President Taylor in his first annual message (December 4, 1849) said: A collector has been appointed at San Francisco under the act of Congress extending the revenue laws over California, and measures have been taken to organize the custom-houses at that and the other ports mentioned in that act at the earliest period practicable. The collector proceeded overland and advices have not yet been received of his arrival at San Francisco. Meanwhile it is understood that the customs have continued to be collected there by officers acting under the military authority, as they were during the administration of my predecessor. It will, I think, be expedient to confirm the collections thus made and direct the avails (after such allowances as Congress may think fit to authorize) to be expended within the Territory, or to be paid into the Treasury for the purpose of meeting appropriations for the improvement of its rivers and harbors. (Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 5, p. 19.) ALASKA. The treaty for the purchase of Alaska was proclaimed June 20, 1867. (15 Stat. L., 539.) On April 6, 1868, Mr. McCullough, then Secretary of the Treasury, addressed a letter to the collector of the port of New York wherein he acknowledged receipt of a request from the Russian minister for the free entry of certain oils shipped from Alaska to San Francisco and from there reshipped to New York. In response to this request Mr. McCullough said: The request for the free entry of said oil was made on the ground that the oil was shipped from Sitka after the ratification of the treaty by which the territory of Alaska became the property of the United States. The treaty in question was ratified on the 20th of June, 1867, and the collector at San Francisco has reported that the manifest of the vessel shows the oil to have been shipped from Alaska on the 6th day of July, 1867, and that the shipment consisted of 52 packages. Under these circumstances you are hereby authorized to admit the said 52 packages of oil free of duty. The views expressed by the Secretary of the Treasury were also entertained by the Secretary of State, William H. Seward. In a letter dated January 30, 1869, Mr. Seward said: I understand the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Harrison v. Cross (16 How., 164) to declare its opinion that, upon the addition to the United States of new territory by conquest and cession, the acts regulating foreign commerce attach to and take effect within such territory ipso facto and without any fresh act of legislation expressly giving such extension to the pre-existing laws. I can see no reason for a discrimination in this effect between acts regulating foreign commerce and the laws regulating intercourse with the Indian tribes. On July 27, 1868, Congress passed an act entitled "An act to extend the laws of the United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation over territory ceded to the United States by Russia, to establish a collection district therein, and for other purposes. (15 Stat. L., 240.) The first section of this act extended the laws of the United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation to and over "all the mainland, islands, and waters of the territory ceded to the United States by the Emperor of Russia." In connection with the course pursued by the administration of President Johnson in the instance of Alaska, it is advisable to recall that. President Johnson, prior to the time Alaska was acquired, had insisted that the Executive possessed the authority to determine what relations to the Federal Government of the United States should be sustained by the territory and inhabitants of the late rebellious States. If his position were well taken, it followed that, the treaty having been ratified by the Executive, there remained nothing to be done to complete the incorporation of Alaska into the United States. COMPARISON OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR UNIFORM TARIFF LAWS WITH THE REQUIREMENTS AS TO UNIFORM LAWS ON INTERNALREVENUE AND DIRECT TAXES. Under the Constitution, the internal-revenue laws should be as universal and uniform in application as the tariff laws. The first internal-revenue tax on spirits distilled in the United States was levied by the act of March 3, 1791, which, for purposes of collection, provided that the United States shall be divided into fourteen districts, each consisting of one State." (1 U. S. Stats., sec. 4, pp. 199, 200.) · Although said act did not prohibit the distilling of spirits except in compliance with said tax regulations, no provision was made for the collection of said tax in the territories not included in the boundaries of the existing fourteen States. It was not until 1868 that the internal-revenue laws were extended to apply to all places "within the exterior boundaries of the United States." (15 U. S. Stats., sec. 107. p. 167.) The territories thus subjected to the provisions of the internalrevenue acts were the Indian reservations and the lands of the civilized tribes, which theretofore had not been invaded by the collector of internal-revenue taxes. The provisions of the Constitution for direct taxation, instead of requiring that direct taxes shall be universal and uniform, requires that they shall be "apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined" by enumeration. (Art. 1, sec. 2, clause 3.) This provision is apparently coextensive with that relating to customs. The two clauses must be taken together, and the fact that one in requiring uniformity mentions the United States as a whole, and the other in prescribing a rule of proportion among the several parts refers to the taxable area distributively, can not be taken to mean that the limits of the taxable area in the two cases are different. In the first twenty-five years of the Government's existence, under the Constitution, Congress provided for several levies of direct taxes, which were imposed solely on the States. Finally, one was extended to territory (District of Columbia), and in upholding it Chief Justice Marshall held that while Congress might include the Territories in imposing a direct tax, Congress were not required to do so. borough. Blake, 5 Wheat., 317.) (Lough If, as Chief Justice Marshall held, the Constitution allows Congress discretion in fixing the area to be affected by direct taxation, by confining the direct tax to States or extending it to include the Territories, does not the Constitution permit a like discretion in fixing the area affected by indirect taxation? Attention is also directed to certain legislation of Congress relating to the United States Bank and Louisiana. The original charter of the bank authorized the directors to establish branch banks "wheresoever they shall see fit within the United States." (Act Feb. 25, 1791; 1 U. S. Stats., sec. 15, p. 195.) Upon the acquisition of Louisiana the bank desired to establish a branch in New Orleans. To enable it to do so Congress passed the following act: AN ACT supplementary to the act intituled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States." Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the president and directors of the Bank of the United States shall be, and they are hereby, authorized to establish offices of discount and deposit in any part of the Territories or dependencies of the United States, in the manner and on the terms prescribed by the act to which this is a supplement. Approved March 23, 1804. (2 U. S. Stats., p. 274.) The Constitution requires that Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State. (Art. 4, sec. 1.) The First Congress (1790) passed an act providing— That the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any State shall be proved or admitted in any other court within the United States by the attestation And the said records and judicial proceedings, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United States as (Act of May 26, 1790, 1 U. S. Stats., p. 122.) * * * * * When the province of Louisiana was acquired, it was of course necsary to secure a like recognition in that territory for such public acts, records, and judicial proceedings. To accomplish this the Eighth Congress (1804) passed “An act supplementary to the act entitled," etc., being the act above referred to. This act specifically divided all territory under the sovereignty of the United States into three classes, as follows: (1) States of the Union. (2) Territories of the United States. (3) Countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. This classification appears in section 2 of said act, which is as follows: That all the provisions of this act and the act to which this is a supplement shall apply as well to the public acts, records, office books, judicial proceedings, courts, and offices of the respective Territories of the United States and countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as to the public acts, records, office books, judicial proceedings, courts, and offices of the several States. (Act of March 27, 1804, 2 U. S. Stats., pp. 298, 299.) This classification, adopted by the Eighth Congress and approved by President Jefferson, is preserved to this day. Sections 905 and 906, Revised Statutes of the United States (1878), are as follows: 905. The acts of the legislature of any State or Territory or any country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, etc. 906. All records and exemplifications of books which may be kept in any public office of any State or Territory or any country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, etc. REPORT ON THE RIGHT OF SPAIN TO ACCEPT A RENEWAL OF [Submitted June 24, 1901. Case No. 425, Division of Insular Affairs, War Department.] 1. The provisions of the royal decree of Spain (May 11, 1901) do not infringe upon the rights of the United States respecting the allegiance of the inhabitants of the islands affected by the treaty of Paris, 1898. 2. The provisions of said royal decree do not violate the provisions of said treaty. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge and comply with your request for a report on the above-entitled subject, presented as follows: The State Department transmits to the Secretary of War a copy of a royal decree of Spain, dated May 11, 1901, declaring the law of Spain on the subject of the change of citizenship of the inhabitants of the territories ceded or relinquished by the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, and the procedure by which persons who have lost their Spanish citizenship may recover it. In the letter transmitting said decree the Acting Secretary of State, Hon. David J. Hill, says Some of the articles of this decree do not appear to be in harmony with the stipulations of the treaty, but the apparent conflict is probably intended to be saved by the provisions of Article V. (NOTE.—In the copy of decree transmitted by the State Department the article immediately succeeding article 4 is not numbered, and the one succeeding that is numbered 7.) The examination and report desired by the Secretary of War is understood by the writer to be in respect of the following questions: 1. Do the provisions of said royal decree of Spain (May 11, 1901) infringe upon the rights of the United States in the matters with which said decree deals? 2. Do the provisions of said royal decree violate provisions of the treaty of Paris (1898)? I am of opinion that both questions are to be answered in the negative. The provisions of said decree relate exclusively to citizenship under the Government of Spain. They declare the willingness of that Government to confer citizenship on certain classes of individuals, provided such individuals follow a certain procedure whereby would be evidenced the desire of such individuals to accept such citizenship. No attempt. is made to force Spanish citizenship upon any person unwilling to assume it. Apparently the decree goes no further than to declare that the provisions of articles 19, 21, and 23 of the civil code of Spain are applicable to the cases of former citizens of Spain whose citizenship and appurtenant rights were affected by the treaty of Paris. Said articles are as follows (Laws of Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines, vol. 1, War Dept. Trans.): ART. 19. The children of a foreigner born in Spanish possessions must state, within the year following their majority or emancipation, whether they desire to enjoy the citizenship of Spaniards granted them by article 17. * * * * * ART. 21. A Spaniard who loses his citizenship by acquiring the nationality of a foreign country can recover it upon returning to the Kingdom by declaring to the official in charge of the civil registry of the domicile which he elects that such is his wish, in order that the proper entry may be made, and by renouncing the protection of the flag of said country. ART. 23. Any Spaniard who loses his citizenship by accepting employment from any other government, or by entering the armed service of a foreign power without the King's permission, can not recover the Spanish nationality without previously obtaining the royal authorization. The civil code of Spain, including these articles, has been in force in the Spanish Peninsula since May, 1888, and was extended to Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippines by decree dated July 31, 1889. The existence and enforcement of said provision of said law of Spain have been acquiesced in by the United States, without challenge, during the period indicated, and at the present time is not objected to when applied to individual residents or citizens of the States of the Union who for any reason desire to be reinstated in Spanish citizenship. This decree does not ordain new laws nor provide new tests or procedure. It simply declares the willingness of Spain to treat its former subjects in the territories ceded or relinquished in the treaty of Paris in the same way it does its former subjects in other portions of the globe. In adopting said provisions of said civil code Spain asserts a right which the United States has always contended belonged to each member of the family of nations. From its inception this Government has insisted that the right of a man to confer his pernianent allegiance upon a sovereign was a natural right in the exercise of which the man was a free agent. This right of expatriation was the subject of an |