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I notice in your issue of to-day Mr. Moak's letter on this subject. His reasoning seems to me entirely fallacious. There is no objection to jury men as individuals studying medicine and surgery, and getting all the information they can on these as on all other subjects. But the idea that they can be educated in the course of an argument by hearing the lawyer of each party read from some medical work such extracts as he deems helpful to his side of the case, and that prohibiting the lawyer from so doing, is debarring the iury from any trustworthy source of information, seems to me entirely unsound. If one counsel is permitted to read from one book, the opposing counsel can of course read from another, written perhaps by an author entertaining entirely conflicting views. The jury have no opportunity to read or inquire for themselves. When doctors disagree' (as they occasionally do), when called as witnesses, the jury must in some way "decide." But to permit each counsel to cull out from "standard works" such expressions as he thinks will aid his side, would be vastly to increase the labor of deciding, without furnishing any additional light. It would tend to confusion and not to knowledge.

As you say, the law provides a way for giving the jury the opinions of experts through sworn witnesses, whose opinions may be brought to the test of a crossexamination. If selected extracts from books may be read to the jury, it must be for the purpose of giving them the opinions of the authors of those books. Calling them part of an argument can make no differ

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Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

We are somewhat in doubt as to the length of the official term of the justices of sessions throughout the State and in our dilemma we come to you.

Section 40 of chapter 280 of the Laws of 1847 provides that the two justices of sessions chosen shall serve for two years commencing on the 1st day of January next" after their election.

The act referred to was amended by chapter 470 of the Laws of the same year, and section 34 of the amending act provided that the justices should be designated at every general election of members of assembly, and should hold their office as members of the court of sessions for one year.

The provisions of the last-named section are sufficiently clear, but this section was repealed by chapter 417 of the Laws of 1877, while section 40 of the first mentioned act was not repealed. Does not the repeal of the amending act revive the original law, and were not the justices of sessions elected at the general elections of 1877 and 1879 chosen for two years, or is there some provision on the statute books relative to the terms of justices of sessions other than section 40

of the Laws of 1847?

HERKIMER, N. Y., Oct. 18, 1881.

USURY-CONFLICT OF LAW.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

QUISQUAM.

Is the doctrine maintained by Judge Martin, in Depeau v. Humphreys, 20 Martin, 1, discussed by Story (Conflict of Laws, 298, § 305) and Parsons (Parsons on

Contracts, vol. 2, p. 95, note e, and pages 391, 392). the law of this State? In other words, would a promissory note be held not void for usury, which is made by a resident of Texas in Texas, at a rate of interest legal there, but higher than is allowed here, and payable in this State? When the transaction is not resorted to as a means of avoiding any statute on usury, it is certainly reasonable that the contract should be held valid. Yours truly, J. A. M.

WATERTOWN, N. Y., Oct. 18, 1881.

RELATIVE OF THE HALF BLOOD. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

The question of "Uncertain," in to-day's JOURNAL, is answered thus: The child C. is not a relative of the whole or "half blood" of D., the intestate, and cannot inherit the real or succeed to any part of the personal estate of the decedent. The term "half blood" is applicable only to the "relation between two or more persons born of the same father or of the same mother, but not of both, as a brother, or sister of the half blood." Webster's Dic., "half blood;" Bouvier's Dic., "half blood." Yours,

ROCHESTER, N. Y., Oct. 22, 1881.

CONSTRUCTIVE CLERKSHIP.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

CERTAIN.

Can you give me some information on this point? A student files his certificate of clerkship and commences to study under an attorney, as prescribed by the court rules, spending about two hours a day, more or less, at pied at a regular employment. Study is pursued in the attorney's office, the remaining time being occuthis manner one and a half years, and then student spends his whole time at attorney's office, during remaining one and a half years. Would that fulfill the law regarding three years' clerkship? Very respectfully,

UTICA, N. Y., Oct. 21, 1881.

STUDENT.

[We say no, unhesitatingly. We should be very much surprised if any attorney could be found unconscientious enough to certify to any such "clerkship." There is altogether too much constructive clerkship and constructive attendance at certain law schools. —ED. ALB. L. JOUR.]

THE ESPOSITO CASE. Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

In your issue of the 15th instant you gave a column of your editorial page to a very accurate resume of the prisoner's counsel's statement of the Esposito case. May we request of your impartiality quite as brief a report of the procedure actually adopted, that your readers may fairly judge whether there was any thing "peculiar" about it?

The first peculiarity complained of is, that the prisoner was brought from New Orleans to New York for examination.

This was no novelty. In Heinrich's case, decided by Judge Shipman and reported in 5 Blatchf. C. C. 414, the prisoner was brought from Michigan: in Vandervelpen's case, 14 Blatchf. C. C. 137, he was brought from Indiana; and in Van Hoven's case, 4 Dill. C. C. 411-14, he was brought from Minnesota.

The distinction sought to be made that in those cases no question of identity was raised can have no force, for there is no way by which the officer who issues his warrant can be apprised of what questions are to be raised until the prisoner is brought before

him; and no power is given him by the statute under which he acts (§ 5270, U. S. Rev. Sta.) either to decline jurisdiction or to remand the prisoner to the State from whence he came; both of which applications were made and denied in the Esposito case.

The second peculiarity is that the warrant was addressed to and executed by a private citizen, whereas it should have been addressed to a marshal of the United States.

Apart from the consideration that even if addressed to Mr. Knox that gentleman would not have personally travelled to New Orleans in search of the prisoner, but would willingly have deputized James Mooney to do that service, there is no requirement in the law which alone gives authority for warrants in extradition cases that such warrants should be addressed to United States marshals, and this for two obvious reasons: first, because the authority of United States marshals, as such, is limited to the judicial district for which they are appointed, and they have not by virtue of their office any power outside of such district; and second, because under the law (§ 5370, U. S. Rev. Stat.) State judges have equal authority with Federal officials to carry out extradition proceedings.

Finally, as the person who executed the warrant marshal, sheriff or private citizen-had but one office to perform, to wit: to bring the prisoner before the officer who issued it, the result to the prisoner must be the same in either case. Moreover, in the present instance detective Mooney was so cautious as to consult the United States district attorney in New Orleans in reference to the warrant, and we inclose copy of the assistant's letter indorsing its validity, which was also upheld by the United States commissioner.

The last peculiarity pointed out is that upon the commissioner's decision, rendered on the 14th September, a warrant of surrender was issued without delay by the State department and that warrant promptly presented to the marshal by the charge of the Italian government and at once carried into execution, secrecy being meanwhile enjoined on the marshal. The alleged injunction of secrecy is the only element in this latter proceeding which does not conform to the most ordinary and almost invariable routine in such cases, and the explanation has already been given that the charge had information which he doubtless deemed trustworthy that a rescue would be attempted by the numerous sympathizers, not to say allies, of banditti that swarm in New York city; in consequence of which information he asked the marshal to have the transfer of the prisoner effected as quietly as might be. In this there was no injunction of secrecy against any inquiry by the prisoner's counsel as to the state of the proceedings. If they made no such inquiry, should the blame rest upon the charge or upon them?

It subsequently transpired that on the day of the commissioner's adverse decision the prisoner's counsel had addressed to the secretary of State a written application for review, but of this application no notice or copy was ever given to the counsel who represented the Italian government, and for this simple reason they could predicate no action upon it, nor make it the ground for a dilatory plea to the charge with whom alone the department could have direct intercourse after the decision, and with whom alone rested the fulfillment of the warrant of surrender.

It is admitted that the prisoner was examined before the United States commissioner in accordance with the statute, and as a result of such examination delivered to the Italian authorities," that the commissioner "assigned counsel to defend the accused and gave him all opportunity to establish his right to a discharge, which was then and there possible;" the opportunity to have any supposed irregularities or illegalities passed upon on habeas corpus or certiorari was

not deemed of any value by the counsel, although it is clear that if any such existed they could have been thus redressed; the papers bear evidence of having been examined by the law bureau of the State department; the only opportunity "lost to the prisoner was therefore the chance that some argument which had no weight with the commissioner and was not worth presenting to the higher courts might yet have influenced the secretary-granting that the secretary had power to refuse the execution of a treaty in a case already pronounced upon by the judiciary.

It is perhaps the irony of fate that this slender shadow of a chance should have been lost by the disregard of that "fair-play" which would have dictated the propriety of giving counsel for the Italian government a copy of the written application for relief secretly contemplated by the prisoner's counsel to the secretary.

We remain, dear sir, yours truly,

NEW YORK, Oct. 17, 1881.

(COPY.)

COUDERT BROTHERS.

NEW ORLEANS. July, 1881. SIR-The warrant now in your hands issued in re the requisition for the surrender of Guiseppe Esposito alias Randazzo, a fugitive from justice from Italy, under the provisions of the treaty of extradition with that country, by John A. Osborn, United States commissioner, duly authorized to act as commissioner in matters of extradition at New York on 17th June, 1881, is in itself sufficient to authorize you to arrest and convey before the said commissioner for examination the person therein named.

In addition to the official character in which you are now acting, and for greater security, I advise that you be also deputized by the marshal of this district. You should satisfy yourself of the identity of the person; an error in this regard may subject you to an action for false imprisonment.

(Signed)

TO JAMES MOONEY, Esq.

J. W. GURLEY,

Asst. U. S. Atty.

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[That what was done in the case of Esposito had been done before, we have no doubt, yet we are unable to satisfy ourselves that it is the proper thing to take a resident of New Orleans to New York for the purpose of an examination that can just as well be had in New Orleans, if the proceedings are instituted there. If the counsel for the Italian government had seen fit to apply to a commissioner in New Orleans for the extradition of a native resident in New York who had never been out of the State, and could establish that fact by incontestible evidence, the injustice of taking him as a prisoner to a distant city and compelling him to bring witnesses at great expense to uphold his rights would be too apparent to require any argument. In the cases referred to in the above communication this point was not raised, so far as we understand. In Henrich's case it was claimed that the arrest of the ac

cused was illegal because made in Wisconsin by a deputy of the marshal of a New York district instead of the marshal of Wisconsin. Judge Shipman held this point not well taken, and also (so far as appears, obiter) that the district judge in New York who issued the warrant had jurisdiction to do so,

sympathy, and the untimely loss of so good a citizen and so learned and able a magistrate will be regarded with unanimous regret.

NOTES.

THE American Journal of Insanity for July contains

and to send the case for examination before a commissioner in New York. In the other cases the jurisdiction of the commissioner was not questioned. As to the address of the warrant to "James Mooney" we are confident that it is a very unusual method of address. And Mooney himself does not seem to have felt satisfied that it was all right, for he sought for but did not obtain a deputization from the Uni-husbandry and sheep raising, with the history of Fence ted States marshal at New Orleans.

an interesting article entitled "Lord Chief Justice Cockburn on the Responsibility of the Insane," with particular reference to his judgment in Banks v. Goodcapacity does not imply perfect sanity.The Washfellow, establishing the doctrine that testamentary burn and Moen Manufacturing Company, of Worcester, Mass. send us a pamphlet entitled, "The Fence Question in the Southern States, as related to general Customs, and laws pertaining thereto, and a view of the new farm system of the South, as shown in the Census of 1880." The frontispiece represents a flock of very well-conditioned sheep on one side of a barbed wire fence and a number of hungry and disappointed

The reason given for the hasty and secret transfer of the accused from the prison to the steamer, namely, the danger of a rescue, does not appear to be well founded, or even if it was so, it is not a suf-looking dogs on the other. At first we were inclined ficient one. There were no threats of a rescue, or other indications that one was intended, and we can hardly believe that there are enough sympa. thizers with Italian banditti in New York at present seriously to interfere with the execution of Federal process, even if they felt inclined to do so. While the proceedings in the Esposito case may have been technically unobjectionable, they indicate the necessity of a change in the statutes regulating practice in such matters.-ED. ALB. LAW JOUR.]

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

THE

to suppose that this contained some covert and unhandsome allusion to lawyers and clients, but we soon discovered that the publication is an advertisement of the aforesaid barbed wire fence. The legal information about fences and the statement of the various statutes may be of use to lawyers who indulge in the luxury of farming. The Report of the Commissioner of Education, for the year 1879, contains very full and interesting statistics and information concerning the law schools, legal education, and admission to the bar.

A VERY PROPER DECISION. In notes of cases on page 302 of the October number of that excellent publication, the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, we learn that in the case of McDonald v. Minneapolis Lumber Company the court held that a mechanic's lien could not be con

HE following decisions were handed down, Tues- veyed from one lot to another by steam. We are not day, October 25, 1881:

Judgment affirmed with costs - Tuttle v. Hazard; Persch v. Cook; Millard v. The Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railroad Company; Perry v. Rollins; Smith v. Endres; The National Bank of Gloversville v. Place; Ackley v. Westervelt; Birch v. Jansen; Gilmore v. The Ontario Iron Company; Truax, assignee, v. Slater; Evans v. Rogers; Hart v. The Direct United States Cable Company; Earle v. David. Judgment affirmed

Abbott v. The People.- Judgment reversed and

new trial granted, costs to abide event-Doran v. The Franklin Fire Insurance Company; McPherson v. Cox; Chapman v. McCormick; The City National Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Phelps; Granger v. Craig.- Order affirmed and judgment absolute for respondent on stipulation with costs- Bishop v. Alcott; Tyng v. The Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the Diocese of Ohio. Orders of General and Special Terms reversed with costs - Hobart v. Hobart. Appeal dismissed with costs - -Walter v. Fellows.

in the least surprised by this decision. Ever since we were conveyed from the deck of a Mississippi passenger boat belonging to the opposition line, to an uncomfortable position on a snag at the edge of a morass, by virtue of a writ of assistance issued by a defective boiler, we have entertained some very decided notions concerning conveyances by steam. In an old publication it is stated that a Mr. Fulton steamed up the Hudson, but we do not regard this as a supporting authority, because to the present day on the Hudson, and particularly every winter near the State capital, very many persons get steamed up. How such persons acquire any lien upon the lots they take we do not care to discuss, inasmuch as the liens cannot be mechanics' liens. In the McDonald case the court held that a mechanics' lien on a lot could not be conveyed to another lot by steam. Now the correctness of this decision will appear clearly when we consider the improbability, if not impossibility, of making such a transfer by steam. The register's office might have been so conveyed away from the lot on which it reposed, but to so manage and control the steam that the building would alight on a particular lot, intact, is contrary to experience, and quite impossible; still more impossible is it to believe that the steam can select a particular CHARLES F. SANFORD. volume of records and the identical one containing the HARLES F. SANFORD, one of the Judges of the entry of the lien, and convey it to a particular vacant New York Supreme Court, died on the 21st ult., lot. Unquestionably the court was familiar with the aged 54 years. He was a man of liberal education and doctrine of chances, and very properly held that the culture, a good lawyer, and a very laborious and intel- conveyance by steam of a mechanic's lien from one ligent judge. Raised to the Superior bench in 1875, lot to another was so improbable as to justify a finding and discharging his judicial duties with acceptance that it could not be done. - Troy Daily Times. The until 1879, he then was compelled by failing health, above is very flattering to us, but if our esteemed coninduced by excessive work, to abandon his post, and temporary had only known that our journal is issued has been gradually sinking ever since. His sad condi-weekly instead of monthly, its law might have been tion has called out many expressions of sorrow and four times better in the past.-ED.

OBITUARY.

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The Albany Law Journal.

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ALBANY, NOVEMBER 5, 1881.

CURRENT TOPICS.

He

only for the vacancy, and an election must be held for the office next week. It is believed that the election can legally he held, in spite of the lack of the customary notice; that the notice is merely customary, not essential; and that the people are not to be deprived of their right to an election by the misconstruction and omission of public officials. Perhaps Mr. Calvin will be elected. Having expressed our sense of the bad taste of the "banquet given by the lawyers in his honor some time ago, we feel bound to reiterate that he has proved an excellent surrogate. We like him better as a judge than as a banqueter or banquetee.

The most graphic account of the deliberations of a jury on which there are eleven obstinate men, that has ever come under our notice, is to be found in a story in the current number of the Century Magazine (Scribner's Monthly), entitled "Eli." The queer characters constituting the jury are admirably depicted, and the various arguments which the eleven brought to bear upon the one are narrated with a knowledge of human nature that led us for a moment to suspect that the author is a lawyer or has sat on a "hung" jury. Especially amusing is the device of the eleven to worry out the one by allowing ten to sleep and another to argue with him, by turns, all night. But after all, this fine image with head of gold has feet of clay. What is the evidence upon which the eleven are so ready to convict the prisoner of robbery? The offense charged is the robbery of a bank vault, the lock of which is found broken, but which experts say was first unlocked. Only two persons have keys, the

we have lost our chief judge after all! could resist the arguments of Mentor, but he succumbed to those of New York. This is one of the rare and fitting instances of the office persistently seeking the man, and is a remarkable evidence of the homage that public opinion pays to modesty, integrity, and unselfish talents. The unanimous approval with which his appointment has been received, without distinction of party, must be extremely gratifying to the recipient, but is deserved by the man who has sunk the partisan in the patriot, the politician in the magistrate. Mr. Folger's acceptance was unfeignedly and extremely reluctant, and emphasizes the unselfish rule of conduct which has always guided his public course. A good deal of injustice has unintentionally been done him by the newspapers by attributing motives for his action which did not influence him. It is not true that he has wearied of his judicial labors; on the contrary they are exactly to his taste and have grown easy by experience. Nor is it true that he has in view much less that he has bargained for- a seat ultimately on the Federal supreme bench. Respectable and elevated as is an associate justiceship of the United States, Mr. Folger never would have exchanged the chief judgeship of New York for it. His action was determined indirectly by the persistence with which the office has sought him-carry-president, and the prisoner, who had recently taken ing a strong impression that it was his duty to accept it and immediately by his warm friendship for the President and his sympathy with him in his trying position. Doubtless Mr. Folger will be the central figure of the new cabinet, and his influence in the National counsels will be very great, but we believe it will always be for good. His administration of the public finances will be honest and conservative. Wall street gamblers will get no sympathy or help from him would that he could sink

them all forever in a Red Sea of National wrath and contempt! His broad and patriotic views, his extensive political learning and experience, and his judicial impartiality will render him such a cabinet minister as few administrations are favored with, and he will continue to deserve the extraordinary public faith and confidence with which he assumes his new office. We shall miss him from our bench, but we really think it will be easier to fill his place there than to find his equal as chancellor of the exchequer. Our State will believe that his determination has been made for the public good and with the exercise of that rare judgment which has controlled him through life.

The Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the General Term of the Supreme Court, have determined that Surrogate Calvin's appointment was VOL. 24.- No. 19.

the cashier's place and performed his duties in his absence for a short time. On the night of the robbery, the prisoner, who was a fisherman, was seen at one o'clock coming across the fields from the direction of the bank with a large wicker basket slung over his shoulders. He said he had been eelspearing. The president swore that he himself did not rob the bank. This is all the implicating testimony reported. None of the plunder traced to the prisoner; no sudden affluence; no suspicious conduct; no confession or significant admission. The prisoner proved a good reputation. This was the evidence on which eleven men proposed to convict their reputable townsman ! On such a case a jury might possibly disagree, but it would be eleven to one the other way. Really, the gifted author should have taken legal counsel before he wrote this clever story, just as Bulwer did before he wrote "Night and Morning."

We are pleased to learn from New York city that the course of Roman law lectures begun last winter is to be repeated this coming winter, by Dr. Pincoffs, of the University of Leyden. We had occasion a year ago to notice the institution of this course, and remarked that it was a step in the right direction. We now hope that it will lead to a permanent chair of Roman or civil law in one of our

great universities. Dr. Pincoffs' essay on the uses of the study of Roman law, published in the American Law Review for September last, indicates his qualifications to treat of the subject; and to use Lord Campbell's language, shows that he is something more than "a mere lawyer."

In speaking of Mr. Snyder's "Great Speeches by

the doctor called on him next day, he showed no serious symptoms, nor any evidence of the attack." Judgment was directed for the defendant on the ground that no proof was made that the defendant knew that the dog was vicious. The defendant's counsel also insisted that the plaintiff was shamming hydrophobia, and that it was a case of blackmail-which was certainly very reprehensible in a letter carrier. But whether hysteria or imposition, it is a singular case, and the result shows that the plaintiff was "barking up the wrong tree."

THE

NOTES OF CASES.

THE case of Stack v. O'Hara, in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, has received a fresh decision, October 3, 1881, 12 Pitts. Leg. Jour. (N. S.) 64. (See 20 Alb. L. Jour. 511; 21 id. 462.) It is held that "in the United States the Catholic Church is missionary, and those who enter its priesthood obligate themselves to serve the missions of the Diocese, under the obedience of the bishop. Both bishop and priest are bound to obey the laws of their church which are applicable to the missions in this country, and these laws define and limit the authority of the one and the obedience of the other. The bishop has power to appoint the priest to a mission and to recall him thence, the priest being

Great Lawyers," the London Law Times says "the book is disappointing. Mr. Snyder certainly gives us some great speeches by great lawyers; but he gives us also much that cannot come under that head. Instead of the masterpieces of Erskine, Brougham, and other world-renowned advocates, we have speeches by Pinkney, Wirt, Prentiss, Paul Brown, C. O'Conor, Stanton, Porter, Beard, and Black-names which are no doubt more familiar in the United States than in this country." Is not this rather provincial and insular? Does the Times think that Great Britain has produced the only great lawyers, and that only the familiar speeches of the acknowledged great British lawyers should be reproduced in such a collection? One would say that the "disappointment" at finding so many great lawyers in the United States ought to be agreeable to our contemporary. Unprejudiced critics would say that leaving Erskine-facile princeps—out of the question, there are several names in the Times' list not inferior to Brougham and other "world-removable at the will of the bishop; but the bishop renowned advocates." Pinkney was certainly one of the most all-accomplished advocates that ever lived; Wirt one of the most elegant; Prentiss one of the most eloquent; O'Conor is certainly one of the most learned, and Porter one of the most fertile and ingenious. Mr. O'Conor will hardly recognize himself under the description of "C. O'Conor." Perhaps the Times thinks he is some Fenian. The Times ought to be glad to be made acquainted with these Americans, and to remember that heroes lived after as well as before Agamemnon.

should use his right of removal only for grave reasons. Removal may be made without assigning cause, without supposition of wrong done by the priest, and the priest is not entitled to a previous

trial as he would be if accused of an ecclesiastical

offense; and if he feel aggrieved his remedy is by recourse to the bishop's superior. Where the bishop officially removes a priest it will be presumed that it was for sufficient cause, and the priest will not be entitled to recover damages of the bishop, unless the evidence shows that he was wrongfully and unlawfully removed from his charge. The profession of priest or minister in any denomination is held subject to its laws; the priest acquired it by com

and authority of his church; he has no property in his profession that shields him from the consequences of his broken vows and compacts. It is a universal rule that one who becomes a member of any church thereby consents to be governed by its rules and laws, and he cannot justly claim to have suffered wrong by the enforcement of such rules or laws upon himself and his property. Courts will not interfere with the internal police and discipline of churches so long as they keep within the reasonable application of their own rules, which were known, or might have been known upon inquiry, to the members at the time they became members. Where the removal of a priest is in accord with the rules and laws of his church, which were known to

In Pottle v. Wilberforce, a recent English county court case, the action was for injuries inflicted by the bite of a dog. The plaintiff was a letter car-pact, and is not exempt from the proper discipline rier, the defendant was a canon. The Law Journal says: "The plaintiff's case was that, on June 27, he was delivering letters at the deanery, defendant's residence, when a colley flew at him and bit him in the thigh. He finished his delivery, and then went to his club doctor, who cauterised the wound and attended him for a month. During this period he was affected by symptoms which, if genuine, were most alarming. He barked like a dog, attempted to bite persons who came near him, foamed at the mouth, and in other ways appeared to be mad. Canon Wilberforce was communicated with; and being in London as a witness in the Mabel Wilberforce case, he telegraphed to direct that all possible attention should be paid to the patient, but that it was probably only hysteria, and not hy-him when he was ordained, it is a result of his condrophobia, the dog being perfectly healthy. From this alarming condition the plaintiff recovered very soon, and went out by the water to walk; and when

tract, and is not contrary to the law of the land." The court cite Judge Redfield's note to Hennessy v. Walsh, 15 Am. Law Reg. 264. Mercer and Gordon,

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