appealed to the Court of quarter sessions against the refusal of the respondents as justices acting in and for the county borough of Bolton at the general annual licensing meeting for the borough on February 8, 1911, to grant and renew to the appellant Cooke a justices' licence authorizing him to hold an excise licence to sell by retail intoxicating liquor at the licensed premises aforesaid.

3. The grounds of objection to the renewal of the licence were (a) that the licensed premises had been ill-conducted, and (b) that the fitness of the appellant Cooke was unsatisfactory.

4. Notice of appeal by each of the appellants against the refusal was duly served. The notice was dated February 11,

1911.

5. After service of the notice of appeal and before the hearing of the appeal, namely, on February 19, 1911, the appellant Cooke died.

6. On February 25, 1911, Margaret Cooke, widow of the appellant Cooke, applied to the justices for the borough for a temporary transfer to her of the licence in respect of the premises pending the hearing of the appeal and without prejudice to any question arising therein. The justices refused the application, and on March 4, 1911, the Court of Appeal made an order nisi calling upon the justices to shew cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue directed to the justices commanding them to hear and determine the application of Margaret Cooke according to law. These proceedings were still pending on April 10, 1911, when the appeal of the appellants came on for hearing before the Court of quarter sessions.

7. On March 11, 1911, letters of administration of the estate of the appellant Cooke were duly granted to Margaret Cooke.

8. Upon the hearing of the appeal it was objected by counsel for the respondents that by reason of the death of the appellant Cooke the licence in respect of the premises had become extinct, and that therefore no appeal lay from the refusal to renew the licence; and that the owners had no right of appeal as they were not persons aggrieved within the meaning of s. 29 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910 (10 Edw. 7 & 1 Geo. 5, c. 24).

9. The licence held by the appellant Cooke came to an end by effluxion of time on April 5, 1911, and no licence was actually in existence at the time when the appeal came on for hearing.

10. The appellants by their counsel contended

(a) that the licence was not extinct and, on the contrary, that Margaret Cooke should for the purposes of the appeal be deemed to be in the position in which the appellant Cooke would have been if he had lived until the hearing of the appeal, and

(b) that in any event the appellants the Manchester Brewery Company, as owners of the premises, had a right of appeal, notwithstanding the death of the appellant Cooke. S

VOL. II. 1912.

2

1911

COOKE

v.

COOPER.

11. The Court of quarter sessions was of opinion that the objection taken by the respondents was correct in law, and that the appeal failed; accordingly, without fully hearing the evidence for the appellants, the Court dismissed the appeal subject to this special case stated for the opinion of the King's Bench Division.

The question for the opinion of the Court was whether the decision of the Court of quarter sessions was right in law.

Ashton, K.C. (J. M. St. John Yates with him), for the appellants. The Court of quarter sessions was in error in thinking that on the death of the appellant Cooke the licence became extinct. No doubt that is so as far as the dead man is concerned; but it is not extinct for all purposes. The effect of s. 65, sub-s. 7, of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, which replaces s. 3 of the Licensing Act, 1872 (35 & 36 Vict. c. 94), is that the licence continues to exist for a certain time, and that the representatives of the licence holder who carry on the business of the house are entitled to act as licensed persons until the next transfer sessions. The representatives may be held liable for offences against the licensing laws: McDonald v. Hughes. (1) It follows that they must be entitled to maintain an appeal against a refusal to renew. Then as to the Manchester Brewery Company, it is provided by s. 29 of the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910, that any person who thinks himself aggrieved by the refusal of the licensing justices of any licensing district to grant a renewal, in cases where the power of refusal is vested in those justices, may appeal against the refusal to the Court of quarter sessions for the county in which the premises in respect of which the appeal is made are locally situated. It cannot be disputed that the owners of the licensed premises are persons aggrieved by a refusal to renew the licence.

The respondents did not appear.

LORD ALVERSTONE C.J. There is no reason why this case should not go back to the justices to be dealt with. The case is governed by the principle of the decision in McDonald v. Hughes. (1) On the death of a licence holder the licence is not absolutely void.

(1) [1902] 1 K. B. 94.