acknowledged to be obligatory on individuals, are equally obligatory on nations. It was undoubtedly difficult for men in their situation, constantly contending either for empire or existence, and environed by a multitude of adverse influences, to elevate their thoughts to the comprehension and belief of the sublime doctrine of Christianity, that all mankind are brethren; that no distinctions of clime, country, or language can sunder the ties of brotherhood, and annul its beneficent requisitions. It is here we discover the great defect of their position; they restricted not only their sympathies and kindness, but the exercise of justice to their own nation, and were led to look upon a stranger, nearly in the same light as an enemy. It was in consequence of this undue restriction of the better principles of our nature to their own people, and this perversion of the moral sentiment in relation to strangers, that the civilized and polished Greeks were induced to approve and practice the odious crime of piracy. "There were powerful Grecian states, says Chancellor Kent, that avowed the practice of piracy; and the fleets of Athens, the best disciplined and most respectable naval force in all antiquity, were exceedingly addicted to piratical excursions. It was the received opinion, that Greeks were bound to no duties, nor by any moral law without compact, and that prisoners taken in war had no rights, and might lawfully be put to death, or sold into perpetual slavery, with their wives and children."*The Romans appear to have exhibited a more determinate and correct sense of what was due to other nations than the Greeks; and yet it cannot be denied that their history discloses abundant instances of cunning and prevarication, of pride and cruelty, altogether inconsistent with that rectitude, magnanimity, and benevolence, which enlightened conscience, as *Kent's Commentaries, Lect. I,-Potter's Antiquities, Book III, Chap. 10,12.

well as Christianity, teaches us ought to characterize the dealings of man with man, and of nation with nation. Their historians make mention of the jus belli and the jus gentium; but the code, which they designated by such appellations, if such it may be called, was abundantly imperfect in some of its requisitions, impolitic and cruel in others, and would at once be rejected at the present day, as discordant with the rights and the well-being of man.

If we examine the history of the human race at later periods, during the first ages of the Christian era, and down through the days of chivalry, we shall find renewed proofs, how little the duties, owed by one nation to another, were understood and practised. At some periods since the commencement of the Christian era, international law seems to have been thrown back to a point of depression below its position, previous to the annunciation of Christianity among Gentile nations. But on the whole, it may be looked upon as slowly progressive. While it has remained stationary in some respects, it has proceeded from step to step in others, and has attempted, with a partial success at least, to complete what was deficient, and correct what was erroneous.

A few facts will more fully illustrate what we mean. It was originally an established principle, that, if a merchant vessel were wrecked upon a foreign coast, the wreck became the property of the occupants of the coast, although the real owners were living. It was an established principle also, equally characterized by injustice, that, if a person resident in a foreign country died there, his property, instead of descending to those, whom he designed and wished to be his heirs, was taken for the use and benefit of the country, where he happened to be resident at the time of his death. In both of these particulars, a great improvement has been made in the law

of nations. It was originally one of the laws of war, that the prisoners, taken in the progress of a contest, might be put to death. The conqueror was supposed to possess complete power over the captured; and but little hesitation was manifested in taking their lives, if their preservation would not answer the conqueror's purposes better.* And in point of fact, this was not unfrequently the case, especially among nations but a little removed from the savage state. Even the high-minded Romans are not altogether free from this charge. A recent writer, after remarking that their captives were led behind the chariot wheels of the victorious Roman general, adds, that death itself by the executioner in prison was sometimes the closing scene of this inhuman spectacle.† In process of time less cruel sentiments were entertained, and it seems to have become the settled practice to retain prisoners of war as slaves, and to employ them as such. But when it was considered, that a permanent detention from one's native country is but a little more favorable than immediate death, a further change took place, and the laws, which regulate the state of hostility among nations, now require an exchange of prisoners; a change of principles and practice, which cannot be regarded otherwise than an improvement. According to the modern law of nations, prisoners are treated in every respect much more favorably than they were formerly; but it is exceedingly humiliating to observe, how slow and hesitating mankind were in arriving at these results. We find instances of the reduction of prisoners to slavery, in the history of Europe, as far down as the fourteenth century, and it is only at a period somewhat later, that we find the practice branded with the published and practised disapprobation of the whole civilized world.

* Grotius, Book III, Chap. 7.-t Ward's Law of Nations, Vol. I. pp. 190. 251, 298.

At the present time it is also against the laws of war, which of course hold a prominent place in the laws of nations, to poison wells, or to use poisoned arms; but it is only within a comparatively recent period that this has become a settled and permanent arrangement. On the savage assumption, that the death of enemies is the prominent object in battle, it was deemed of subordinate consequence, how that object was secured. On these grounds it was deemed admissible and proper to employ poisoned arms, and what seems even more atrocious, to poison wells and springs of water. Richard, Cœur de Lion, died by means of a poisoned arrow, with which he had been wounded. Ambrose, earl of Warick, died of a wound by a poisoned bullet. At the seige of Bourges, in 1412, poisoned bullets were used; the fountains also in the suburbs are said to have been corrupted by poison. "Since the beginning of the seventeenth century," says Martens, "the use of empoisoned arms has been looked upon as unlawful " And in connection with this remark he refers to a Treatise on War of Beust, who there gives an account of a Convention on this very subject, made with the express object of preventing the use of poisons in war, which was concluded as late as 1675.

The same writer on the Laws of Nations refers briefly to another topic, which may properly be noticed here, as coming in aid of the illustration of our subject.—“Formerly, he observes, it was frequent enough to see the subjects of one state making reprisals on those of another; but the disorders resulting from such a practice and the dangers, to which the state itself was exposed by leaving the use of such violences in the hands of individuals, have induced, since the 14th century, the states of Europe in general, to withhold from their subjects the exercise of this dangerous right."*

* Martens' Law of Nations. Book VIII, Chap. I, §. 6.

This undoubtedly is to be considered a great improvement. Indeed it is difficult to conceive of a Law of nations, in any degree worthy of the name, while the right and the power of reprisals is left in the hands of individuals, acting on their own authority and responsibility. Happily, therefore, for the interests of mankind, it seems now to be fully settled, that a legitimate and public state of war does not necessarily ensue, as consequent on private hostilities, whatever their character may be. The opinion has even been expressed on high authority, that, if all the subjects of a king of England were to engage in hostilities against another country in league with it, but without the assent of the king, there would be still no breach of the league between the two countries.

It would not be difficult to enlarge upon this subject. But without going further, the preceding statements and illustrations are sufficient clearly to evince, that the Law of nations has been gradual in its developement, and has been brought to its present comparatively improved state only by successive steps. This advancement was so slow, and the intercourse of nations was attended with so many embarrassments and so much deception and cruelty, that no one will pretend to assert the ability and adaptedness of the Law of nations to secure permanent justice and peace at any period whatever, previous to the time of Grotius. Its principles were exceedingly indeterminate; it rested almost wholly upon precedents, which were often variant and inconsistent with each other; it was not reduced to the form of a science, and illustrated by appeals to enlightened reason and conscience. It is impossible to designate any considerable period from the beginning of history down to the commencement of the seventeenth century, when the illustrious philosopher of Delft obtained a hearing on this great subject never given before, which is not sul