necessary to give effect to any provision of this Act, and the carriers complained of have refused or neglected to voluntarily establish such through routes and joint rates, provided no reasonable or satisfactory through route exists, and this provision shall apply when one of the connecting carriers is a water line." Sec. 527. Principal objects of Act. "The principal objects of the Interstate Commerce Act were to secure just and reasonable charges for transportation; to prohibit unjust discriminations in the rendition of like services under similar circumstances and conditions; to prevent undue or unreasonable preferences to persons, corporations, or localities; to inhibit greater compensation for a shorter than for a longer distance over the same line; and to abolish combinations for the pooling of freights."14 Subject to the foregoing prohibitions and to the right of the commission under certain conditions to prescribe what will be the just and reasonable maximum rate or rates, joint or several, the act leaves common carriers as they were at common law, free to make special contracts looking to the increase of their business, to classify their traffic, to adjust and apportion their rates so as to meet the necessities of commerce, and, generally, to manage their important interests upon the same principles which are regarded as sound and adopted in other trades and pursuits.15 The act was not intended to re-inforce the provisions of the tariff laws, 16 and in-so-far as it inhibits railroad carriers from 14. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore, etc. R. R. Co., 145 U. S. 263, 12 Sup. Ct. R. 844, 36 L. Ed. 699, affirming 43 Fed. 37; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., 141 Fed. 1003. 15. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 167 U. S. 479, 42 L. Ed. 243, 17 Sup. Ct. R. 896, id. 104 Fed. 1005, 43 C. C. A. 682, affirm ing 76 Fed. 183; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 73 Fed. 409; Southern Pacific Company v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 536. 16. Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L Ed. 940, reversing Interstate Commerce Commission r. Texas, etc. Ry. Co., 57 Fed. 948, 6 C. C. the imposition of unjust and unreasonable rates, is an express adoption by the national legislature of the principles of the common law on this topic.17 Sec. 528. Act must be construed broadly. "The intent of congress is to be gathered from a consideration of the entire act, and not solely from detached portions thereof, and the familiar rule of construction is to be followed, to-wit, that in determining the meaning of the words employed, the general purpose of the act and the evils sought to be remedied. must be always kept in mind, and, furthermore, parts of the act are not to be so construed as to defeat other important features of the same; nor is such a construction to be given to the act, in whole or in part, as may tend to prevent the proper enforcement of the legislative purpose.'18 So also the tribunal appointed to enforce its provisions, whether the commission or the courts, is empowered to consider all the circumstances and conditions that reasonably apply to the situation. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the tribunal may and should consider the legitimate interests as well of the carrying companies as of the traders and shippers, and in considering whether any particular locality is subjected to an undue preference or disadvantage the welfare of the communities occupying the localities where the goods are delivered is to be considered as well as that of the communities which are in the locality of the place of shipment.19 Sec. 529. Reasonableness of rates-Necessity of actual tender of merchandise for shipment.--When a common carrier promulgates a schedule of rates without previous conference with its patrons, it acts under the mandate of the A. 653, 20 U. S. App. 6, and id. 52 Fed. 187. 17. Tift v. Southern R. Co., 123 Fed. 792; Swift v. Railroad, 58 Fed. 858. 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940, reversing Interstate Commerce Commission v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 57 Fed. 948, 6 C. C. A. 653, 20 U. S. App. 6, and 52 18. Van Patten v. Chicago, etc. Fed. 187; Interstate Commerce R. Co., 81 Fed. 547. 19. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, Commission v. Louisville & N. statute that all interstate rates must be fair and reasonable and under and subject to the rule that it may be called to account by the shipper in an action at law for damages, provided any unreasonable or unjust rate or charge is either exacted from the shipper or demanded. When a rate that has been exacted or demanded is challenged on the ground that it was unreasonable or unjust, it is within the province of a court and jury to determine the issue so raised, and to redress the wrong, if one has been committed; but, before an alleged unreasonable rate has been either paid or demanded, or an actual tender of merchandise for shipment has been made, it is not within the legitimate province of a court of equity to interpose and fix a maximum rate, and thereupon enjoin the carrier from demanding more than the rate so established. Such an order effectually deprives an interstate railroad of its right to change and fix rates which is conceded to it by the Interstate Commerce Act. It is tantamount both to making a contract between the shipper and the railroad, and to an exercise of the legislative power of prescribing rates, neither of which powers properly belongs to a court of equity.20 Sec. 530. Interests of public predominant on questions of reasonableness of rates. While it is true that an interstate carrier has the right to exact a fair return for the public utilities it affords, the public is entitled to exact that no more be required of it for the use of such utilities than the services rendered are reasonably worth,21 and where there is a plain and irreconcilable conflict between the interest of the public and the interest of the carrier, the former must prevail.22 Thus railroads have no legal right to graduate their charges in proportion to the prosperity which attends industries whose products they transport.23 20. Southern Pacific Railway Co. . Colorado Fuel & Iron Co., 101 Fed. 779, 42 C. C. A. 12. 21. Tift v. Southern Railway Co., 138 Fed. 753. 22. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 118 Fed. 613. 23. Where a vast increase of lumber traffic had resulted in Sec. 531. Value of goods should be considered in fixing a reasonable rate-Weight and bulk of goods. In fixing the reasonable compensation of the carrier the element of the value of the service must be taken into account and the courts will refuse to enforce a rate which denies the carrier any remuneration for additional risk in carrying articles of the same kind and bulk, but of a higher value than the ordinary.24 So the weight and bulk of the article to be transported, and the convenience or inconvenience to the carrier in transporting it, may be considered in rate making.25 Sec. 532. Mileage is not the controlling factor in fixing a reasonable rate.-Mileage, while it is a circumstance which should be considered with all other facts and conditions in determining the reasonableness of interstate rates, is by no means the controlling factor.26 Thus the fact that the cost of carriage of all coal upon an entire railroad system, from all points of shipment to all destinations, is a certain per cent of the gross receipts from all coal carried upon the entire system, is no reason for concluding that upon a particular line or part of the system the cost of carriage bears the same ratio to the receipts from coal carried on that particular line or part.27 lar traffic is practically destroyed immediately after the advance is made. Tift v. Southern Railway Co., 138 Fed. 753. 24. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 64 Fed. 723; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., 141 Fed. large increase of net revenue to the carrier, the service was inexpensive, required neither rapidity of movement nor specially equipped cars, shippers were obliged to furnish and pay for equipment, railroads were neither to load nor unload, the commodity was neither fragile nor perishable, the risk of damage was inappre- 1003. ciable, the industry afforded a tonnage second in magnitude to none other transported by the carrier, an arbitrary increase to 26. Interstate Commerce Compoints of principal destination of mission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., two cents a hundred pounds is unreasonable and unlawful. This is especially clear where the particu 25. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Chicago Great W. Ry. Co., supra. 73 Fed. 409. 27. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., Sec. 533. On questions of reasonableness of rates, a comparison of rates is of small importance. In determining the reasonableness of a rate, a comparison of rates to other places or points is of small importance, except as a circumstance or fact in the proof, and having no other than an evidentiary bearing 28 Too many other factors must be taken into account, as, for instance, that between the same points and over the same road, a greater flow of traffic in one direction will justify a lower rate in that direction than in the other.29 A finding, therefore, that the rates charged to a particular point are unreasonable in themselves cannot properly be based on evidence which only tends to show that they are high as compared with the rates charged between the initial points and intermediate points.30 The above rule, of course, does not prevent consideration of other rates as evidentiary facts. Thus the rates at competitive points may be compared in determining what are reasonable rates at non-competitive points.31 Sec. 534. What is a reasonable rate may vary with the season of the year. The reasonableness of rates may also be affected by the nature of the goods carried in reference to the season of the year. Thus lower summer rates and higher winter rates on some goods are not unreasonable or unlawful where such rates are necessary to keep cars employed and are offered all persons on equal terms.32 Sec. 535. Second section of Interstate Commerce Act modeled on English Act. The second section of the Interstate Commerce Act was modeled upon section 90 of the English "Railway Clauses Consolidation Act" of 1845, known as the 74 Fed. 784, appeal withdrawn, 82 Fed. 1002, 27 C. C. A. 681, 39 U. S. App. 764. 28. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 73 Fed. 409. mission v. Nashville C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 120 Fed. 934, 57 C. C. A. 224. 31. Van Patten v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 81 Fed. 545. 32. Interstate Commerce Com 29. See 6 Int. Com. Rep. 85, 121, mission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., and 9 Int. Com. Rep. 642. 73 Fed. 409. 30. Interstate Commerce Com |