papers, both of the carrier and the shipper, which relate directly or indirectly to such transaction; the claim that such testimony or evidence may tend to criminate the person giving such evidence shall not excuse such person from testifying or such corporation producing its books and papers, but no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence documentary or otherwise in such proceeding: Provided, That the provisions of an Act entitled "An Act to expedite the hearing and determination of suits in equity pending or hereafter brought under the Act of July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' 'An Act to regulate commerce,' approved February fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, or any other Acts having a like purpose that may be hereafter enacted, approved February eleventh, nineteen hundred and three," shall apply to any case prosecuted under the direction of the Attorney-General in the name of the Interstate Commerce Commission."

"SECTION 4. That all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, but such repeal shall not affect causes now pending nor rights which have already accrued, but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion and such rights enforced in a manner heretofore provided by law and as modified by the provisions of this Act."

"SECTION 5. That this Act shall take effect from its passage." Approved February 19, 1903; amended June 29, 1906.

Sec. 524. Who are subject to the Act.-By its terms the act applies to "any corporation or any person or persons engaged in the transportation of oil or other commodity, except water and except natural or artificial gas by means of pipe lines or partly by pipe lines and partly by railroad, or partly by pipe lines and partly by water, who shall be considered and held to be common carriers within the meaning and purpose of this act, and to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad (or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used under a common control, management or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment), etc." The term "common carrier," as used in the act, is broadened to include express companies and sleeping car companies, and

the term "railroad," as used in the act, is expressly given the most sweeping signification possible by the provision that it "shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement or lease, and shall also include all switches, spurs, tracks, and terminal facilities of every kind used or necessary in the transportation of the persons or property designated herein, and also all freight depots, yards and grounds used or necessary in the transportation or delivery of any of said property; and the term 'transportation' shall include cars and other vehicles and all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any contract, express or implied, for the use thereof, and all services in connection with the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit, ventilation, refrigeration or icing, storage, and handling of property transported."

Under the old act the courts had held that express companies, not operating railway lines of their own, were not subject to its provisions, although a railroad conducting an express business was subject to the act.2 So the old act was held inapplicable to independent carriers by water,3 and to a stockyards company not engaged in transportation under the definition of the term "transportation" in the old act.4 Under the act as amended June 29, 1906, it seems to be the clear intent of congress not only to bring express companies within the purview of the act, but, by enlarging the definition of the term "transportation," to include stockyards companies, irrespective of ownership or of any contract.

1. United States v. Morsman, 42 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. ed. 940, 16 Fed. 448; Southern Indiana Express Co. v. United States Express Co., 88 Fed. 659, affirmed in 92 Fed. 1022, 35 C. C. A. 172.

Sup. Ct. R. 666, reversing Interstate Commerce Commission V. Texas & Pac. Railway Co., 57 Fed. 948, 6 C. C. A. 653, 20 U. S. App.

2. Express Co. v. Seibert, 44 6 and Id. 52 Fed. 187; Ex parte

Fed. 310.

3. Texas & Pac. Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,

Koehler, 30 Fed. 869.

4. Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 82 Fed. 839.

Sec. 525. What shipments are subject to the act.-After quoting the first part of the first section of the old act verbatim, which language is repeated in the amendatory act of 1906, the supreme court of the United States in a case before it used the following language: "It would be difficult to use language more unmistakably signifying that congress had in view the whole field of commerce (excepting commerce wholly within a state) as well that between the states and territories as that going to or coming from foreign countries." In accordance with that view, it has been held that the act applies to a shipment to or from an unorganized territory, and even to a shipment involving continuous through transportation between two points in the same state when a part of the route is outside the state through another state or territory. A state, therefore, can make no law regulating the rate of freight for the transportation of goods between that and another state, and this is so where the regulation prescribed is construed as applying only to the line of the road within the territorial limits of the state.

5. Tex. & Pac. Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 666, 40 L. Ed. 940, reversing 57 Fed. 948, 6 C. C. A. 653, 20 U. S. App. 6 and 52 Fed. 187.

6. Railway Co. v. Bowles, 1 Ind. Terr. Rep. 250, 40 S. W. Rep. 899.

7. To bring the transportation on the question of the right to fix rates within the control of the state, as part of its domestic commerce, the subject transported must be during the entire voyage under the exclusive jurisdiction of the state. A state board of railroad commissioners, therefore, has no right to fix rates for continuous transportation between two points in a state, when goods are shipped on a through bill of lading and a large part of

the route is outside the state through another state or territory. Such an action on the part of a state board of railroad commissioners is not within the power of a state and is bad as interfering with the power of Con gress to regulate commerce among the several states and with the Indian Tribes. Hanley v. Railway, 187 U. S. 617, affirming Kansas, etc. Railway v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 106 Fed. 353 and overruling United States v. Railroad, 115 Fed. 373, Campbel! . Railway, 86 Iowa 587, and Seawell v. Railroad, 119 Mo. 222, 24 S. W. Rep. 1002.

8. Gaines v. Railway, 75 Tex. 572, 12 S. W. Rep. 1001.

A state cannot authorize a recovery for overcharges for freight

Sec. 526. Effect of joint rates in bringing a railroad within the scope of the Act-Commission has power to establish joint rates under certain conditions.-The voluntary making of a through rate on interstate shipments by the joint action of connecting railroads is the act of each, and brings each within the scope of the Interstate Commerce Act, and renders it responsible for such rate, without regard to the proportion thereof received for its own service. This constitutes a "common control, management, or arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment," as defined by section one of the act,9 and it is immaterial that one of the roads over which the goods pass receives the sole benefit of the rate on its own line.10 Both lines are subject to the act notwithstanding.

on an interstate shipment involving unjust discrimination. Gatton v. Railway, 95 Iowa 112, 63 N. W. Rep. 589, 28 L. R. A. 556.

When cotton has been delivered to a common carrier, to be transported on a continuous voyage or trip to a point beyond the limits of the state it is not subject to state regulations as to compressing. State v. International, etc. Railroad Co., 31 Tex. Civ. App. 219, 71 S. W. Rep. 994.

9. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 118 Fed. 613; United States v. Seaboard Ry. Co., 82 Fed. 563.

When goods shipped under a through bill of lading, from a point in one state to a point in another, are received in transit by a state common carrier, under a conventional division of the charges, such carrier must be deemed to have subjected its road to an arrangement for a continuous carriage or shipment within the meaning of the act to regulate commerce. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,

162 U. S. 184, 40 L. Ed. 935, 16 Sup. Ct. R. 700, affirming Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co., 64 Fed. 981, 9 C. C. A. 689, 13 N. S. App. 730, and reversing 56 Fed. 925.

A terminal or belt railroad, operating entirely within a state, as it receives shipments of interstate freight on through bills of lading upon whose line the shipment begins or ends, is to be treated as having subjected itself to a common control for a continuous shipment within the first clause of section one of the Interstate Commerce Act. Interstate Stock Yards Co. v. Railway, 99 Fed. 472.

A railroad, even if it is a local road, wholly within a state, is not exempted from the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act in receiving, shipping and forwarding interstate traffic. Augusta S. R. Co. v. Wrightsville & T. R. Co., 74 Fed. 522.

10. Railroad Co. v. Behlmer, 175 U. S. 648, 44 L. Ed. 309, 20 Sup. Ct. R. 209, reversing Behlmer v. Railroad, 83 Fed. 898, 28 C. C. A. 229,

There was nothing in the old Interstate Commerce Act to compel connecting railroads to form through routes or to join in making through rates,11 and the mere fact that goods were intended by the shipper for an ultimate destination beyond the state did not subject the initial carrier to the operation of the act where it received, transported and delivered such goods wholly within one state and had nothing to do with their transportation beyond the state.12 Local switching or transfer companies, therefore, were not necessarily subject to the act, unless they were parties to a through bill of lading.13 In section one of the new act, however, it is provided that "it shall be the duty of every carrier subject to the provisions of this act to provide and furnish such transportation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish through routes and just and reasonable rates applicable thereto." And in section fifteen of the new act it is also provided that "the commission may also, after hearing a complaint, establish through routes and joint rates as the maximum to be charged and prescribe the division of such rates as hereinbefore provided, and the terms and conditions under which such through routes shall be operated, when that may be

42 U. S. App. 581 and modifying Id. 71 Fed. 835.

11. Interstate Commerce Com mission . Southern Ry. Co., 122 Fed. 800, 60 C. C. A. 540, affirming 117 Fed. 741.

A court of equity has no power either at common law or under the Interstate Commerce Act to compel railroad companies to enter into a contract with another company for a joint through rate and joint through routing of passengers. Little Rock & M. R. Co. r. St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. 559.

12. Ex parte Koehler, 30 Fed. 869; Missouri & Ill. Railroad Tie & Lumber Co. v. Railway Co., 1 Int. Com. Rep. 30.

Under the above rule a class of cases is created in which shipments are interstate and consequently not subject to state regulation, and which still do not come within the purview of the Interstate Commerce Act. See the later sections on state regulation of rates and the following cases:

Cutting v. R. & Nav. Co., 46 Fed. 641; Railway Co. v. Fort Grain Co., 7 Tex. Ct. R. 207, 72 S. W. Rep. 419, 73 S. W. Rep. 845; Railway Co. v. Barry (Tex. Civ. App.) 45 S. W. Rep. 814.

13. Railroad Co. v. Becker, 32 Fed. 849; Kentucky, etc. Bridge Co. v. Louisville, etc. R. Co., 37 Fed. 567.