purchase of land which was formerly part of the glebe of a rectory, and had before been sold for the redemption of the land-tax, is not bound to complete his purchase, when it appears that upon the prior sale for the redemption of the land-tax, the rector himself was the actual purchaser in the name of his curate;(a) it being the duty of the rector to obtain the best possible price for the land sold, and his interest, as purchaser, to pay the least possible price for it.

VIII. TITLES OF EQUITIES OF REDEMPTION.

An equity of redemption is an equitable interest, and may be aliened or entailed in equity; it will descend, if of real estate, to the mortgagee's real representatives; and if of personal estate, to his personal representatives. (b) But an equity of redemption is not recognized as an estate by a court of law, (c) and is therefore only transferable in equity.

A purchaser of an equity of redemption should ascertain, by communication with the mortgagee, the exact state of the mortgage account, and should not depend upon the statement of the mortgagor as to this. He should also give the mortgagee notice of the mortgage, as he will thus obtain priority over all incumbrances of which the mortgagee has no notice; (d) and he may at the same time inquire what circumstances affect the estate, of which the mortgagee already has notice.

(a) Graver v. Hugell, 3 Russ. 428. (b) Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603. 605; 2 Eq. Ca. Ab. 594. Tucker v. Thurstan, 17 Ves. 133. Pettat v. Ellis, 9 Ves. 563. Lloyd v. Lander, 5 Madd. 290.

(c) Preston v. Christmas, 2 Wils. 86. Boscarick v. Burton, 1 Cha. Ca. 217. Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 2 Mer. 359.

(d) Ante, p. 126.

It is usual to transfer an equity of redemption by lease and release, but an agreement in writing will bind the interest effectually in equity. (a) And where the person to whom the equity of redemption is to be conveyed is the mortgagee himself, a mere release indorsed on the back of the mortgage deed will be all that is necessary. (b)

A purchaser of an equity of redemption usually covenants with the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt; but if he does not enter into such a covenant, he will still be bound to indemnify the vendor against the mortgage debt. (c) But if the purchaser covenants with the mortgagor to pay a mortgage debt, to which a third person was liable as a surety for him, (the mortgagor,) and who afterwards paid the debt, the surety cannot maintain an action of assumpsit against the purchaser, as he is only liable to the mortgagor. (d)

(a) See Staines v. Morris, 1 Ves. & B. 8.

(b) See 6 Park. & Stew. Conv. 437.

(c) See Waring v. Ward, 7 Ves. 337. (d) Crafts v. Tritton, 8 Taunt. 365. S. C.; 2 Moo. 411.

CHAPTER XX.

OF DEFECTS IN ABSTRACTS OF TITLE.

WE have now discussed the principal rules relating to all the most usual abstracts of title; and we shall proceed to consider some defects in titles of a general nature, and affecting more or less all kinds of property. Counsel must see, first, that there is a good title at law; and secondly, that there is a good title in equity; for unless the vendor, as we have seen, (a) can make out a good title both at law and in equity, his title will be defective. He must see particularly whether the title is open to objection on the ground of any of the defects mentioned in this chapter. It will be proper to treat of these in detail; and we shall therefore divide our inquiries into the following sections-I. Judgments and recognizances.—II. Crown debts. III. Non-compliance with the registry acts.—IV. Annuities and rents.-V. Debts and legacies. VI. Dower and curtesy.-VII. Mortgages.

(a) See ante, p. 1, 47, 56, 58.

VIII. Loss or non-existence of title-deeds.-IX. Insufficient description of parcels.-X. Decrees.—XI. Lis pendens.-XII. Leases.-XIII. Fines, recoveries, and feoffments.-XIV. Purchases by trustees of trust property.-XV. Voluntary and fraudulent conveyances.-XVI. Illegitimacy.-XVII. Breaches of trust and destruction of contingent remainders.

I. JUDGMENTS AND RECOGNIZANCES.

The search for incumbrances will depend upon the persons with whom the contract is entered into. They may be persons of such well-established respectability, that the search may be safely limited, or altogether omitted; but as a general rule, as this duty will fall on the purchaser's solicitor, if his client is unwilling to bear the expense of the necessary search, he should adopt the course recommended in a former part of this work, (a) and take a written authority from the purchaser, releasing him from all responsibility on this account.

A judgment in an action of debt, obtained in any of the courts of record in Westminster, becomes a lien on freehold estates, and enables the person in whose favour it is pronounced to sue out an elegit, and to obtain possession of one half of the debtor's lands; (b) and a judgment entered up in pursuance of a warrant of attorney, will equally entitle the creditor to an elegit as a judgment obtained in an adverse suit.

If two elegits are issued on the same day on judgments signed in the same term, an entire moiety of

the land may be extended on each, whether the judgments are obtained by different plaintiffs, or by the same plaintiff; and although the inquisition on the second should recite that a moiety had been extended on the first. (a) If half the lands are extended by elegit, and afterwards another elegit issue at the suit of the same or a different person, only a moiety of the remaining moiety can be extended. (b)

A scire facias is necessary to revive a judgment after a year and a day, before an elegit can be sued out. (c)

The judgment gives a general and not a specific lien; it does not affect any particular estate of the debtor, but a moiety of all the lands of which he is seised, whether at the time of entering up the judgment, or those which he may afterwards acquire. (d) And this lien affects the legal estate, and cannot be defeated by any alienation whatever, with notice. (e)

Before the Union, a judgment given in England had not the effect in Ireland of a judgment of record, so as to bind the land, or have a priority as a specialty; (f) nor was an Irish judgment a lien on lands in England; and the Union has made no difference on this point. (g)

Judgments are charges by way of lien in equity from the time at which they are recorded against every purchaser who can be affected with notice thereof; (h)

(a) Attorney-General v. Andrew, Hard. 23. King v. Giles, 8 Pri. 347. 329. Doe d. Davies v. Creed, 5 Bing. 327, S. C. 2 Moo. & Pay. 648.

(b) Hunt v. Cogan, Cro. Eliz. 482. Burnham v. Pain, 2 Brownl. 97; Com. Dig. Execution, C. 14.

(c) Putland v. Newman, 6 Mau. & Sel. 179.

(d) Finch v. Winchelsea, 1 P. W.

277; 9 Mod. 395; 1 Roll. Abr. 892. pl. 14 & 16; 2 ib. 472.

(e) Forth v. Duke of Norfolk, 4 Madd. 505.

(f) Otway v. Ramsay, 2 Stra.

1090.

(g) Harris v. Saunders, 4 B. & C.

411.

(h) Davis v. Earl of Strathmore, 16 Ves. 419.