Sec. 1153. (§ 624.) Regulations to prevent collisions. Rules have also been prescribed by law for the prevention of collisions between sailing vessels and steam vessels, whenever approaching each other in such manner as to involve the danger of collision, or when, in a fog or in thick weather, they may not be seen by each other, and there may be consequently danger of collision when one may be stationary and the other in motion.2

Sec. 1154. (§ 625.) Purpose of these regulations.-These legislative enactments, of which the foregoing is a very brief summary, intended merely to indicate their character, have been framed with great particularity, with the view, as far as it can be done by statutory regulations, of protecting the lives of passengers upon water, and of securing for them the accommodations necessary for their comfort upon long voyages. The provisions of the law, however, in regard to the inspection of such vessels, being intended solely to secure the safety of the passengers, have been extended so as to require the inspection of the hulls and boilers of ferry-boats, yachts and other small craft of like character, as well as of tug boats, towing boats. and freight boats, all of which are also required to be navigated by a licensed engineer and a licensed pilot.

Sec. 1155. (§ 626.) These regulations do not lessen liability of carrier for safe carriage of passengers.-These acts are not intended to, nor do they, in anywise lessen the responsibil

Statutes, pages 2930 to 2936 inclusive.

Although the certificate of a U. S. marine inspector permitting a vessel to carry more passengers than she actually carried may relieve her against the statutory penalty for carrying an excessive number of passengers, it does not relieve her from liability to the passengers if any damage to them is occasioned thereby. Pacific Steam Whaling Co. v. Grismore,

117 Fed. 68, 54 C. C. A. 454, affirming The Valencia, 110 Fed. 221.

2. R. S. of U. S., Tit. XLVIII, ch. 5, §§ 4233-4251; U. S. Compiled Statutes, pages 2863 to 2903 inclusive.

Non-compliance with the statute makes a prima facie case of negligence. Schloterer v. Ferry Co., 78 N. Y. Supp. 202, 75 App. Div. 330.

ity of the carrier of passengers by steam vessels, for the care and diligence in providing for the safety and comfort of such passengers which are required upon the general principles of the common law, according to which carriers by water as well as by land are bound, "as far as human care and foresight will go" to provide for the safety of their passengers. They are intended as additional safeguards for the protection of passengers on steamboats and steam vessels of every kind, without in any manner interfering with or affecting the obligation of the carrier to the passenger; and the liability of the owners of such vessels is not restricted nor confined to the acts of omission or commission for which penalties are provided, nor will the strictest compliance with every provision of the act in regard to the inspection of his vessel and its machinery, nor the certificate from the inspectors of their fulfilling in every respect the requirements of the act relating thereto, create any presumption in the carrier's favor when the question of his negligence is involved. He cannot screen himself behind the provisions of the law showing that he has complied with them, and the question of his liability to the passenger will be determined independently of them and as though they had never been enacted. The presumption of negligence, for instance, arising from the explosion of a boiler will not depend upon evidence of a non-compliance with the act providing for its inspection, but upon the rule of common law that where an act takes place which usually, and according to the ordinary course of events, would not happen if proper care was exercised, it will be presumed that such care was not observed; nor, on the other hand, would any presumption of the observance of due care arise from evidence of a strict conformity with the law, but, on the contrary, if such evidence be admissible, its effect would be to strengthen the probability of negligence.3 Sec. 1156. (§ 627.) Duty to furnish passengers with food and other necessaries.-It not being the usage of carriers of

3. Caldwell V. The Steamboat Co., 47 N. Y. 282; s. c. 56 Barb. 425; Bradley v. The Railroad, 2

Cush. 539; Simmons v. The Steamboat Co., 97 Mass. 361,

passengers by water, other than deck or steerage passengers, to require that the passenger shall furnish his own provisions or sleeping accommodations, but it being, on the contrary, the universal custom of such carriers to provide for the passenger these necessaries, when the length of the voyage makes them indispensable, it is implied as a part of the contract of carriage in such cases, in the absence of express stipulations upon the subject, that the carrier will supply the passenger with such food and other accommodations as will be necessary for his health and comfort upon the voyage and as may be usual and customary upon such vessels and upon such voyages; and if the carrier, under such circumstances, should so far fail in his duty in this respect as to cause suffering or sickness, or serious grievance of any kind to the passenger, he would be liable to an action for the breach of his contract. If the passenger, however, with full knowledge of all the circumstances, voluntarily accepts poorer accommodations rather than not to be able to make the journey at all, the carrier will not be liable for any damages to the passenger resulting from the poorer accommodations.5

4. The Oregon, 133 Fed. 609, 68 C. C. A. 603; The European, 120 Fed. 776, 57 C. C. A. 140 (improper food); The D. C. Murray, 89 Fed. 508 (inferior food); Defrier v. The Nicaragua, 81 Fed. 745 (insufficient food).

The responsibility of furnishing food as imposed by Passenger Act of 1882 (22 St. at Large, 186) cannot be evaded by charter contract. The Prinz Georg, 23 Fed. Rep. 906.

The carrier is liable for not furnishing food and acommodation as stipulated on the ticket. O'Carroll v. The Havre, 45 Fed. Rep.

764.

Passengers who purchase second class tickets are entitled to second class accommodations, and if they are furnished badly venti

A carrier by water cannot exact a charge for the use of a stateroom and then by means of a regulation printed on the ticket deprive the passenger of the use of it. If the passenger fails to comply with the regulations printed on the ticket, and the stateroom is resold, he must be given another room or his money must be refunded. Clark v. Railroad Co., 83 N. Y. Supp. 162, 40 Misc. Rep. 691.

5. It being at the close of a

"I

Sec. 1157. (§ 628.) Same subject.-In the case of Young v. Fewson, in which the declaration averred that, in consideration of a certain sum paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, it was the defendant's duty to furnish him with good and fresh provisions on a voyage, and that he did not do so, Lord Denman, in summing up, told the jury that it was the duty of the defendant, as master of the vessel, to supply good and fresh provisions for the plaintiff, and that if he did not provide such supply, then the question would be whether the plaintiff had been in any degree a sufferer by the captain's neglect. think," said he, "the result of the whole is, that the captain did not supply so large a quantity of good and fresh provisions as is usual under such circumstances. But there is no real ground of complaint, no right of action, unless the plaintiff has really been a sufferer; for it is not because a man does not get so good a dinner as he might have had, that he is therefore to have a right of action against the captain who does not provide all that he ought. You must be satisfied that there was a real grievance sustained by the plaintiff." There was, however, a verdict for the plaintiff. And where a passenger filed a libel in rem against the ship, alleging that he had not been furnished with provisions and water on his passage from Liverpool to New York, there was a decree for the libelant, the court (Nelson, J.) holding that it was a part of a passenger's contract that they should be furnished, and that the vessel was liable for a breach of such contract in the same manner as for a breach of a contract of affreightment of merchandise.7

Sec. 1158. Same subject-Steerage passengers. In the absence of a binding usage to the contrary, or special contract

summer season, a boat was over. crowded. Not having reserved berths for himself and party, deceased, nevertheless, insisted on going. The officers of the boat finally offered to take him if he would accept a cot or mattress. He accepted the offer, contracted pneumonia, and died. The carrier was held not liable because, with

full knowledge of all the circumstances, deceased had assumed the risk of sleeping on the mattress. Van Anda v. Navigation Co., 111 Fed. 765, 49 C. C. A. 596, 55 L. R. A. 544.

6. 8 Carr. & P. 55.

See also, The President, 92 Fed. 673.

7. The Aberfoyle, 1 Blatch. 360.

with the carrier, steerage passengers are not entitled to be furnished bedding. And although a steerage passenger may have some cause to complain because dogs are carried in the steerage cabin, still this does not constitute such a breach of the carrier's contract for passage as to entitle him to substantial damages.9

Sec. 1159. (§ 629.) Authority of master. The master of a ship must, from necessity, be justified in emergencies in assuming and exercising a more despotic power over both the passengers and the crew of his vessel than could ever become necessary in the case of carriers by land. He is a quasi magistrate on board his ship at sea, and may, within certain limits, enforce and justify orders which in port would expose him to censure, to civil responsibility and to punishment.10 His ship may be placed in situations of extreme peril from tempests, from mutiny, or from exposure to capture by an enemy or by pirates, when the preservation of all on board, and of the ship itself, may depend upon implicit obedience to his orders, not only by the crew of the ship but by the passengers themselves. In such perilous situations, obedience to his authority is a duty incumbent upon every passenger, and in times of such extraordinary danger he may be called upon to render any service which may be required by the master and which it may be in his power to perform, although it may expose him to danger. He may be required, for instance, to work at the pumps with the crew if his assistance in that way may be deemed necessary to save the ship and the lives of those on board, or he may be required to resist the attack of an enemy upon the ship, though it may expose him to great personal danger.

Sec. 1160. (§ 630.) Same subject.—But while the master may lawfully require whatever is necessary for the security of the vessel, the discipline of the crew, or the safety of all on board, not only of the ship's company, who are bound at all

8. The Centennial, 131 Fed. 816; Defrier v. The Nicaragua, 81 Fed. 745.

9. The Centennial, supra.

10. Block v. Bannerman, 10 La. Ann. 1.