The manner of procedure adopted by the Massachusetts Board of Conciliation and Arbitration and by the Minimum Wage Boards of New Zealand and Australia follow virtually the same lines; that is, both the employers and employees can be heard and certain rates are fixed. In the case of the Massachusetts Board, these rates must be accepted by both the employers and employees and made the basis of an industrial agreement before they actually go into operation. In New Zealand and Australia, the matter is brought before the court and argued by both sides. In New Zealand, when the rate is fixed, it is a minimum rate and applies to all the employers and employees of a specific industry in a specified geographical district. By the New South Wales plan, when the Board fixes the rates, they apply to every establishment engaged in the same line of business in the State in question, so that all employers engaged in a particular line of business shall pay the same rates. By the Massachusetts plan, the Board of Conciliation and Arbitration may settle a dispute in a single factory, but that settlement has no effect upon any other factory in the State.

The president of one of the courts in Western Australia gave the following decision:

What we have to bear in mind when considering a measure is what is the condition of the industry at the present time and what are the prospects for the future. Can the industry afford to pay more wages as it is worked at the present time? I cannot take into consideration the difference in the cost of living within a radius of a few miles from any one centre.

The question of allowing for the maintenance of a wife and family being raised in connection with the cost of living, the president expressed his views as follows: "Do you think this court is bound to take into consideration a man's family? If so, a man with 10 children should have larger wages than a man with four, and a married man should have higher wages than a single man. If we can take the family into consideration, we must reduce the wages of the single man."

An inquiry was then made of the judge: "Is not a man's wife and family included in the living wage?" The president replied: "I do not think so. If it were, you would have to have the wages on a sliding scale, the first wage being for a single man, then a rate for the married man with

one child, a married man with two children, a married man with three children, and so on. We can only consider the man, we cannot consider the family. When considering the living wage myself, however, I should take into consideration what is a living wage for a man with a wife and one or two children. I think that would be reasonable."

One of the attorneys then said: "We think that a living wage should be fixed for a married man with a family. We want population." The president replied: "Then it is only logical that a man with a large family should have a larger wage than the man with a small family.”

The statement having been made that a company had not been carried on economically, the president said: "Let us look at it in this light. Assuming that there has been waste of money, and that in some respects there might have been a reduction of expenditure, do you think we can consider that? We must not kill the industry, otherwise we shall throw every one out of employment. What we have to consider is whether it is possible to increase the wages under the present condition of affairs without killing the industry. Can we consider the question of whether the men could have been paid more if the management had adopted another mode of constructing the factory complained of? It seems to me that we can only consider this: Can the industry afford to pay more wages as it is worked at present?"

The counsel for the employees then said: "If I prove that $5,000 has been recklessly thrown away in the last three months through mismanagement, surely the workmen should not be asked to pay for that. If the directors get exorbitant fees that also should be considered." president replied: "If you show that it would be something."

The

If the wages established by the Minimum Wage Boards are carefully examined, it will be seen that in comparatively few instances do the figures indicate a disposition to fix upon what may be called a uniform living wage. Instead of considering the man, attention is given to the industry, for, as is evident, some industries can pay higher wages than others, and as the best thought of these boards has been given to the subject, the result would seem to indicate that the fixing of an absolute living wage for all branches of industry is impracticable.

Professor Ryan's contention, as well as the position taken by the Bureau in 1875, is that the man is entitled to the "living wage; " but the judge and his colleagues in a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration in Australia rule that the man or woman must take what the industry will pay and leave a profit to the employer. And this is the problem: How can the workers in all industries be paid a living wage unless the surplus in the industries, after paying all bills, will warrant such payment and leave a margin of profit?

DIVORCES IN MASSACHUSETTS.

1860-1904.

In the Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau for the year 1880 statistics of divorce in Massachusetts were presented, covering the period from 1860 to 1878. At the time the report was published, the Chief of the Bureau stated that, in his opinion, it was perfectly legitimate for this Bureau to present the statistics in question, saying: "As there is no law providing for [a] report of statistics of this kind, we have taken the liberty of publishing the same as being of great importance in discussing the social condition of our people."

After the presentation of the report in question to the Legislature, an Act was passed requiring the Secretary of the Commonwealth to prepare and present each year statistics relating to births, marriages, deaths, and divorces in the Commonwealth, and since 1882 statistics of divorce have formed part of the Registration Report. The edition of that report, however, is limited, and it does not reach the persons who are in the habit of receiving the reports of this department; for that reason we have deemed it advisable, and in fact necessary, to present a few tables showing the great increase in the number of divorces in this Commonwealth during the past 45 years.

In order that the reader may thoroughly understand the legislation now in force relating to divorce, we present, first, some notes on divorce legislation originally printed in the Bureau Report for 1880.

The first Legislature under the Constitution of Massachusetts assembled in Boston, October 25, 1780. The first statute on the subject of divorce was passed March 16, 1786. This authorized full divorce, or divorce from the bond of matrimony, for impotency or adultery, and for no other cause whatever, although limited divorce, or divorce from bed and board, might be granted for the additional cause of extreme cruelty. This was all the divorce law that the founders of the Commonwealth thought necessary, and it stood for a quarter of a century without enlargement or amendment in any direction. Twenty-five years later the General Court again took up the subject, and enacted what appears as Chapter 119 of the Acts of 1810, which authorizes divorce a mensa et thoro, or limited divorce, to the wife when she is utterly deserted by her husband, or when he grossly or wantonly and cruelly neglects or refuses to provide suitable maintenance for her. There was no further change of law until 1836.

Thus it appears that at the end of the first half century from the formation of the Constitution full divorce was allowable to either party in the marriage contract for two causes only, with limited divorce to the husband for one cause, and to the wife for three causes.

In the Revised Statutes of 1836, Chapter 76, it is provided that full divorce may be decreed for adultery or impotency in either party, or when either is sentenced to imprisonment at hard labor for seven years or more; while limited divorce may be granted to either party in case of extreme cruelty or utter desertion, and to the wife also when her husband grossly or wantonly and cruelly refuses or neglects to provide her with a suitable maintenance. It will be observed that with this revision of the laws, sentence to imprisonment for a certain period is introduced as a cause for divorce, and that desertion now becomes a cause for which limited divorce may be given to the husband as well as to the wife. Two years laterActs of 1838, Chapter 126-wilful and utter desertion for five consecutive years became a cause for which full divorce might be decreed in favor of the innocent party. With 1850 still another cause for full divorce was introduced, Chapter 100 of the Acts of that year providing that it may be granted to either party when the other separates therefrom, and joins, and for three years remains united with, any religious sect or society believing or professing to believe that the relation of husband and wife is void or unlawful.

Thus the law as to the causes for which divorce might be decreed remained until the general revision of 1860. Eighty years after the formation of the Constitution the original two causes for full divorce had grown to five, while there were two causes for limited divorce open to both parties, with an additional cause of which the wife might avail herself. The succeeding twenty years have brought numerous and important changes.

The General Statutes of 1860, Chapter 107, authorize full divorce for adultery, impotency, union for three years with a sect denying the validity of marriage, imprisonment at hard labor for five years, and desertion for five consecutive years. The change here from previous laws is that the minimum period of imprisonment is fixed at five instead of seven years, and desertion has become a cause for which divorce may be granted to the deserting as well as to the deserted party, with a proviso that when applied for by the first mentioned it must be shown that extreme cruelty, or, in the case of the wife, neglect to provide, led to the desertion. The chapter further provides that limited divorce, from bed and board, may be decreed for extreme cruelty, utter desertion, gross and confirmed habits of intoxication contracted after marriage, cruel and abusive treatment, and, in favor of the wife, for neglect on the part of the husband to properly provide for her maintenance. The change here from previous laws is in the appearance for the first time of the clauses about habits of intoxication and cruel and abusive treatment. The chapter also retains.

the provision of 1857, in pursuance of which a divorce from bed and board might be made absolute, on petition of the party to whom the original limited divorce was granted, after the parties had lived separate five consecutive years, and on petition of either party, when the separation had continued for ten years.

There was no other legislation of importance on this subject until 1867. Chapter 222 of the Acts of that year provides that decrees of divorce from the bonds of matrimony may in the first instance be entered as decrees nisi, to be made absolute, in the discretion of the Court, at any time after six months. Chapter 404 of the Acts of 1870 was more radical than any previously drawn statute relating to divorce. By its terms all divorces from bed and board were thenceforward prohibited; pending libels for limited divorce were to be construed as libels for full divorce; and all outstanding limited divorce decrees were to be treated as decrees nisi under that law. Moreover, all the causes specified in the preceding paragraph as causes for limited divorce under the General Statute were thereafter to be causes for full divorce from the bond of matrimony, with the proviso that in these cases decrees nisi should be entered, which must be made absolute on proof that the parties had lived apart five consecutive years, and might be so made after three years in the discretion of the Court. Thus the two original causes for full divorce were now increased to nine, except that in respect to four of them a decree nisi must stand three years before divorce could be made absolute.

With 1873 came another most radical measure. By Chapter 371 of the Acts of that year divorce nisi was prohibited except as in accordance with the Statute of 1867, to which reference is made in a preceding paragraph. This law also provided that full divorce might thereafter be granted for any cause then warranting divorce nisi, with the proviso that desertion must have continued for at least three consecutive years next prior to the filing of the libel before divorce could be granted for that cause. The law further provided that a full divorce might at once be granted to any one in whose favor a decree nisi had been entered, except that where it had been entered for desertion the parties must have lived separately for at least three years. This law, by striking out three words in the limited divorce section of General Statute 107, authorized full divorce for gross and confirmed habits of intoxication without regard to the time. when such habits were contracted. With the enactment of this statute full divorce for nine separate causes became possible, the only restriction being that desertion must have continued three years, while in any case the Court might enter a decree nisi for six months.

The Legislature took another step in 1874, and Chapter 397 of the Acts of that year considerably abridged the authority of the Court respecting divorce nisi, by adding to the Statute of 1867 a clause providing, substantially, that decrees of divorce shall be absolute and not nisi, whenever personal service is made on the libellee, or when the libel is entered