had felt all its weaknesses. He appealed to the recollection of others, whether, on many important occasions, the public interest had not been obstructed by the small members of the Union. The success of the Revolution was owing to other causes, than the constitution of Congress. In many instances it went on even against the difficulties arising from Congress themselves. He admitted that the large States did accede, as had been stated to the Confederation in its present form. But it was the effect of necessity not choice. There are other instances of their yielding, from the same motive, to the unreasonable measures of the small States. The situation of things is now a little altered. He insisted that a jealousy would exist between the State Legislatures and the General Legislature; observing, that the members of the former would have views and feelings very distinct in this respect from their constituents. A private citizen of a State is indifferent whether power be exercised by the General or State Legislatures, provided it be exercised most for his happiness. His representative has an interest in its being exercised by the body to which he belongs. He will therefore view the National Legislature with the eye of a jealous rival. He observed that the addresses of Congress to the people at large had always been better received, and produced greater effect, than those made to the Legislatures.

On the question for postponing, in order to take up Mr. LANSING's proposition, "to vest the powers of legislation in Congress,"-Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, aye-4; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-6; Maryland, divided.

On motion of the Deputies from Delaware, the question on the second Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the Whole, was postponed till to-morrow.

Adjourned.

THURSDAY, JUNE 21st.

In Convention,-Mr. JONATHAN Dayton, from New Jersey, took his seat.

The second Resolution in the Report from the Committee of the Whole, being under consideration,

Doctor JOHNSON. On a comparison of the two plans which had been proposed from Virginia and New Jersey, it appeared that the peculiarity which characterized the latter was its being calculated to preserve the individuality of the States. The plan from Virginia did not profess to destroy this individuality altogether; but was charged with such a tendency. One gentleman alone (Colonel HAMILTON), in his animadversions on the plan of New Jersey, boldly and decisively contended for an abolition of the State Governments. Mr. WILSON and the gentleman from Virginia, who also were adversaries of the plan of New Jersey, held a different language. They wished to leave the States in possession of a considerable, though a subordinate, jurisdiction. They had not yet, however, shewn how this could consist with, or be secured against, the general sovereignty and jurisdiction which they proposed to give to the National Government. If this could be shewn, in such a manner as to satisfy the patrons of the New Jersey propositions, that the individuality of the States would not be endangered, many of their objections would no doubt be removed. If this could not be shewn, their objections would have their full force. He wished it, therefore, to be well considered, whether, in case the States, as was proposed, should retain some portion of sovereignty at least, this portion could be preserved, without allowing them to participate effectually in the General Government, without giving them each a distinct and equal vote for the purpose of defending themselves in the general councils.

Mr. WILSON's respect for Doctor JOHNSON, added to the importance of the subject, led him to attempt, unprepared

as he was, to solve the difficulty which had been started. It was asked, how the General Government and individuality of the particular States could be reconciled to each other, and how the latter could be secured against the former? Might it not, on the other side, be asked, how the former was to be secured against the latter? It was generally admitted, that a jealousy and rivalship would be felt, between the general and particular Governments. As the plan now stood, though indeed contrary to his opinion, one branch of the General Government (the Senate, or second branch) was to be appointed by the State Legislatures. The State Legislatures, therefore, by this participation in the General Government, would have an opportunity of defending their rights. Ought not a reciprocal opportunity to be given to the General Government of defending itself, by having an appointment of some one constituent branch of the State Governments. If a security be necessary on one side, it would seem reasonable to demand it on the other. But taking the matter in a more general view, he saw no danger to the States, from the General Government. In case a combination should be made by the large ones, it would produce a general alarm among the rest, and the project would be frustrated. But there was no temptation to such a project. The States having in general a similar interest, in case of any propositions in the National Legislature to encroach on the State Legislatures, he conceived a general alarm would take place in the National Legislature itself; that it would communicate itself to the State Legislatures; and would finally spread among the people at large. The General Government will be as ready to preserve the rights of the States, as the latter are to preserve the rights of individuals,— all the members of the former having a common interest, as representatives of all the people of the latter, to leave the State Governments in possession of what the people wish them to retain. He could not discover, therefore, any danger whatever on the side from which it was apprehended.

On the contrary, he conceived, that, in spite of every precaution, the General Government would be in perpetual danger of encroachments from the State Governments.

Mr. MADISON was of opinion, in the first place, that there was less danger of encroachment from the General Government than from the State Governments; and in the second place, that the mischiefs from encroachments would be less fatal if made by the former, than if made by the latter.

1. All the examples of other confederacies prove the greater tendency, in such systems, to anarchy than to tyranny; to a disobedience of the members, than usurpations of the Federal head. Our own experience had fully illustrated this tendency. But it will be said, that the proposed change in the principles and form of the Union will vary the tendency; that the General Government will have. real and greater powers, and will be derived, in one branch at least, from the people, not from the Governments of the States. To give full force to this objection, let it be supposed for a moment that indefinite power should be given to the General Legislature, and the States reduced to corporations dependent on the General Legislature, — why should it follow that the General Government would take from the States any branch of their power, as far as its operation was beneficial, and its continuance desirable to the people? In some of the States, particularly in Connecticut, all the townships are incorporated, and have a certain limited jurisdiction, have the representatives of the people of the townships in the Legislature of the State ever endeavoured to despoil the townships of any part of their local authority? As far as this local authority is convenient to the people, they are attached to it; and their representatives, chosen by and amenable to them, naturally respect their attachment to this, as much as their attachment to any other right or interest. The relation of a General Government to State Governments is parallel.

2. Guards were more necessary against encroachments

of the State Governments on the General Government, than of the latter on the former, The great objection made against an abolition of the State Governments was, that the General Government could not extend its care to all the minute objects which fall under the cognizance of the local jurisdictions. The objection as stated lay not against the probable abuse of the general power, but against the imperfect use that could be made of it throughout so great an extent of country, and over so great a variety of objects. As far as its operation would be practicable, it could not in this view be improper; as far as it would be impracticable, the convenience of the General Government itself would concur with that of the people in the maintenance of subordinate governments. Were it practicable for the General Government to extend its care to every requisite object without the co-operation of the State Governments, the people would not be less free as members of one great Republic, than as members of thirteen small ones. A citizen of Delaware was not more free than a citizen of Virginia; nor would either be more free than a citizen of America. Supposing, therefore, a tendency in the General Government to absorb the State Governments, no fatal consequence could result. Taking the reverse as the supposition, that a tendency should be left in the State Governments towards an independence of the General Government, and the gloomy consequences need not be pointed out. The imagination of them must have suggested to the States the experiment we are now making, to prevent the calamity, and must have formed the chief motive with those present to undertake the arduous task.

On the question for resolving, "that the Legislature ought to consist of two branches," - Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no-3; Maryland, divided.

The third Resolution of the Report being taken into consideration