mit No. 78, to operate denaturing plant No. 111, and that the appellees were about to revoke the permit. The appellant, however, denies the validity of the proceedings whereby the appellees sought to effect the revocation. The proceedings in question were prosecuted under section 9 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (41 Stat. 311 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101381⁄2dd]), which reads as follows:

"Sec. 9. If at any time there shall be filed with the commissioner a complaint under oath setting forth facts showing, or if the commissioner has reason to believe, that any person who has a permit is not in good faith conforming to the provisions of this act, or has violated the laws of any state relating to intoxicating liquor, the commissioner or his agent shall immediately issue an order citing such person to appear before him on a day named not more than thirty and not less than fifteen days from the date of service upon such permittee of a copy of the citation, which citation shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint, or in the event that the proceedings be initiated by the commissioner with a statement of the facts constituting the violation charged, at which time a hearing shall be had unless continued for cause. Such hearings shall be held within the judicial district and within fifty miles of the place where the offense is alleged to have occurred, unless the parties agree on another place. If it be found that such person has been guilty of willfully violating any such laws, as charged, or has not in good faith conformed to the provisions of this act, such permit shall be revoked, and no permit shall be granted to such person within one year thereafter. Should the permit be revoked by the commissioner, the permittee may have a review of his decision before a court of equity in the manner provided in section 5 hereof. During the pendency of such action such permit shall be temporarily revoked."

The record discloses that after several attempts to revoke the appellant's permit the Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, on April 23, 1924, made a finding that there was reason to believe that the appellant as permittee under permit 78 aforesaid, had not in good faith conformed to the provisions of the National Prohibition Act, in that among other alleged violations of the act the permittee had withdrawn from its plant and delivered to certain parties 200 barrels of specially denatured alcohol, and at the same time knowingly and falsely recorded and reported

on government forms that the barrels contained fully denatured alcohol.

At this point it may be noted that specially denatured alcohol, formula 39-B, is capable of various uses not possible for completely denatured alcohol, and furthermore the denaturing ingredients thereof may be removed by redistillation or other processes, and pure ethyl alcohol fit for beverage purposes may thus be recovered. Moreover the sale of specially denatured alcohol is forbidden except to persons holding a permit under bond to purchase the same. No such requirement exists as to purchasers of completely denatured alcohol. Proceedings were accordingly begun by the commissioner against the permittee under section 9, and after a hearing of the evidence, the permittee appearing by counsel, the hearing officer on August 28, 1924, sustained the foregoing charge, and revoked and canceled the permit. This action was approved on the same day by the prohibition commissioner. A review of these proceedings convinces us that they were based upon legal evidence, and conformed throughout to the requirements of section 9 aforesaid. Accordingly they were valid, if such proceedings may be prosecuted under that section.

[1] The appellant, however, contends that, in order to revoke such a permit, the permittee must be proceeded against under section 5 of title 2 of the act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101382bb), and not under section 9, as was done in this instance. Section 5 requires, among other things, that the commissioner shall cause an analysis of the article in question to be made before serving notice upon the permittee, and that notice be served upon the appellee to show cause why the article should not be dealt with as an intoxicating liquor; whereas section 9 does not require such an analysis, and the notice required by it differs in certain particulars from that of section 5. The appellant claims that these provisions are jurisdictional in character, and that, since they were not followed, the order of revocation was null and void.

We do not agree with this contention. Section 4 of title 2 of the act (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 101382b) provides that certain enumerated articles shall not, after having been manufactured and prepared for the market, be subject to the provisions of the act, if they correspond with certain descriptions and limitations set out in the section. Among the articles thus exempted are "denatured alcohol or denatured rum pro

duced and used as provided by laws and regulations now or hereafter in force"; also certain medicinal preparations, unfit for use for beverage purposes; patented, patent, and proprietary medicines, unfit for use for beverage purposes; toilet, medicinal, and antiseptic preparations and solutions, unfit for use for beverage purposes; flavoring extracts and sirups, unfit for use as a beverage; and vinegar and preserved sweet cider. These provisions are followed by section 5 of the act, reading as follows:

"Sec. 5. Whenever the commissioner has reason to believe that any article mentioned in section 4 does not correspond with the descriptions and limitations therein provided, he shall cause an analysis of said article to be made, and if, upon such analysis. the commissioner shall find that said article does not so correspond, he shall give not less than fifteen days' notice in writing to the person who is the manufacturer thereof to show cause why said article should not be dealt with as an intoxicating liquor, such notice to be served personally or by registered mail, as the commissioner may determine, and shall specify the time when, the place where, and the name of the agent or official before whom such person is required to appear.

"If the manufacturer of said article fails to show to the satisfaction of the commissioner that the article corresponds to the descriptions and limitations provided in section 4 of this title, his permit to manufacture and sell such article shall be revoked. The manufacturer may by appropriate proceeding in a court of equity have the action of the commissioner reviewed, and the court may affirm, modify, or reverse the finding of the commissioner as the facts and law of the case may warrant, and during the pendency of such proceedings may restrain the manufacture, sale, or other disposition of such article."

In our opinion the revocation proceedings in the instant case are not within the purview of section 5. Therefore it was not necessary that an analysis should be made or notice given thereunder, as claimed by the

appellant. The section provides a method whereby the commissioner, if he has reason to believe that an article claiming the benefit of section 4 does not in fact correspond to the descriptions and limitations thereof, shall cause an analysis of the article to be made, and, if he finds that it does not so correspond, he shall cause a hearing to be had, and upon proper findings shall revoke the permit of the party to manufacture and sell such article. The purpose of this proceeding is to ascertain whether the article in question is being manufactured and prepared according to law. On the other hand, the purpose of section 9 is to ascertain whether "any person who has a permit" has not in good faith conformed with the provisions of the act, whether in the preparation or disposition of the article, or has violated the laws of any state relating to intoxicating liquor, even though the article produced by him may have been manufactured and prepared in strict compliance with law. This is the offense charged against the appellant. See Hoell v. Mellon (D. C.) 4 F. (2d) 859; McGill v. Mellon (D. C.) 5 F. (2d) 262; Blackman v. Mellon (D. C.) 5 F. (2d) 987. The penalty prescribed for a conviction in such case is that the offender's permit shall be revoked, and that no permit shall be granted to such person within one year thereafter. Regulations 61, articles 100 to 111.

[2] The appellant also argues that under section 1932 of article 19, Regulations 60, it was the duty of the hearing officer to render his decision, and either revoke the permit or dismiss the proceedings within 10 days after the hearing; whereas in this instance the officer did not file his decision until several months later. It is contended that this provision is jurisdictional, and therefore that the order of revocation is void. This view is not tenable, for, even if the regulation is applicable to this proceeding, it is directory only, and not jurisdictional. 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction (2d Ed.) § 612.

The decree of the lower court, dissolving the injunction pendente lite and dismissing the plaintiff's bill, is affirmed with costs.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Gift Inter Vivos.]

2. Gifts 21-Delivery to agent or trustee for donee is sufficient to complete valid gift. A delivery to a third person as agent or trustee for donee, under circumstances indicating relinquishment of control, is sufficient to complete valid gift, which is not revoked by death of donor before actual delivery to donee. 3. Gifts 28 (2)-Delivery of bonds to bank for donee and delivery of receipt to donee held valid gift of bonds.

Delivery of bonds to bank for donee and taking of receipt in her name, which was delivered to her, but replaced in donor's safe, held complete valid gift, notwithstanding donor inaccurately spoke of donee as his "daughter," and subsequently had interest coupons credited to his account.

claimants accordingly filed their respective pleadings, and the issues were submitted to the court upon the evidence, whereupon the court adjudged Margaret B. Turley individually to be the owner of the bonds, and entered a final decree in her favor. This appeal followed. The bonds have since been converted into cash, which is now held by trustees subject to the orders of the court.

It appears that on October 25, 1918, John Rudden, a resident of the District of Columbia, duly executed a written instrument as and for his last will and testament in case of his decease, whereby his wife, Mary A. Rudden, was to have his personal property absolutely, except his furniture business, which was to go to Margaret B. Turley, his niece, whom he called his adopted daughter in the will, upon condition that she pay all of his debts, and further pay to his wife the sum of $100 per month during her lifetime. His real estate was to go to his wife for life, and at her death, or in case she died before the testator, it was to go to Margaret B. Turley absolutely.

It does not appear in the record whether Margaret B. Turley, who was also known as Margaret V. Turley, was ever legally adopted as a daughter by the Ruddens, but it may be inferred that there was no such legal

their marriage then living. It appears that about a year after the execution of the will Mr. Rudden made a cash sale of certain real estate which he had owned for many years; that he thereupon took the proceeds of the sale to the Columbia National Bank and directed the cashier to buy Victory notes or bonds therewith, and that the cashier accordingly purchased the bonds now in question. When these were ready for delivery, Mr. Rudden was notified and came to the bank, where the bonds were shown to him, whereupon he said, "Here, now, I want these placed in safe-keeping for my daughter, and I want a receipt made out in her name." He added, "The reason for this is, if anything happens to me, I want my daughter to have these bonds." The bonds were then placed in an envelope, marked "Margaret V. Turley," and this was placed in the safe-keeping department of the bank. At the same time the following receipt was written upon bank stationery, signed by the cashier, and delivered to Mr. Rudden:

"Oct. 6, 1919.

"Received of Margaret V. Turley $10,500 in Victory 44 per cent. notes for safe keeping.

"[Signed] C. Corson, Cashier."

Mr. Rudden took the receipt to his office, and placed it in the strong box of his safe. In the latter part of the same month, Margaret B. Turley, who resided at Chattanooga, was at the office of Mr. Rudden in the city of Washington, engaged in conversation with him, when Mr. Rudden gave the keys of his safe to a clerk, according to his custom, for he never opened the safe himself, and directed the clerk to get the receipt from the strong box for him. The clerk got the receipt for Mr. Rudden, who then presented it to Mrs. Turley, with some statement, which the clerk as a witness was unable to repeat, and Mrs. Turley then made the remark to keep it until she went home. Mrs. Turley then took the receipt herself and put it in the safe, whereupon the clerk closed the safe and handed the keys back to Mr. Rudden. The clerk often saw the receipt afterwards in the place where it was then put, and it was found there after the death of Mr. Rudden. Mrs. Turley never again had the receipt in her hands during Mr. Rudden's lifetime, nor did she ever go to the bank to inquire about the bonds, or personally obtain manual possession of them until after his death.

It appears that on December 15, 1919, the semiannual interest coupons attached to the bonds became payable, and that Mr. Rud. den then went to the bank and instructed the cashier to have the coupons clipped from the bonds and credited to his bank account, which was done. The record contains the testimony of four several witnesses to the effect that after the time when the bonds were purchased Mr. Rudden stated to them in different conversations that he had given the bonds to Mrs. Turley, in one instance adding the statement that "he knew that she would take care of his wife in case anything happened to him."

John Rudden died in the month of January following the purchase of the bonds. His wife died intestate about two weeks later, leaving certain next of kin, and the appellant is the administrator of her estate. The last will and testament of Mr. Rudden, above referred to, was duly admitted to probate and record. The bonds in the meantime remained in the custody of the bank, and the question involved in this case is whether the foregoing facts show a valid gift of them to Mrs. Turley, or whether they became assets of Mr. Rudden's estate, to be disposed of according to the terms of his will. The lower court held that there had been a valid gift of the bonds to Mrs. Turley, and accordingly adjudged the proceeds thereof to her.

[1,2] We agree with the decree of the lower court. It is, of course, elementary that in order to constitute a valid gift of property inter vivos there must in general be an actual delivery thereof to the donee, with an intention upon the part of the donor to divest himself of the title, dominion, and control over the subject of the gift, and to invest the donee therewith. Lee v. Lee, 5 F. (2d) 767, 55 App. D. C. 344; Lust v. Miller, Custodian, 4 F. (2d) 293, 55 App. D. C. 217; 28 Corpus Juris, p. 626; Allen-West Co. v. Grumbles, 129 F. 287, 63 C. C. A. 401. Nevertheless, "delivery of the property to a third person as agent or trustee for the use of the donee, and not as agent of the donor, under such circumstances as indicate that the donor relinquishes all dominion and control over the property, is a sufficient delivery to complete the gift, which in such case is not revoked by the subsequent death of the donor before the property has been actually delivered to the donee. Knowledge of the gift on the donee's part is not necessary to render it effective, since the assent of the donee may be implied." 28 Corpus Juris, p. 640, § 32; 12 R. C. L. p. 934; Martin v. Funk, Adm'r, 75 N. Y. 134, 31 Am. Rep. 446.

[3] The gift now in question responds to the foregoing conditions. The donor unconditionally parted with the possession of the bonds by delivering them to the bank as bailee for the donee alone, and accepted a receipt from the bank to that effect. Afterwards this receipt was delivered by the donor to the donee, who thereupon dealt with it as her own, leaving it in the donor's strong box for safe-keeping until her return home. This conduct of the donor was sufficient evidence of his intention to invest the donee with full title and dominion over the property. The explanation of the donor's failure to make an immediate manual delivery of the bonds to the donee is easily understood when the great value of the bonds, as well as the danger of losing them unless left in a safe place, is remembered. Moreover, the donee lived in a distant city, and was not present at the time when the bonds were purchased and left with the bank.

The statement of the donor to the cashier, at the time of the deposit, that his reason for making it was that, if anything happened to him, he wanted "his daughter" to have the bonds, is not inconsistent with the theory of a gift in præsenti, and in view of all the circumstances it should not be given the effect of overcoming the plain force