Impropriety of subjecting appointments to the action of the house of
representatives,

The remaining powers of the president unobjectionable,
The provisions of the constitution combine the elements of safety,
dependence on the people and due responsibility,

LXXVIII. — A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT,
IN RELATION TO THE TENURE OF GOOD BEHAVIOR,

Necessity of a federal judicature experienced under the confed-
eration,

353

354

354

355

355

Mode of appointing the judges,

355

Tenure by which they hold office,

355

The tenure of office during good behavior is similar to the provisions
in the best state constitutions,

355

Of the departments, the judiciary has the least power to invade con-
stitutional rights,

356

It is the weakest of the three departments,

356

The complete independence of the judiciary essential,

356

Objection to the judiciary pronouncing legislative acts void, exam-
ined,

357

Interpretation of laws, the proper sphere of the courts,

357

This power does not imply the superiority of the judiciary to the
legislature,

358

Necessity of such a power shown by the case of two conflicting
statutes,

358

Permanent tenure of judicial offices necessary to secure the constitu-
tion from legislative encroachments,

359

Independence of judges also requisite to guard individual rights from
popular passions or prejudices at times,

359

It will likewise check the enactment of bad laws,

360

Inflexible adherence to right cannot be expected from courts not in-
dependent,

360

360

Periodical appointments would be fatal to judicial independence,
Permanency of judicial offices requisite, from the small number of
persons who have the necessary skill in the laws, combined with
integrity,
LXXIX. A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN RELATION TO
THE PROVISIONS FOR THE SUPPORT AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGES,

A fixed provision for the support of the judges necessary to their in-
dependence,

361

The provision of the constitution stated and defended,

362

The liability to impeachment secures the responsibility of the judges, 362
Reasons against a provision for removing judges on account of ina-
bility,

363

Objections to a limitation in respect to age, as in New York,

363

LXXX.

A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT, IN RELATION TO THE
EXTENT OF ITS POWERS,

364

Cases to which the judiciary power of the union should extend,
Necessity of a constitutional mode of giving efficacy to constitution-
al provisions,

364

364

The judicial power must be coëxtensive with the legislative,
It must embrace all cases where the United States shall be a party,
Also all cases involving the peace of the confederacy, as where for-
eigners, states, or citizens of different states, are parties,
Equality of privileges between citizens of different states the basis of
the union, and should be enforced by a national tribunal,
All maritime cases should belong to the federal judiciary,
Provisions of the constitution as to the judiciary, stated,
Reasons for investing it with equity jurisdiction,
These powers are conformable to the principles before laid

LXXXI.

A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTEENT, IN RELA-
TION TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF ITS AUTHORITY,

369

369

The necessity of a supreme court will not be contested,
The proposition that the senate should be the supreme court examined, 369
This would be an abondonment of the doctrine of a separation
between the departments,

370

The same body which had an agency in passing bad laws, would
`rarely be a suitable tribunal to test their constitutionality,
Legislators will seldom be chosen with a view to the qualifications
of judges,

370

371

The constitution follows the example set by nine states, in erecting a
separate tribunal,

371

No legislature can rectify erroneous judicial decisions, except so far
as to prescribe a new rule for future action,.
Danger of judicial encroachments on legislative authority, imaginary,
Propriety of the power to constitute inferior courts,
Reasons against the employment of state courts, as substitutes,
Probability that the union will be divided into judicial districts,
Distribution of judicial authority between the, supreme and infe-
rior courts,

371

371

372

372

373

373

The supreme court to have original jurisdiction in cases affecting
states and foreign ministers.

373

This provision does not give to federal courts power to enforce
debts against states,

374

The notion that the clause giving appellate powers to the supreme
court impairs the right of trial by jury, examined,

374

The province of the supreme court will generally be to decide
questions of law,

375

Congress will have power to restrict the supreme court from reëxam-
ining matters of fact,

376

LXXXII. —A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN REFERENCE.
TO SOME MISCELLANEOUS QUESTIONS,

377

Examination of the question whether the state courts will have con-
current jurisdiction with the federal courts,
The states will retain preexisting powers, unless exclusively dele-
gated to the federal authorities,

State'courts will continue to have the same jurisdiction as heretofore, 378
But it is not denied that congress may vest exclusive jurisdiction in
the federal courts,

378
378

Appeals would lie from state courts to the supreme federal court,
Considerations to show such appeals may lie to inferior federal courts, 379
LXXXIII. —A FURTHER VIEW OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT IN RELATION
TO THE TRIAL BY JURY,

Objection that the constitution contains no provision for trial by jury
in civil cases examined,

380

380

The effect of this omission, is not to abolish trial by jury in such cases, 380
Rules of legal interpretation discussed and applied to this provision, 381
A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of trial, 381
Trial by jury shown to be in no case abolished,
Value of the the right acknowledged by all,
But its value is chiefly in criminal cases,

382

382

383

Examination of some of the alleged uses of trial by jury in civil cases, 383
It is a security against corruption,

383

It is an excellent mode of settling questions of property,
Difficulty of fixing a proper limit to a constitutional provision,
Examination of varying rules in the several state constitutions,

Objections to adopting the provision contained in the constitution of

New York,

389

All important interests sufficiently secured without further provision, 390

LXXXIV. — CONCERNING SEVERAL MISCELLANEOUS OBJECTIONS,
Objection to the want of a bill of rights considered,

The constitution contains a number of provisions to secure individual
rights,

The writ of habeas corpus and other provisions, important safeguards
of liberty,

Bills of rights originally concessions to the people by their rulers,
Not consistent with a constitution made by the people themselves,
Bills of rights may be dangerous, as implying the grant of all powers
not expressly withheld,

391

391

391

392

393

393

394

Many provisions in bills of rights are too indefinite to furnish any se-
curity to liberty,

!

394

395

The constitution itself is a bill of rights,
Objection to the powers granted, that the seat of government will be
too remote from many states to secure responsibility, examined, 395
Responsibility depends less on proximity than facility of communi-
cation,

Objection that there is no provision as to debts due the United States,
answered,

Objection to the probable expense of the government, considered,
Inquiry as to the supposed increase of offices,

The expense of additional officers will be counterbalanced by the
shortening of the sessions of congress,

The sessions of the state legislatures will also be much shortened,

LXXXV. — CONCLUSION,

396

396

397

397

398

398

399

Manner in which the writer has endeavored to discuss the sub-
ject of these papers,

Resemblance of the constitution to that of the state of New York,
Additional security it will afford to republican government, to liberty
and property,

399

400

400

Appeal to the readers to weigh the subject candidly and conscien-
tiously,

401

The constitution, although not perfect, is in no respect radically de-
fective,

401

402

Folly of delaying action in expectation of a perfect plan being pre-
sented,
401, 402
Improbability of a new convention presenting a preferable plan, 402
Amendments to the proposed constitution will be more readily made,
than a different system can be devised and adopted,
Any plan will involve differences of opinion and require concessions, 402
Supposed obstacles in the way of making amendments, considered, 403
Congress required to call a convention on application of the legisla-
tures of two thirds of the states,

403

Immediate adoption of the constitution urged, in view of the neces-
sity of time and experience to ascertain and correct defects,