formance of his contract is also true. If the carrier receives goods for transportation, agreeing to hold them until a future. date, or until the happening of an event, and forward them at once, damages resulting from this breach of his agreement may be recovered.22 Sec. 630. (§ 319b.) Same subject-Implied authority of agent to agree to furnish cars on given day.-Connected with this subject is the question of the implied authority of the agent of a railroad company to furnish cars for the transportation of property upon a given day. In the case of a general or superior agent having control of such affairs, or of any agent expressly authorized, there could be, of course, no question; but in the case of local agents at the various shipping places along the lines, more question has arisen. As to these, however, the rule is well settled that a local agent, placed in charge of a station and given authority to receive and forward freight, has implied authority to bind his principal by an apparently reasonable agreement with a shipper to furnish proper cars in a sufficient number and on a given day for the transportation of the shipper's goods.23 That the agent had, in fact, instructions not to make such agreements will make no difference if the shipper did not know of them, and the agreement was one within the apparent scope of the agent's author 22. Campion v. Railway Co., 43 Railroad Co. v. Waters, 50 Neb. Fed. 775, 11 L. R. A. 128. 23. Wood v. Railway Co., 68 Iowa, 491; Harrison v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 364; Pruitt v. Railroad Co., 62 Mo. 527; Gelvin v. Railway Co., 21 Mo. App. 273; Easton v. Dudley, 78 Tex. 236, 14 S. W. Rep. 583; McCarty v. Railway Co., 79 Tex. 33, 15 S. W. Rep. 164; Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Graves, (Tex. Civ. App.) 16 S. W. Rep. 102; Deming v. Railroad Co., 48 N. H. 455; Miller v. Railroad Co., 62 Mo. App. 252; Wilson v. Railway Co., 66 Mo. App. 388; 592, 70 N. W. Rep. 225; Railway But a local station agent has no implied authority to bind the carrier to furnish cars at any other station on the carrier's line than the one where he is employed. Railway Co. v. Hodge, 10 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 30 S. W. Rep. 829. ity.24 In one case25 of this nature the court said of such an agent, "He was the only representative of the company at that station. He was placed there for the purpose of transacting its business at that place. He was authorized to contract, in its name, for the transportation of property of the kind in question, and had authority to receive it for shipment. Shippers had the right to assume, in the absence of information to the contrary, that he had authority from his principal to contract for the doing of whatever was reasonably necessary to be done in the shipment of such property. By placing him in charge of its business at that station, and empowering him to contract for the shipment of such property, it held him out as possessing the authority to contract with reference to all the necessary and ordinary details of the business. Within the range of that business, he was a general agent. Shippers, as a rule, are required to deal with these agents in making contracts for the shipment of property. They are agents of the company's own selection, and are employed to represent and act for it; and to hold that contracts entered into by them, within the apparent scope of their authority, may be defeated by secret limitations upon their authority, would impose, in many cases, very grievous hardships upon those who are compelled to deal with them. The soundest considerations of public policy demand that the rule should be otherwise; and this view is well sustained by the authorities." . So it is within the implied power of a local agent to contract for the delivery of a car to a connecting carrier within a specified time;26 and an agent of a railroad company, who has authority to place cars along the line of railway at points other than stations for the purpose of receiving freight, has power to make an agreement in behalf of the company to receive such 24. Wood v. Railway Co., 68 Iowa, 491 (overruling Wood v. Railroad Co., 59 Iowa, 196); Harrison v. Railway Co., 74 Mo. 364; Railway Co. v. Racer, 10 Ind. App. 503, 37 N. E. Rep. 280; Railway Co. v. Hume, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 653, 24 S. W. Rep. 915. 25. Wood V. Railway Co., 68 Iowa, 491. 26. Stoner v. Railway Co., 109 Iowa, 551, 80 N. W. Rep. 569. freight when deposited along the line of railway to await the arrival of the cars, notwithstanding he may not have authority to make a contract of affreightment.27 Sec. 631. (§ 320.) Care to be taken of the goods in case of delay or accident in the course of the transportation.-If, during the transportation of the goods, any accident should happen to them from which damage is likely to ensue to the goods, it is the duty of the carrier to give to them all the reasonable care and attention which will prevent further damage and secure their preservation. Where coffee in barrels and boxes was being carried on the Mississippi river, in a barge, from New Orleans to St. Louis, and became wet from an accident to the barge, it was held to have been the duty of the carrier to open the boxes and barrels, if necessary, and dry the coffee, in order, as far as possible, to preserve it from further damage by being kept in its wet state for the rest of the trip.28 Where packages of furs were being carried by steamboat from Cincinnati to Pittsburg, and by an accident to the boat they became wet, it was held to have been the duty of the carrier to unpack and dry them while on the voyage, and for not having done so he was held liable.29 Where dressed poultry, packed with ice in boxes, was delivered upon the steamboat of the carrier, which was delayed by a fog, and during the delay the ice melted and the poultry was spoiled by the heat, the carrier was held liable, it being shown that his agent was informed of the nature of the freight, and knew that, under the circumstances, if not attended to, it would spoil; and it not being shown that any care or attention was bestowed upon it.30 So where the carrier received a cask of brandy to carry, which leaked in the course of the journey, and, when his attention was called to it, he took no steps to prevent the leakage, and a considerable quantity was thereby lost, he was held liable on the ground that the loss had accrued from gross negligence.31 27. Railway Co. v. Marchman, 121 Ga. 235, 48 S. E. Rep. 961. 28. Bird v. Cromwell, 1 Mo. 58. 29. Choteaux v. Leech, 18 Penn. St. 224. 30. Peck v. Weeks, 34 Conn. 145. 31. Beck v. Evans, 16 East, 244. And the carrier has also been held liable where his servants stood by and allowed thieves and marauders to break into the cars without opposition and appropriate their contents.32 Sec. 632. (§ 321.) Same subject. When beans loaded upon a vessel became wet by the leaking of the vessel, caused by a collision which compelled the vessel to put back to port and lie there for some time for repairs, it was held to have been the duty of the master to unload the beans while in port, and dry them; and having proceeded on his voyage without having done so, and the beans having become greatly damaged by being permitted to continue wet for so long a time, he was held liable for the damage.33 Where the bill of lading contained a stipulation that casks in which oil was contained should be wetted twice a week to prevent leakage, the carrier was held liable for loss by leakage because this was not done, although leakage was one of the excepted causes of loss contained in his contract; and without such stipulation, if the loss had occurred from the want of reasonable care in preventing such leakage, he would have been liable.34 Sec. 633. Same subject.-Where a cargo, however, has been discharged for the purpose of reconditioning it, and the time such reconditioning would occupy and the cost that would have to be incurred would be out of all proportion to the value of the cargo, the master of a vessel may take these circumstances into consideration and proceed upon the voyage without waiting for the cargo to be put into a fit state for reshipment.35 Sec. 634. (§ 322.) Care to be taken of live stock. It is the duty of the carrier of live stock, in the absence of special contract, and when they are not accompanied by the owner or some agent of his whose duty it becomes to provide for them, 32. Lang v. Railroad Co., 154 Pa. St. 342, 26 Atl. Rep. 370, 20 L. R. A. 360, 35 Am. St. Rep. 846. 33. Notara v. Henderson, L. R. 5 Q. B. 346; s. c. (Exch. Ch.) L. R. 7 Q. B. 225. 34. Hunnewell v. Taber, 2 Sprague, 1. 35. The Savona L. R. (1900) P. 252, 69 L. J. P. 95. See also, post, §§ 647, 648. to give them that attention which they require as living animals, and he cannot treat them as inanimate freight. They absolutely require ventilation and to be fed and watered; and if the carrier has not provided otherwise by contract with the owner when he accepts them for transportation, it becomes as obligatory upon him to care and provide for them in these respects, as their necessities may require, as to provide for them safe vehicles of transportation. If, for instance, a railroad company accepts hogs for transportation, which, from the crowded manner in which they are necessarily carried upon its cars, are liable to die from overheating, it is the duty of the agents of the road to apply water to them externally when this is found necessary to prevent such overheating, and if they fail to do so the company will be liable.36 And there can be no doubt that if the carrier intrusted with a living animal of any description for transportation should suffer it to die from starvation or thirst, or for the want of ordinary care and attention in any respect which it required, he would be liable unless he should be relieved from the duty by contract with his employer.37 36. Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Adams, 42 Ill. 474; T. W. & W. R. R. v. Thompson, 71 id. 434; T. W. & W. R. R. v. Hamilton, 76 id. 393; Wallace v. Railway Co., 133 Mich. 633, 95 N. W. Rep. 750. Where delay occurs during transportation it is the duty of the carrier, unless the shipper has expressly assumed the duty, to see that the property does not suffer injury, as to prevent hogs from "piling up;" and he cannot escape by alleging that the cars were overcrowded, if he accepted them with knowledge of their condition. Kinnick v. Railway Co., 69 Iowa, 665. So, though the shipper accompanies them, the carrier is bound, if requested, in case of accident or delay, to put the cars in such a position that the shipper can get to them to attend to the wants of the animals; e. g. to haul the cars to a point where they can be unloaded; and he cannot escape on the ground of a want of motivepower, if by reasonable diligence he could have obtained it. Bills v. Railroad Co. 84 N. Y. 5. A carrier will be liable in damages if it smothers a hog by placing it in a steam-heated car when such a result could easily have been foreseen. Express Co. Burke, 94 Ill. App. 29; s. c. Burke v. Express Co., 87 Ill. App. 505. 37. South, etc. R. R. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606. Where a jack was shipped in a crate and during the transporta |