although the purchaser pays for the opinion, " yet for the same reason," says Sir Edward Sugden, (a) "that ought, it should seem, to be returned with the abstract.' However, it seems that if a purchaser obtain an opinion for his own private information, and allow it to be inserted on the margin of the abstract, he is at liberty to erase it from the abstract, the erasure being made on affidavit, (b) or it will be referred to the Master to inquire what shall be erased.

In a case where the purchaser returned the abstract to the vendor, to answer the queries and opinion of counsel, it was held that he (the purchaser) might maintain trover against the vendor for the abstract, although the vendor himself might ultimately be entitled to the abstract. The temporary property of the purchaser in the abstract is sufficient to enable him to maintain the action. (c)

It is proper to mention, that where a title is referred to a Master to inquire into its validity, he may nominate a conveyancer to examine into it; (d) Lord Eldon, C. observing, "I do not say whether the Master has or has not a right to call on the parties to give him, upon a question of title, the information and judgment of a conveyancer. But if he is not to act upon his own opinion, there is no pretence for telling him that he must be satisfied with the opinion of the individual whom the solicitor of a party chooses to select, and that he is not to expect the opinion of any other person. If," continued his lordship, "I were in the situ

ation of a Master, and if the parties told me I should not assist my own opinion by that of a conveyancer, I should report that a title was not made to my satisfaction."

It has often been questioned whether an attorney has a right to the drafts and copies of deeds belonging to his client; and it has lately been laid down that he has no right to such papers; and the Court of King's Bench ordered them to be delivered up at the instance of a client, at whose expense they were prepared, on the ground that he who pays for the drafts, has, at law, the right to the possession of them. (a) And one attorney has no right to order the papers of his clients to be delivered to one of his partners, without the consent of the clients. (b)

(a) Ex parte Horsefall, 7 B. & C.

528.

(b) Davidson v. Napier, 1 Sim. & Stu. 97.

PRACTICE

OF

CONVEYANCING.

APPENDIX.

VOL. III.

THE act by which the most important alterations are effected in the contents of the third volume, is the 3 & 4 W. 4, c. 27, intituled "An act for the limitation of actions and suits relating to real property, and for simplifying the remedies for trying the rights thereto," which materially shortens the time for which a title must be shown to lands. We shall first give the act fully, and endeavour to state its effect in practice, in referring to the parts of the volume to which the sections particularly relate.

The former rules as to the necessary title to lands are stated at pp. 64 and 228, et seq. It will be there seen that a title of at least sixty years was necessary, from analogy to the 32 Hen. 8, c. 2, s. 1, limiting the term for bringing a writ of right. However, by s. 36, stated post, no writ of right shall be brought after the 31st day of December 1834, and the following provisions are made instead of the old rules.

The rules for the construction of the act are provided by section 1.

APPENDIX.-VOL. III.

B

LIMITATION OF

ACTIONS ACT.

words in the

act.

Land.

Rent.

That the words and expressions hereinafter mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different Meaning of the meaning, shall in this act, except where the nature of the provision or the context of the act shall exclude such construction, be interpreted as follows: (that is to say,) the word "land" shall extend to manors, messuages, and all other corporeal hereditaments, whatsoever, and also to tithes (other than tithes belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole), and also to any share, estate, or interest in them or any of them, whether the same shall be a freehold or chattel interest, and whether freehold or copyhold, or held according to any other tenure; and the word "rent" shall extend to all heriots, and to all services and suits for which a distress may be made, and to all annuities and periodical sums of money charged upon or payable out of any land (except moduses or compositions belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole;) and the person through whom another person is said to claim shall mean any person by, through, or under, or by the act of whom, the person so claiming became entitled to the estate or interest claimed, as heir, issue in tail, tenant by the curtesy of England, tenant in dower, successor, special or general occupant, executor, administrator, legatee, husband, assignee, appointee, devisee, or otherwise, and also any person who was entitled to an estate or interest to which the person so claiming, or some person through whom he claims, became entitled as lord by escheat; and the word "person" shall extend to a body politic, corporate, or collegiate, and to a class of creditors or other persons, as well as an individual, and every word importing the singular number only shall extend and be applied to several persons or things as well as one person or thing; and every word importing the masculine gender only shall extend and be applied to a female as well as a male.

Person

through whom another claims.

Person.

Number and gender.

No land or rent to be recovered but

within twenty

years after the

right of action

accrued to the claimant or some person whose estate he claims.

II. That after the 31st day of December, 1833, no person shall make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover any land or rent but within twenty years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress or to bring such action shall have first accrued to some person through whom he claims; or if such right shall not have accrued to any person through whom he claims, then within twenty years next after the time at

ACTIONS ACT.

which the right to make such entry or distress or to bring such LIMITATION OF action shall have first accrued to the person making or bringing the same.

When the deemed to ac

right shall be

crue in the case of an es

tate in pospossession.

session or dis

or death.

III. That in the construction of this act, the right to make an entry or distress or bring an action to recover any land or rent shall be deemed to have first accrued at such time as hereinafter is mentioned; (that is to say,) when the person claiming such land or rent, or some person through whom he claims, shall, in respect of the estate or interest claimed, have been in possession or in receipt of the profits of such land, and shall while entitled thereto have been dispossessed, or have discontinued such possession or receipt, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of such dispossession or discontinuance of possession, or at the last time at which any such profits or rent were or was so received; and when the person claiming On abatement such land or rent shall claim the estate or interest of some deceased person who shall have continued in such possession or receipt in respect of the same estate or interest until the time of his death, and shall have been the last person entitled to such estate or interest, who shall have been in such possession or receipt, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time of such death; and when the person claiming such land on alienation. or rent shall claim in respect of an estate or interest in possession granted, appointed, or otherwise assured by any instrument (other than a will) to him, or some person through whom he claims, by a person being in respect of the same estate or interest in the possession or receipt of the profits of the land, or in the receipt of the rent, and no person entitled under such instrument shall have been in such possession or receipt, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which the person claiming as aforesaid, or the person through whom he claims, became entitled to such possession or receipt by virtue of such instrument; and when the estate or interest claimed shall In case of fuhave been an estate or interest in reversion or remainder, or other future estate or interest, and no person shall have obtained the possession or receipt of the profits of such land or the receipt of such rent in respect of such estate or interest, then such right shall be deemed to have first accrued at the time at which such

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ture estates.