be appointed by the people or the Legislature. Every State has its particular views and prejudices, which will find their way into the general council, through whatever channel they may flow. Wisdom was one of the characteristics which it was in contemplation to give the second branch, would not more of it issue from the Legislatures than from an immediate election by the people? He urged the necessity of maintaining the existence and agency of the States. Without their co-operation it would be impossible to support a republican government over so great an extent of country. An army could scarcely render it practicable. The largest States are the worst governed. Virginia is obliged to acknowledge her incapacity to extend her government to Kentucky. Massachusetts cannot keep the peace one hundred miles from her capital, and is now forming an army for its support. How long Pennsylvania may be free from a like situation, cannot be foreseen. If the principles and materials of our Government are not adequate to the extent of these single States, how can it be imagined that they can support a single government throughout the United States? The only chance of supporting a General Government lies in grafting it on those of the individual States.

Doctor JOHNSON urged the necessity of preserving the State Governments, which would be at the mercy of the General Government on Mr. WILSON's plan.

Mr. MADISON thought it would obviate difficulty if the present Resolution were postponed, and the eighth taken up, which is to fix the right of suffrage in the second branch.

Mr. WILLIAMSON professed himself a friend to such a system as would secure the existence of the State Governments. The happiness of the people depended on it. He was at a loss to give his vote as to the Senate until he knew the number of its members. In order to ascertain this, he moved to insert, after "second branch of the National Legislature," the words, "who shall bear such pro

portion to the number of the first branch as one to." He was not seconded.

Mr. MASON. It has been agreed on all hands that an efficient government is necessary; that, to render it such, it ought to have the faculty of self-defence; that to render its different branches effectual, each of them ought to have the same power of self-defence. He did not wonder that such an agreement should have prevailed on these points. He only wondered that there should be any disagreement about the necessity of allowing the State Governments the same self-defence. If they are to be preserved, as he conceived to be essential, they certainly ought to have this power; and the only mode left of giving it to them was by allowing them to appoint the second branch of the National Legislature.

Mr. BUTLER, observing that we were put to difficulties at every step by the uncertainty whether an equality or a ratio of representation would prevail finally in the second branch, moved to postpone the fourth Resolution, and to proceed to the eighth Resolution on that point. Mr. MADISON Seconded him.

On the question,- New York, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina,

On a question to postpone the fourth, and take up the seventh, Resolution, - Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, no -6.

On the question to agree, "that the members of the second branch be chosen by the individual Legislatures," -Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-9; Pennsylvania, Virginia, no-2.*

It must be kept in view that the largest States, particularly Pennsylvania and Virginia, always considered the choice of the second branch by the State Legislat

On a question on the clause requiring the age of thirty years at least, it was unanimously agreed to.

On a question to strike out the words, "sufficient to ensure their independence," after the word "term,”—it was agreed to.

The clause, that the second branch hold their offices for a term of "seven years," being considered,

Mr. GORHAM suggests a term of "four years," one fourth to be elected every year.

Mr. RANDOLPH supported the idea of rotation, as favorable to the wisdom and stability of the corps; which might possibly be always sitting, and aiding the Executive, and moves, after "seven years," to add, "to go out in fixed proportion," which was agreed to.

Mr. WILLIAMSON suggests "six years," as more convenient for rotation than seven years.

Mr. SHERMAN seconds him.

Mr. READ proposed that they should hold their offices "during good behaviour." Mr. R. MORRIS seconds him.

General PINCKNEY proposed "four years." A longer time would fix them at the seat of government. They would acquire an interest there, perhaps transfer their property, and lose sight of the States they represent. Under these circumstances, the distant States would labor under great disadvantages.

Mr. SHERMAN moved to strike out "seven years," in order to take questions on the several propositions.

On the question to strike out “seven,” — Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no-3; Maryland divided.

On the question to insert "six years," which failed, five States being, aye; five, no; and one, divided,-Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, aye

ures as opposed to a proportional representation, to which they were attached as a fundamental principle of just government. The smaller States, who had opposite views, were reinforced by the members from the large States most anxious to secure the importance of the State Governments,

5; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no-5; Maryland divided.

On a motion to adjourn, the votes were, five for, five against it; and one divided,-Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye-5; Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no5; Maryland divided.

On the question for "five years," it was lost, -Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, aye-5; Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no-5; Maryland divided.

Adjourned.

TUESDAY, JUNE 26TH.

In Convention, -The duration of the second branch being under consideration,

Mr. GORHAM moved to fill the blank with "six years," one-third of the members to go out every second year.

Mr. WILSON seconded the motion.

General PINCKNEY opposed six years, in favor of four years. The States, he said, had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of South Carolina in particular, were different from the Northern. If the Senators should be appointed for a long term, they would settle in the State where they exercised their functions, and would in a little time be rather the representatives of that, than of the State appointing them.

Mr. READ moved that the term be nine years. This would admit of a very convenient rotation, one-third going out triennially. He would still prefer "during good behaviour;" but being little supported in that idea, he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.

Mr. BROOM seconded the motion.

Mr. MADISON. In order to judge of the form to be given to this institution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were, first, to protect

the people against their rulers, secondly, to protect the people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of government most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charged with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution against this danger would be, to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch and check each other. In this they would be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of government, where all business liable to abuses is made to pass through separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It would next occur to such a people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, through want of information as to their true interest; and that men chosen for a short term, and employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection would naturally suggest, that the government be so constituted as that one of its branches might have an opportunity of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, would be, that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of representatives, were liable to err, also, from fickleness and passion. A necessary fence against this danger would be, to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness, might seasonably interpose against impetuous counsels. It ought, finally, to occur to a people deliberating on a government for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might, under sudden impulses, be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized countries the people fall into different classes, having a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors and debtors; farmers, merchants, and manufacturers. There will be, particularly, the distinction