one difficulty, however, of a serious nature, attending an immediate choice by the people. The right of suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States; and the latter could have no influence in the election, on the score of the negroes. The substitution of Electors obviated this difficulty, and seemed on the whole to be liable to fewest objections.

Mr. GERRY. If the Executive is to be elected by the Legislature, he certainly ought not to be re-eligible. This would make him absolutely dependent. He was against a popular election. The people are uninformed, and would be misled by a few designing men. He urged the expediency of an appointment of the Executive, by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives. The people of the States will then choose the first branch; the Legislatures of the States, the second branch of the National Legislature; and the Executives of the States, the National Executive. This he thought would form a strong attachment in the States to the National system. The popular mode of electing the Chief Magistrate would certainly be the worst of all. If he should be so elected, and should do his duty, he will be turned out for it, like Governor Bowdoin in Massachusetts, and President Sullivan in New Hampshire.

On the question on Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS's motion, to reconsider generally the constitution of the Executive, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, and all the others, aye.

Mr. ELLSWORTH moved to strike out the appointment by the National Legislature, and to insert, "to be chosen by Electors, appointed by the Legislatures of the States in the following ratio; to wit: one for each State not exceeding two hundred thousand inhabitants; two for each above that number and not exceeding three hundred thousand; and three for each State exceeding three hundred thousand." Mr. BROOM seconded the motion.

Mr. RUTLEDGE was opposed to all the modes, except the

appointment by the National Legislature. He will be sufficiently independent, if he be not re-eligible.

Mr. GERRY preferred the motion of Mr. ELLSWORTH to an appointment by the National Legislature, or by the people; though not to an appointment by the State Executives. He moved that the Electors proposed by Mr. ELLSWORTH should be twenty-five in number, and allotted in the following proportion: to New Hampshire, one; to Massachusetts, three; to Rhode Island, one; to Connecticut, two; to New York, two; to New Jersey, two; to Pennsylvania, three; to Delaware, one; to Maryland, two; to Virginia, three; to North Carolina, two; to South Carolina two; to Georgia,

one.

The question, as moved by Mr. ELLSWORTH, being divided, on the first part "Shall the National Executive be appointed by Electors?"- Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye-6; North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-3; Massachusetts, divided.

On the second part, "Shall the Electors be chosen by the State Legislatures ?"— Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, Georgia, aye-8;, Virginia, South Carolina no

The part relating to the ratio in which the States should choose Electors was postponed, nem. con.

Mr. L. MARTIN moved that the Executive be ineligible a second time.

Mr. WILLIAMSON seconds the motion. He had no great confidence in electors to be chosen for the special purpose. They would not be the most respectable citizens; but persons not occupied in the high offices of government. They would be liable to undue influence, which might the more readily be practised, as some of them will probably be in appointment six or eight months before the object of it

comes on.

Mr. ELLSWORTH supposed any persons might be appointed Electors, except, solely, members of the National Legislature.

On the question, "Shall he be ineligible a second time?" - North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no — 8.

On the question, "Shall the Executive continue for seven years ?" It passed in the negative, Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-3;* New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no-5; Massachusetts, North Carolina, divided.

Mr. KING was afraid we should shorten the term too much.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was for a short term, in order to avoid impeachments, which would be otherwise necessary. Mr. BUTLER was against the frequency of the elections. Georgia and South Carolina were too distant to send electors often.

Mr. ELLSWORTH was for six years. If the elections be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm enough. There must be duties which will make him unpopular for the moment. There will be outs as well as ins. His administration, therefore, will be attacked and misrepresented.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for six years. The expense will be considerable, and ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the elections are too frequent, the best men will not undertake the service, and those of an inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.

On the question of six years,-Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-9; Delaware, no.

Adjourned.

• In the printed Journal, Connecticut, no; New Jersey, aye.

FRIDAY, JULY 20TH.

In Convention,- The proposed ratio of Electors for appointing the Executive, to wit: one for each State whose inhabitants do not exceed two hundred thousand, &c., being taken up,

Mr. MADISON observed that this would make, in time, all or nearly all the States equal, since there were few that would not in time contain the number of inhabitants entitling them to three Electors; that this ratio ought either to be made temporary, or so varied as that it would adjust itself to the growing population of the States.

Mr. GERRY moved that in the first instance the Electors should be allotted to the States in the following ratio: to New Hampshire, one; Massachusetts, three; Rhode Island, one; Connecticut two; New York, two; New Jersey, two; Pennsylvania, three; Delaware, one; Maryland, two ; Virginia, three; North Carolina, two; South Carolina, two; Georgia, one.

On the question to postpone in order to take up this motion of Mr. GERRY, it passed in the affirmative,—Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-6; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no — 4.

Mr. ELLSWORTH moved that two Electors be allotted to New Hampshire. Some rule ought to be pursued; and New Hampshire has more than a hundred thousand inhabitants. He thought it would be proper also to allot two to Georgia.

Mr. BROOM and Mr. MARTIN moved to postpone Mr. GERRY'S allotment of Electors, leaving a fit ratio to be reported by the Committee to be appointed for detailing the Resolutions.

On this motion,-New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye, -3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7.

Mr. HOUSTON seconded the motion of Mr. ELLSWORTH to add another Elector to New Hampshire and Georgia.

On the question, — Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-3; Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no-7.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved as an amendment to Mr. GERRY'S allotment of Electors, in the first instance, that in future elections of the National Executive the number of Electors to be appointed by the several States shall be regulated by their respective numbers of representatives in the first branch, pursuing as nearly as may be, the present proportions.

On the question on Mr. GERRY's ratio of Electors, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6: New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no—4.

On the clause, "to be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty," (see the ninth Resolution),

Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved to strike out this part of the Resolution. Mr. PINCKNEY observed, he ought not to be impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. DAVIE. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He considered this as an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.

Mr. WILSON Concurred in the necessity of making the Executive impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. He could do no criminal act without coadjutors, who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides, who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his functions? If it is not, the mischief will go on. If it is, the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement; and will render the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach.

Colonel MASON. No point is of more importance than