statute seizure of both vessels and goods intended for foreign parts in violation of the act was directed by the statute; condemnation of both ship and cargo was to follow, usually in the case of the ship and under certain specified circumstances in that of the cargo. Under that act it was held in Slocum v. Mayberry, 2 Wheat. 1, at page 9 (4 L. Ed. 169): "The party supposing himself aggrieved by a seizure cannot, because he considers it tortious, replevy the property out of the custody of the seizing officer, or of the court having cognizance of the cause. If the seizing officer should refuse to institute proceedings to ascertain the forfeiture, the District Court may, upon the application of the aggrieved party, compel the officer to proceed to adjudication or to abandon the seizure." [7] In the century and more that has elapsed since the embargo, seizures such as those under that statute have been rare until the passage of the National Prohibition Act. But the rule is the same. The remedy of the party who feels himself aggrieved by seizure is to contest the validity thereof in the suit for condemnation; he cannot "shortcircuit" the orderly course of law by instituting suit of his own, though he may force the hand of the government officers and compel them promptly to proceed in the way laid down by law. This line of demarcation was thoroughly recognized, not so much in Blatchford, J.'s, opinion in Re Fassett, supra, as in the brief of Mr. Elihu Root of counsel; for the whole basis of his successful argument was that the collector's seizure for an alleged tax was not and never had been pretended to be a seizure "under any law providing for a penalty or forfeiture." This is such a seizure, and whether it is wrongful or not can only be determined in a proper suit for condemnation. Thus it was the duty of the court below, notwithstanding the extraordinary form of pleading, to investigate its own jurisdiction. If that had been done, it would have appeared that no jurisdiction existed. We note the direction in what is in effect the final decree below (though called an "order of release") that the collector shall be entitled to maintain a person on board the vessel until it arrives at the now notorious 12-mile limit. If one looks at the language of the order or decree, and nothing else, the direction is inexplicable; it is impossible to see why the collector should be entitled to put a guest on the Blairmore I until she reaches the high seas, without any suggested method of taking him off. But, if the gloss contained in the opinion be observed, the permission was intended to be a passport or safe-conduct to both vessel and cargo until she reached a point confessedly beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. We are not aware of any justification for such a direction. Nothing is pointed out to us excusing the order. [8] From the briefs and argument (not from the apostles) we learn that the Coast Guard officials were thought to have made a mistake in taking what they had captured into a Connecticut port, instead of New York harbor. They got into the wrong district, and the intent of the order was to prevent any new seizure or capture. If there had been a pleading showing the existence of this alleged error, that would have been no reason for granting a safe-conduct; in the absence of any such information contained in the pleadings, there was even less excuse. We conclude that on the pleadings the libel was open to peremptory exception, and if the pleadings are reformed, possessory suit does not lie for a res governmentally held for forfeiture by judicial process. The decree is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to dismiss the libel or libels, without costs in any court. 2. Aliens 46-Physically defective son of minister, entering country to carry on his vocation, held not entitled to enter. Fifteen year old son of minister entering country to carry on his vocation, found to be suffering from valvular disease of heart and certified as physically defective, held excluded from entry by Basic Act Feb. 5, 1917, § 3 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 42894b). *Certiorari denied 46 S. Ct. 475, 70 L. Ed. -. defective. 10 F.(2d) 38 Court cannot inquire into finding and certificate that alien, desiring to enter country, is physically defective. 3. Aliens 54(16)-Court cannot inquire Into son. Channa and Michel were excluded, alfinding and certificate that alien is physically so, for the defects above mentioned under the Basic Act of 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, §§ 4289a-42891⁄4u), and the mother, Beila, as an alien accompanying the child, Channa, 4. Aliens 54(9) · All the and necessary to her safe return. Finding that aliens are likely to become public charges must be supported by evidence. Manton, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Habeas corpus proceedings by the United States, on the relation of Beila Duner and others, against Henry H. Curran, as Commissioner of Immigration. From an order releasing relators from an order of exclusion by the Secretary of Labor, the Commissioner appeals. Order affirmed in part, and reversed in part. Appeal from an order on habeas corpus releasing the relators from an order of exclusion by the Secretary of Labor under the Immigration Acts. The aliens are the wife and four children under 18 years of age of one Jacob S. Duner, an alien resident of the city of New York and the rabbi of a Jewish congregation in that city. Duner lived in Poland, where he had been a rabbi for about 18 years. He arrived in New York on November 3, 1923, under a call to a Jewish congregation, and for the sole purpose of pursuing his profession. His wife and four children followed him, arriving in New York on November 11, 1924. Of these, the youngest, Channa, 4 years old, upon examination was found to be mentally defective, and was so certified by the surgeon in charge. His son Michel, 15 years old, on a similar examination was found to be suffering from a valvular disease of the heart, which might affect his ability to earn a living, and was so certified by the surgeon. All five of the aliens were beyond the quota admissible under the act of 1924 (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, §§ 428934428934nn) and were excluded for this rea children were likewise excluded as persons likely to become a public charge. After an unsuccessful appeal to the Secretary of Labor from these decisions of the Board of Special Inquiry, the husband took out the writ, upon which the District Court discharged all the aliens except Channa, and allowed the mother, Beila, to furnish a suitable attendant in place of herself. Emory R. Buckner, U. S. Atty. (James C. Thomas, Asst. U. S. Atty., of New York City, of counsel), for appellant. Morris Jablow, of New York City (Louis Marshall, of New York City, of counsel), for appellees. Before ROGERS, MANTON, HAND, Circuit Judges. and HAND, Circuit Judge (after stating the facts as above). [1] The chief question is whether section 4 (d) of the Act of 1924 (Comp. St. Supp. 1925, § 428934b) applies to the wife and children of a minister or professor who entered the country before July 1, 1924, the date when it went into effect. The section is in two parts: First, it exempts from the quota a minister "who continuously for at least two years has been, and who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of, carrying on the vocation," etc. Second, it exempts "his wife, if accompanying or following to join him." Grammatically the logic is inescapable; "his" and "him" refer to the minister or professor, who is exempted by the first part of the section. It is as though the section read: "We exempt the minister, and the wife of the minister whom we so exempt." But the distinction is meaningless as matter of policy. We can see no possible difference in the desirability of the family, whether its head entered before or after July 1, 1924, so long as he answers the prescribed description. We, of course, agree that whenever he enters he must already have practiced his profession for two years and must have entered solely to carry it on, but beyond that we are not disposed to press grammar at the expense of the plain purpose. Therefore, while not all ministers who had lawfully entered under the broader statutes might bring in their families, those might who would have had the same right upon a later entry. This does not give a retroactive scope to the statute, since it allows no family to enter which arrived before July 1, 1924. We think that the pronouns "his" and "him" may, without too great violence, be taken as incorporating the description of the familial head only in terms of his qualifications to enter, and not of his right to do So. The occasion of the section strongly corroborates what we have inferred from its text. The statute was passed on May 26, 1924, at a time when the status of such a family was before the Supreme Court, which indeed decided Commissioner v. Gottlieb, 265 U. S. 310, 44 S. Ct. 528, 68 L. Ed. 1031, on that very day. It was certainly intended to lay any doubts which were known to exist, and which that decision proved to be well found ed. After the decision, by resolution Congress allowed all aliens to remain who had entered on the faith of the decisions so reversed or overruled. Therefore the situation was that all who had entered could stay, and all might in the future enter if the head of the family should himself enter after July, 1, 1924. But if the appellant be right, none may enter whose head was already here, though he were within the more restricted class than those allowed to remain by the resolution. He must leave and come back again. It seems to us not unreasonable to describe such a result as fantastic, and such a purpose is incredible to impute to Con gress. We acknowledge that our construction in fact involves substituting other words in place of those used, and we shall seek no locutions to disguise the liberty taken or the risk assumed. We can appeal, however, to the universal and ancient practice of courts in dealing with any kind of words. Their purpose may appear so clearly as to escape defeat, in spite of its imperfect expression, and though other words must be imputed to the author. In saying that we are thus ascertaining the author's intent we speak somewhat elliptically. That intent as a fact in his mental life is irrelevant; his words are taken to mean what they mean in public use. But if the contrary expression be not too explicit, the disclosed purpose may prevail to cover an unforeseen event, which the author would certainly have comprised by proper words, had it been presented to him. We can see no useful purpose in denying that this is what takes place in such cases, and is what we are doing here. Immigration laws have repeatedly been so treated. Chew Heong v. U. S., 112 U. S. 536, 5 S. Ct. 255, 28 L. Ed. 770; Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., 143 U. S. 457, 12 S. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226; Lau Ow Bew v. U. S., 144 U. S. 47, 12 S. Ct. 517, 36 L. Ed. 340; Tsoi Sim v. U. S., 116 F. 920, 54 C. C. A. 154 (C. C. A. 9). It is quite true that in Commissioner v. Gottlieb, supra, the Supreme Court found the language of the act too explicit to allow the same result. But one case can scarcely be a precedent for another on a question of interpretation, where the result depends upon the utterance as a whole, its occasion, and its precise expression. Naturally we are especially solicitous to follow whatever may be the implications of that decision, but with the best possible will we cannot see that it gives us any guidance here, even though its subject-matter was so closely akin. We conclude, therefore, that section 4 (d) exempted the family of a minister who had himself entered before it went into effect, and the conclusion of the District Court is affirmed on that point. As to the exclusion of the mother, Beila, that she might act as an attendant upon the child, Channa, the question is apparently moot. At least we are told that the little girl has gone back with a satisfactory substitute. We decline, therefore, to decide whether the District Court has the power to interfere with the discretion of the Secretary or Commissioner under section 18 of the Basic Act (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, § 42894j). Since Beila is admissible per se, any ground for her exclusion has now disappeared. [2, 3] Michel Duner must be excluded; he falls within the language of section 3 of the Act of 1917 (section 42894b) as a person "found to be and certified by the examining surgeon as being physically defective." Into that finding and certificate we cannot inquire. U. S. ex rel. Feuerstein v. Tod, 296 F. 127 (C. C. A. 2); Tambara v. Weedin, 299 F. 299 (C. C. A. 9). Assuming for argument that we may consider whether the defect was such as might affect his ability to earn a living, we have no evidence to contradict the finding of the surgeon. The question was indeed involved in U. S. ex rel. Engel v. Tod, 294 F. 820 (C. C. A. 2), but was not discussed, and ' that case is not to be understood as involving a holding to the contrary, as appears from the later case of U. S. ex rel. Feuerstein v. Tod, supra. [4,5] Finally, we have the question whether 10 F.(2d) 41 the finding should stand that all the children Order affirmed as to Beila, Golde, Hudes, and Moshe Duner; order reversed as to Michel Duner. MANTON, Circuit Judge (dissenting). Unfortunately, I think the immigrants here seeking admission must be excluded, because of section 4 (d) of the Immigration Act of 1924. It provides for admission, as nonquota immigrants, of a minister (and family) "who seeks to enter the United States solely for the purpose of carrying on the vocation of minister of any religious denomination, and his wife, and his unmarried children under eighteen years of age, if accompanying or following to join him." Rabbi Duner was admitted to the United States prior to July 1, 1924, which is the effective date of the immigration statute under which his family seeks admission, He made no application to enter after July 1, 1924, and therefore was not in the class of "one who seeks to enter the United States under section 4, subd. (d)." The wife and children of a minister seeking to take advantage of this statute, I think, must of necessity be the family of a minister who entered after July 1, 1924. There is no ambiguity in the phrase of the statute. Therefore the intent of Congress is not important, and there is no reason for the construction of the We are not permitted to read into the act an exemption which is not there. Commissioner of Immigration v. Gottlieb, 265 U. S. 310, 44 S. Ct. 528, 68 L. Ed. 1031; Chung Fook v. White, 264 U. S. 443, 44 S. Ct. 361, 68 L. Ed. 781. I dissent. UNITED STATES v. LIAN et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals. Second Circuit. Nos. 66, 67. 1. Customs duties 82-"Protest," within statute making liquidation of duties conclusive after one year, defined. Under Act June 22, 1874, § 21 (Comp. St. § 5714), providing that liquidation and payment of duties and delivery of goods to importer is conclusive on parties after one year from entry, in absence of fraud or protest by importer, "protest" means written document filed by importer with collector against his decision as to rate and amount of duty for classification, and does not include notice of dissatisfaction with appraisement, leading to appeal therefrom, in view of Act Aug. 27, 1894, § 25 (Comp. St. § 6536), Act Feb. 27. 1877, amending Rev. St. § 3011, Act Oct. 3, 1913, § 3, N (Comp. St. § 5595), Act June 30, 1864, § 14, Rev. St. § 2931, Aug. 5, 1909. Act June 10, 1890, Act July 24, 1897, and Act 2. Customs duties 82-Importer may challenge legality of appraisement by filing protest with collector at time of assessment. Under Tariff Act Oct. 3, 1913, importer may. challenge legality of appraisement, or assert that it proceeded on wrong principle, contrary to law, by filing protest with collector at time he assesses amount of duties on such illegal appraisement. 3. Customs duties 96-Liquidation and pay ment of duties and delivery of goods to importers bars actions for additional duties after year from entry. Where duties, under Tariff Act Oct. 3, 1913, and Tariff Act 1894, § 25 (Comp. St. § 6536), were liquidated and paid, and goods delivered to importers, settlement was final and conclusive on all after one year from entry, in absence of protest by importers, under Act June 22, 1874, § 21 (Comp. St. § 5714), and government's actions for additional duties were barred. In Error to the District Court of the New York. statute. Luria v. United States, 231 U. S. United States for the Southern District of 9, 34 S. Ct. 10, 58 L. Ed. 101; Dewey v. United States, 178 U. S. 510, 20 S. Ct. 981, 44 L. Ed. 1170; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 S. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; United States v. Four Hundred and Twenty Dollars (D. C.) 162 F. 803. Actions by the United States against Abraham Lian and another, doing business under the firm name and style of Lian & Mabarak, and against Alexander J. Hamrah, doing business as Hamrah Bros. Judgments for defendants, and the United States brings have been delivered to the owner, importer, error. Affirmed. Emory R. Buckner, U. S. Atty., of New York City (Mary R. Towle, Asst. U. S. Atty, of New York City, of counsel), for the United States. agent or consignee, such entry and passage free of duty and such settlement of duties the time of entry, in the absence of fraud and shall, after the expiration of one year from in the absence of protest by the owner, im Frederick W. Brooks, Jr., of New York porter, agent, or consignee, be final and conclusive upon all parties." Comp. St. § 5714. City, for defendants in error. The defendants in error argue that "pro Before ROGERS, HOUGH, and MAN- test," as used in the statute, refers to a docTON, Circuit Judges. MANTON, Circuit Judge. These actions were tried together, argued here as one, and will be considered in one opinion. In each case, the government seeks to recover for additional duties on merchandise imported by each defendant under the Tariff Act of October 3, 1913, 38 Stat. 114, and under section 25 of the Tariff Act of 1894, 28 Stat. 552 (Comp. St. § 6536), which were effective when the importations were made. The cases were tried upon a stipulation as to the facts. The merchandise was entered, estimated duties were paid, and it was delivered to the defendants in error in November and December, 1919, and January, 1920. The balance of duties were liquidated and paid in May, July, and August, 1920, and MarchApril, 1921. There is no claim of fraud in the importations and entry of the merchandise. Appeals to reappraisement were filed and decided March 23, 1921. A reliquidation was had September 28, 1921, and additional duties were assessed by the collector under instructions from the Secretary of the Treasury under the provisions of section 25 of the Act of August 27, 1894 (28 Stat. 552). No protests were filed in accordance with section 3, subd. N, of the Tariff Act of 1913 (Comp. St. § 5595). [1] In answer to this suit for collection of the items found due under the reliquidations, the defendants in error say the reliquidations were illegal and void, in so much as they respectively took place more than one year after the respective dates of entry of the merchandise. The argument proceeds upon the basis that the Act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 186, was effective at the time of the importations and is a limitation of the right to reliquidate. The act provides (section 21): "That whenever any goods, wares, and merchandise shall have been entered and passed free of duty, and whenever duties upon any imported goods, wares, and merchandise shall have been liquidated and paid, and such goods, wares, and merchandise shall ument filed with the collector after his liquidation as to the rate and amount of duties, and sets forth the importer's objections to such decision. Because no such protest was made, the contention is that the limitation of one year applied to the reliquidations made and that therefore they were outlawed. The government argues that the term "protest," as used in the Act of June 22, 1874, should reasonably be construed in a more general sense, and should include a notice of dissatisfaction with an appraisement leading to an appeal therefrom. The argument proceeds that the appeal to reappraisement, which was filed on March 23, 1921, is a protest within the meaning of this statute. Ever since the enactment and to the present time, an importer, in connection with his importations, could ask for reappraisement of his merchandise, if dissatisfied with the valuations and assessments thereon. He could appeal from the appraisement. If dissatisfied with the decision of the collector as to the rate and amount, he could file a protest to that decision. The two are quite distinct. In other words, the decision of the appraisers as to the value of merchandise is the subject of an appeal to reappraisement, and the decision of the collector as to the rate and the amount of duties chargeable is the subject of protest. Learned counsel for the government argues, referring to earlier decisions, that the word "protest," used in the act in question, includes a notice of dissatisfaction of the appraisement and an appeal to reappraisement, and from this it is said that the time within which liquidation could take place was extended in the case at bar by the pendency of the appeals to reappraisement. If this be true, the reliquidations were not affected by the one-year limitation in question. In Davies v. Miller, 130 U. S. 284, 9 S. Ct. 560, 32 L. Ed. 932, the Supreme Court, in 1889, considering the Tariff Act of 1864 (13 Stat. 214) reviewed the importers' various rights of appeals up to 1864. There it is said that an importer who paid unauthorized duties might recover them from the col |