destination, and should consequently be carried beyond it before giving such notice, the carrier will have violated no duty to the passenger.13

Sec. 1127. (§ 617a.) Helping passengers to alight.—Where the carrier has provided safe and suitable conveniences at a proper place for the alighting of passengers and has brought his vehicle to a stop at that place and given passengers reasonable time in which to alight, it is ordinarily no part of his duty to assist them, though females, in so doing.14

But this duty may be imposed where the passenger is known to be so sick, aged or infirm as to need assistance in alighting safely.15 And certainly where the passenger is called upon to alight away from the station or at a dangerous and unusual place where conveniences for that purpose have not been provided, the carrier owes to the passenger the duty to see that he has such assistance as is reasonably necessary to enable him to

13. Pence v. Railroad Co., 23 Ky. L. R. 1207, 64 S. W. Rep. 905.

14. Raben v. Railway Co., 73 Iowa, 579; s. c. 74 Iowa, 732; Railroad Co. v. Hobbs, 118 Ga. 227, 45 S. E. Rep. 23, 63 L. R. A. 68; Railway Co. v. Reeves, 116 Ga. 743, 42 S. E. Rep. 1015; Deming v. Railway Co., 80 Mo. App. 152; Hanks v. Railroad Co., 60 Mo. App. 274; Young v. Railway Co., 93 Mo. App. 267.

A promise by the conductor to assist a passenger who is not known to him to be sick, infirm, or in need of assistance, is a mere voluntary promise for which the carrier is not responsible and by which it is not bound. Railroad Co. v. Earnwood, 104 Ga. 127, 29 S. E. Rep. 913.

Where the employees of a railroad company have no notice that a passenger intends to alight at a

station other than his destination, and situated in an uninhabited place for the accommodation of the railroad employees only, the latter owe no duty to the passenger to assist him in alighting. Nichols v. Railroad Co., 90 Mich. 203, 51 N. W. Rep. 364.

The law does not require a carrier to furnish portable steps, in the absence of a controlling usage to the contrary, for the use of its passengers in entering or leaving the car. Young v. Railway Co., 93 Mo. App. 267.

15. Ante, § 992. Railroad Co. v. Hobbs, 118 Ga. 227, 45 S. E. Rep. 23, 63 L. R. A. 68, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Madden v. Railway Co., 41 S. Car. 440, 19 S. E. Rep. 951; Werner v. Railway Co., 105 Wis. 300, 81 N. W. Rep. 416; McDermott v. Railway Co., 82 Wis. 246, 52 N. W. Rep. 85.

alight in safety.16 As is said in one case,17 "the contract of a railroad company with a passenger does not terminate until he has alighted from the cars."

Whether the curcumstances are such in a given case as to suggest the necessity of assisting a passenger to alight is a question for the jury.18

Sec. 1128. (§ 617b.) Awaking sleeping passengers. So it is ordinarily no part of the carrier's duty to see that passengers are awake when the train reaches their destinations, and the company is not bound by the conductor's promise to so awaken a passenger.19 Exceptional circumstances might, however, impose the duty.

But in the case of sleeping-cars, the rule is different. There the passenger is invited to go to sleep and pays extra for the conveniences therefor, and, as will be seen, it is the duty of the

16. Texas, etc. R'y Co. v. Miller, 79 Tex. 84, 15 S. W. Rep. 264, 23 Am. St. Rep. 308; St. Louis, etc. R'y Co. v. Finley, 79 Tex. 85, 15 S. W. Rep. 266; Railroad Co. v. Hendricks, 26 Ind. 232, 41 Ind. 69; Railroad Co. v. Wortham, 73 Tex. 27; Memphis, etc. R. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Alexandria, etc. R. Co. v. Herndon, 87 Va. 193, 12 S. E. Rep. 289; Railroad Co. v. Taylor, 25 Ind. App. 679, 58 N. E. 852; Railway Co. v. Bell, 25 Ky. L. R. 10, 74 S. W. Rep. 700; Bailey v. Richardson, 14 Ky. L. R. 367; Kral v. Railway, 71 Minn. 422, 74 N. W. Rep. 166; Doolittle v. Railroad Co., 62 S. Car. 130, 40 S. E. Rep. 133; Railway Co. v. Buchanan, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 209, 72 S. W. Rep. 96; Ellis v. Railway Co., 120 Wis. 645, 98 N. W. Rep. 942.

18. Railway Co. v. Reeves, 116 Ga. 743, 42 S. E. Rep. 1015.

19. Sevier v. Railroad Co., 61 Miss. 8; Nunn v. Railroad Co., 71 Ga. 710; Nichols v. Railway Co., 90 Mich. 203, 51 N. W. Rep. 364; Atkinson v. Railway Co., 90 Mo. App. 489; Railroad Co. v. Cohn, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 53 S. W. Rep. 698; Railway Co. v. Alexander, (Tex. Civ. App.) 30 S. W. Rep. 1113; Railway Co. v. Kendrick, (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. Rep. 42; Seaboard, etc. R'y Co. บ. Rainey, 122 Ga. 307, 50 S. E. Rep. 88, 106 Am. St. Rep. 134.

Where by reason of the passenger falling asleep, he is carried beyond his destination, it is no part of the carrier's duty to carry him to the next station; and if he refuse to pay his fare to such station, he may be removed from

17. St. Louis, etc. R'y Co. v. Fin- the train. Railway Co. v. James, ley, supra.

82 Tex. 306, 18 S. W. Rep. 589, 15 L. R. A. 347.

company's servants to awaken him in time to dress and alight in safety.20

Sec. 1129. (§ 617c.) Furnishing passengers necessary instructions. So it is the duty of the carrier, especially the carrier by railroad in these days when great union depots with their multiplicity of trains going in all directions, their noise and bustle and confusion are apt to bewilder even the experienced traveler; when women, children and inexperienced persons are frequently upon their trains, and where the safety and dispatch of the journey require that the passenger should take or leave the train at particular times or places, to give to the passenger such directions and information as are reasonably necessary to enable him to pursue his journey without unnecessary danger or delay.21

But, as has been seen,22 it is expected that passengers will exercise ordinary intelligence and prudence in the conduct of their journey, and the carrier will not be liable, in the absence of special circumstances, where he has used such means and given such information as would be sufficient for the requirements of a traveler of ordinary intelligence exercising reasonable care and caution.23 Yet where the carrier knowingly accepts as a passenger a person whose age, sex or condition is such as to require unusual diligence in directing or guarding against injury, the precaution adequate to the need of travelers generally will not suffice.24

20. Post, § 1142.

21. Dwinelle v. Railroad Co., 120 N. Y. 117; Newcomb v. Railroad, 182 Mo. 687, 81 S. W. Rep. 1069. (Must provide reasonable arrangements for directing passengers at depot.) See also, St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. White, Tex. 89 S. W. Rep. 746; Trapp r. Railway Co., S. Car. 51 S. E. Rep. 919.

If an employe of the carrier negligently gives the passenger

the wrong name of a station so that he is induced to alight before his destination is reached, the carrier will be liable in damages. Railway Co. v. Cook, 12 Ind. App. 109, 38 N. E. Rep. 1104. 22. Ante, § 1067.

23. Barker v. Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 599.

24. See ante, § 992, et seq.; Hemmingway v. Railroad Co., 72 Wis. 42.

II. SLEEPING AND PARLOR CARS.

Sec. 1130. (§ 617d.) Sleeping-car companies not common carriers or innkeepers, but bound for reasonable care.-Notwithstanding strenuous efforts to hold them liable in that capacity, it is well settled that sleeping-car companies are not common carriers of the goods of passengers nor are they liable as innkeepers. 25

"A sleeping-car company," says Morton, C. J., "holds itself out to the world as furnishing safe and comfortable cars, and, when it sells a ticket, it impliedly stipulates to do so. It invites passengers to pay for, and make use of, its cars for sleeping, all parties knowing that, during the greater part of the night, the passenger will be asleep, powerless to protect himself or to guard his property. He cannot, like the guest of an inn, by locking the door, guard against danger. He has no right to take any such steps to protect himself in a sleeping-car, but, by the necessity of the case, is dependent upon the owners and officers of the car to guard him and the property he has with him from danger from thieves or otherwise.

"The law raises the duty on the part of the car company to afford him this protection. While it is not liable as a common carrier or as an innholder, yet it is its duty to use reasonable care to guard the passenger from theft, and if, through want of such care, the personal effects of a passenger, such as he might reasonably carry with him, are stolen, the company is liable for it. Such a rule is required by public policy, and by the true interests of both the passenger and the company, and the decided weight of authority supports it."

Sec. 1131. (§ 617e.) Same subject-Negligence the test of liability. The test of the liability, therefore, is negligence, the failure to use that degree of care which the circumstances of the case reasonably demand, and if there is no negligence, or if the negligence of the passenger contributed to cause the loss,

sengers, their horses and attendants, for a reasonable compensation as a public business, and who is bound to take in all travelers and wayfaring persons, and to entertain them, and who, in consequence of his public employment, is held to the most rigid responsibility for the goods of his guest." This extraordinary liability of the innkeeper, standing less upon reason than upon custom, growing out

of a state of society no longer existing, should not be extended, it has been said, to the proprietors of a sleeping-car, for the following reasons:

1. The peculiar construction of sleeping-cars is such as to render it almost impossible for the company, even with the most careful watch, to protect the occupants of berths from being plundered by the occupants of adjoining sec