V. TITLE UNDER REMAINDER-MEN AND REVERSIONERS. A reversion is a vested interest, and the person entitled under it has an immediate fixed right of future enjoyment, which may be aliened or charged as an estate in possession. (a) If a man conveys land in the possession of himself and another, the deed will operate by way of grant as to the lands in the possession of the other, and will be a good conveyance of the reversion of that part, (b) but evidence of the existence of the reversion must be given. (c) If the reversion or remainder is expectant on a lease which was made sixty or even one hundred years ago, the evidence of the title should be deduced from the lessor, because the possession of the tenant is the possession of the reversioner, if rent has been received at any time during that period. (d) A reversion expectant on an estate for years is present assets; (e) a reversion on an estate for life, is quasi assets; (f) a reversion expectant on an estate tail, is also assets, although of course of little value. (g) A reversion expectant on an estate tail is also liable to the judgments, statutes, or recognizances of all those who were at any time entitled to it, whenever (a) See Litt. s. 568. (b) Doe d. Were v. Cole, 7 B. & C. 243. (c) Doe d. Kearns v. Sherlock, 2 Fox & Smith, 78. (d) 1 Prest. Abs. 254. (e) Smith v. Angel, 1 Salk. 354. S. C. 2 Lord Raym. 783. Lutw. 503. (f) Anon Dy. 373 b. pl. 14. (g) 1 Roll. Abr. 269. Kellow v. Rowden, 3 Mod. 253. such reversion comes into possession; (a) it is also liable to the leases made by all those who were at any time entitled to it, and to all the covenants contained in the leases, whenever it comes into possession. (b) It seems now settled that a reversion after an estate tail, being considered as assets, may be sold for the payment of debts. (c) This peculiarity attends the purchase of reversionary interests that inadequacy of consideration will vitiate the sale. (d) The market price will be considered a fair criterion of the value. (e) And although it has been said, that unless the vendor of the reversionary interest is an expectant heir, mere inadequacy of price will not vitiate the transaction; (f) yet the better opinion seems to be, that the rule that a purchaser of a reversion must prove that he gave the full price, has so long been considered as settled that it cannot now be altered. (g) It is clear that the sale of a reversionary interest by public auction will be unimpeachable. (h) VI. TITLES UNDER TENANTS OF CROSS REMAINDERS. Where cross remainders are created, the title should be considered separately, as applying to the different (a) Giffard v. Barber, cit. 1 Ves. 174. (b) Symonds v. Cudmore, 4 Mod. 1. Shelburne v. Biddulph, 6 Bro. P. C. 356. (c) Tyndale v. Warre, 1 Jac. 212. (d) Gowland v. De Faria, 17 Ves. 20. Ryle v. Brown, 13 Pri. 758. (e) Headen v. Rosher, 1 M'Clell. & Yo. 89; but see 10 Ves. 209. (f) See Shelley v. Nash, 3 Madd. 232. Whalley v. Whalley, 3 Bli. 1. (g) Hincksman v. Smith, 3 Russ. 433. (h) Shelley v. Nash, ubi sup. farms, or the different parts of the same farm, which are subject to the cross remainders. Thus if a farm called Blackacre be devised to A. in tail, and a farm called Whiteacre be devised to B. in tail, and if either of them die without issue of his body, then both the farms are devised to the other in tail or in fee, these are cross remainders; and the title to the farm Blackacre should be considered distinctly, as if it stood limited to A. in tail, remainder to B. in tail, and the title to the other farm should be considered as if it stood limited to B. in tail, remainder to A. in tail. So if lands be limited to several persons in tail, with cross remainders between them in tail, the title should be considered with a view to each aliquot part, exactly as if that part stood limited to A. in tail, remainder to B. in tail, remainder to C. in tail, &c. (a) A tenant in tail, with cross remainders over, may by a common recovery convey his own purparty of the estate in fee. But he cannot alone, by recovery or other means, convey his remainders in the shares of his companions; for having no estate of freehold in possession in these shares, he cannot make a tenant to the præcipe. However, by levying a fine with proclamations, he may convey all his estates in remainder, for his issue could never claim in opposition to his fine; and he should also covenant to suffer a recovery of these parts if they come into his possession, which would better the assurance of the purchaser. Cross remainders cannot be raised by implication in a deed, although it be evident that the probable inten (a) 2 Prest. Abs. 109. G tion of the parties was that there should be cross remainders; but cross remainders will be implied in a will. (a) (a) Nevell v. Nevell, 1 Roll. Abr. 837. Cole v. Levingston, 1 Vent. 224. Twisden v. Lock, Ambl. 663. Gilbert v. Witty, Cro. Jac. 656. Doe v. Wainwright, 5 T. R. 427. Doe v. Dorvell, 5 T. R. 518. Doe v. Wortley, 1 East, 416. Meyrick v. Whishaw, 2 B. & A. 810. Leven v. Weatherall, 1 Brod. & B. 401. Edwards v. Alliston, 4 Russ. 78. CHAPTER VI. OF ABSTRACTS OF TITLE OF COPYHOLD AND OTHER THIS chapter will be divided into-I. Titles under copyholders.-II. Titles under customary freeholds. -III. Titles under enfranchised copyholders and IV. Titles under tenants in ancient demesne. I. TITLES UNDER COPYHOLDERS. A copyholder will be tenant in fee, in tail, or for life, according to the form of the grant; and a custom to grant a fee will authorize a grant for any less estate; (a) and a custom to grant to several successively for three lives, will warrant a grant to one person for three lives. (b) The alienation of a copyholder must also be governed by the mode prescribed by the custom of the manor; and as a general rule, no legal estate can pass inter vivos without a surrender; and as to the copyhold estates of persons dying before the 12th day of July, 1815, a surrender to the use of a will devising them is necessary, but after that time no surrender to the use (a) Co. Cop. s. 34. Cro. Jac. 99. Raym. 994. (b) Smartle v. Penhallow, 2 Lord |