cordingly, an ambassador was sent to Copenhagen with instructions to demand the delivery of the Danish fleet into the possession of a British Admiral, who was not far distant. This demand was of course indignantly refused, and the consequence was, that Copenhagen was bombarded, and the fleet taken. And all this, so revolting to the natural sentiments of justice, was done in pursuance of the consultations of ministers learned in the Law of nations, and on the ground that the flag of Denmark, strange as it may seem, was dangerous to the mighty power of Great Britain. And now we are almost tempted to ask, what value can be attached to a Law of nations like this, which can be adduced with great gravity and confidence, in support of the murder of individuals, the burning of cities, and the destruction of fleets, not because they have actually committed acts of transgression against us, but because it is within the range of pcssibility, that such acts may be committed at some future time.-England has loudly and justly condemned the conduct of Bonaparte in the murder of the Duke of D'Enghien; but she has applied the same principle on a larger scale, with as little benefit and as great dishonor. Bonaparte himself, in his interviews with Mr. Warden, took this view of the subject. He defended his measures on the broad ground that the Bourbons were dangerous to the tranquillity of France, and that some decisive blow was necessary to the prevention of ulterior evils." And now tell me, said he, did I do more than adopt the principle of your Government, when it ordered the capture of the Danish fleet, which was thought to threaten mischief to your country?" A question which can receive but one answer, and that dishonorable to both parties alike, even on the most favorable supposition for them, that they were warranted in their measures by the principles of the public code.

But this doctrine of armed and violent intervention can accommodate itself, not only to the case of individuals and cities and fleets, but, when occasion requires, to the more responsible purpose of dismembering kingdoms and overthrowing governments. Let us refer to a recent instance. A few years since, the people of Spain, after their dreadful contest with Napoleon, made a commendable effort to establish their political institutions on a basis more favorable to individual rights and more consonant to the enlightened demands of the age. The king and the people seem to have gone together in the great work of embodying their political principles in the permanent form of a written Constitution, and whether it was well adapted to its object or not, whether it was good or evil in itself, it seemed reasonable that other nations should be satisfied with it, provided the Spaniards were satisfied themselves; the more especially as foreign nations could not be supposed to be in a situation to judge of the peculiar circumstances and wants of that country. It is true, the Cortes of Spain met with difficulty in carrying into full effect the plans, which, in patriotic good faith, they had adopted and promulgated for the benefit of their country. Undoubtedly they were in some instances too hasty; their zeal outran their discretion; and excited by the joyful possession of liberty, they adopted measures which would have been rebuked and rejected by a clearer insight into the perversities of ignorance and the strength of ancient prejudices. Nevertheless the country had a government administered by the king and the Cortes, and which held out, in due time and on suitable experiment, a tolerably fair promise of the regeneration of that degraded and suffering State. It is not to be denied, that there were some internal commotions, and that a strong party had set themselves in opposition to the existing Government; but the circum

common measures.

stances do not seem to have been of such an extraordinary nature, as to call for any unauthorized and unIt was in this state of things that the French Government, though not supported in it by the wishes of the great body of the French people, thought proper to interfere forcibly. The Spaniards made such resistance as under the circumstances of the case they were able to, but the powerful army of D'Angouleme speedily overcame all obstacles opposed to it, dispersed the Cortes, annulled the Constitution, and restored a despotism, which for centuries had been the fruitful source of dishonor and suffering. It is not necessary to enter into the particulars of this transaction; they are deeply registered in the memories of the present generation; they will have their place in mournful characters on the page of history. Our business is merely to inquire, Whether such an inteference is warranted by the Law of nations? And if it should be said that there are cases where a forcible interference is lawful by the code of nations, as it now stands, still may we not justly maintain that the principle was wickedly and grossly perverted in the instance just referred to? It is certainly a serious and important question, whether a nation may be invaded, her homes despoiled, and the blood of her patriots shed, merely because she has adopted political institutions that are not approved by her neighbors. There is much reason to believe that a forcible interference on such grounds was never contemplated by the right of intervention as laid down in writers on the Law of nations, but is an odious perversion of it. France, Spain, Naples, Prussia, or any other nation may establish a limited, constitutional monarchy, or even a purely republican form of government, and, although it may be a ground of uneasiness to neighboring nations, we cannot possibly conceive what justifiable reason it can furnish

for aggressive violence and bloodshed. Why is it more criminal to establish a monarchy restrained in its action by the people represented in a legislature, than a monarchy without such restraint? Why is it less justifiable to establish a republican form of government than a despotism? And we may add, what is that national independence worth, which does not permit a nation to establish or alter its own internal forms of administration ? The right to form a government is involved in the very idea of independence; and the nation, that receives its government from the forcible hand of foreign interposition, are undoubtedly to be regarded as slaves, whatever different pretensions they may make.

There is not only reason to believe, that the right of interposition does not extend to the mere object of establishing or altering a form of government, but there is reason to question also, whether the principle, in its most mitigated form, is not untenable in the view of enlightened reason, and ought not to be wholly expunged. It would seem to be clear, looking at the question as an original and unsettled one, that every independent nation, which has not restricted itself by some previous compact, has a right to extend or diminish the amount of its armaments at pleasure. On the other hand it is equally evident, that other nations, in the view of such increased armament, have a right to take their measures accordingly, and to any extent short of actual hostility. The increased armaments of a neighboring nation would be a just ground of solicitude; but it is questionable, whether they are to be regarded as just grounds of offence. They would justify, (reasoning on the false maxims, which now govern the political intercourse of the world,) a preparation for war, but it is not so clear, that they would justify an actual resort to war without further cause; in a word, without some overt and decided act

of hostility. If this were the position taken in the precepts of public law, instead of the one already referred to, we are persuaded, it would be found favorable to the repose of nations. Nothing obviously can lead to more evil results than the right of resorting to arms on the ground of a presumed or anticipated hostility of other nations. This alledged right, (which is the principle actually established in the existing public law,) is so broad and indefinite, that ambition and intrigue may deduce from it a colorable pretext for any war whatever. In other situations, even those of small consequence, there is hazard in acting on mere suspicion. How unreasonable, then, is it, on such grounds to plunge into the horrors of war, when all the purposes of prudence will be answered by an augmentation of any precautions on our own part, short of actual hostility! And if there still remain any doubts in respect to this course, may we not find a solution of them in history? It is believed, that many of the wars, which have afflicted the world, may justly be attributed to this doubtful principle, originating in a determination on the part of the actual aggressor, which this principle permits nations to entertain, to retaliate on merely suspected and anticipated wrongs. A nation prepares some fifty or an hundred cannon, perhaps merely because it is a matter of convenience, or sends on some indefinite destination a few ships of war, probably to keep the vessels in order and the sailors out of idleness; and this is considered sufficient cause for a grand movement on the part of other nations, the sending of ambassadors, the utterance of rebukes, the note of warlike preparation, the striking of some sudden homeblow, the involving of the world in strife, and thousands of private families in misery. Let nations publish to the world in good faith, that they are determined to pursue a strict course of neutrality and