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notice to leave the conveyance at his destination, and has failed to take advantage of the opportunity to alight, it has been held that his unreasonable delay may put an end to the relation of passenger, and that he may thus forfeit his right to that extraordinary care which the carrier owes to one in that character;14 and that, if afterwards he be injured in alighting, he can claim compensation from the carrier only for such negligence as would make him liable to one not a passenger.15

In a leading case16 upon the subject it is said: "All the duty the law imposes upon a conductor acting as the agent of

14. Imhoff v. The Railway, 20 Wis. 344; Railway Co. v. Mitchell, (Tex. Civ. App.) 26 S. W. Rep. 154; Railway Co. v. McKenzie, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 293, 70 S. W. Rep. 237; Railway Co. v. Mathes, 7 Tex. Ct. Rep. 172, 73 S. W. Rep. 411; Railroad Co. v. Frazer, 55 Kan. 582, 40 Pac. Rep. 923; Dunning v. Railroad Co., Ind. App.

77 N. E. Rep. 1049.

It is the duty of the passenger to leave the car with reasonable promptness. Philadelphia, etc. R. Co. v. Hand, Md. 61 Atl. Rep. 285. In the absence of a custom to give signals for passengers to get off, a railroad company is not bound to give any signal for such purpose after having stopped its train and kept it standing at the station a sufficient time to allow passengers to alight by the exercise of ordinary and reasonable diligence on their part. Railroad Co. v. Dickinson, 89 Ga. 455, 15 S. E. Rep. 534.

If the carrier holds the train sufficiently long to enable passengers to alight from it in safety, and the passenger does not use such speed in doing so as he

should, still if he attempts to alight from the train in the presence of those in charge of it and with that knowledge they give the signal while he is in the act of alighting, and the train starts, throwing him from it and injuring him, the carrier will be liable. Railroad Co. v. Harmon, 23 Ky. L. R. 871, 64 S. W. Rep. 640.

A plaintiff is not conclusively barred by an estimate, ignorantly and inadvisedly made, of the time consumed by her in alighting, where the facts, related in detail, show due diligence by her in alighting, for a jury might conclude that she was wide of the mark in making her estimate. Culberson v. Railway Co., 50 Mo. App. 556.

15. Imhoff v. The Railroad, 22 Wis. 682; Railroad Co. v. Cohn, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 53 S. W. Rep. 698; Railway Co. v. Turner, (Tex. Civ. App.) 77 S. W. Rep. 255, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Fanning v. Railway Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 86 S. W. Rep. 354.

But see Gaynor v. The Railway, 100 Mass. 208. See also, Clotworthy v. Railroad Co., 80 Mo. 220. 16 Hurt v. Railway Co., 94 Mo.

a corporation, in order to comply with the obligation of the carrier to a passenger, is to carry him safely to his point of destination, announce the arrival of the train at the station, and give him a reasonable opportunity to leave the cars. When this is done the duty of the conductor ceases. And when the servants of a corporation engaged in the business of a common carrier afford passengers a reasonable time to leave the cars after arrival at the end of their journey, they have the right, at the expiration of such reasonable period, to presume that all passengers, whose place of destination is then reached, have done what is customary for passengers in like circumstances to do, to wit, have left the cars.

"When such a reasonable time has thus elapsed, it is no part of the duty of the servants of such corporation to make personal inspection of, or to interrogate, the remaining passengers, to see whether they intend leaving the cars. The law imposes no such onerous duty upon a carrier of passengers. And if it should appear in evidence in any given case that passengers similarly situated as to age, sex, etc., have safely left the cars prior to any injury or accident complained of, this would afford ground for legitimate inference by the jury that sufficient time had been granted to the passenger who sues for a negligent injury to have alighted in safety."

Sec. 1120. Same subject-Not liable where passenger has evaded payment of fare. So while it is the duty of a conductor to see that all passengers on his train have a reasonable opportunity to alight at their respective destinations, he is relieved from such duty where a passenger has evaded payment of fare and the conductor consequently has no notice of such passenger's destination. It cannot be said under such circumstances that the conductor is negligent if the passenger is in

255, distinguishing and explaining Kelly v. Railroad Co., 70 Mo. 604.

A person who gets on a train to assist another on, and whose presence is not known to the officers

of the train, has no right to notice to get off before the train starts, there being no custom to give such a notice. Coleman v. Railroad Co., 84 Ga. 1.

jured in attempting to leave the train, after it has started, with no notice to the conductor.17

Sec. 1121. (§ 614.) Must give notice of arrival at stations.— It has also been held that railway carriers of passengers must, besides sufficient time and opportunity to alight, give due notice of the arrival of their trains at their various stations. "In the case of goods," said the court, "the obligation is to carry and deliver; as to passengers, it is simply to carry, and to allow them sufficient time and opportunity to leave the vehicle

Yet, as passengers must necessarily often travel in such conveyances as railroads to places whose localities are entirely unknown to them, a duty devolves upon the carrier, in order to afford them an opportunity to depart at their points of destination, to give notice of the arrival of the trains at such places. The mode of performing this duty by railroads appears to be well established by general custom throughout the country to be to announce in a distinct and audible manner in each car, so that it may be heard by all passengers, the arrival of the trains at each station or fixed place of departure, and then to stop a sufficient length of time to allow the passengers to get off without danger or injury to their persons. And this proceeds upon the reasonable ground that they are vigilant to do their part of the undertaking which they set out to accomplish, and which is only to be done by their own exertion. '18

But railway carriers of passengers are under no duty to give

17. Railroad Co. v. Smith, 110 Tenn. 197, 75 S. W. Rep. 711, 100 Am. St. Rep. 799.

18. Railroad Co. v. Hobbs, 118 Ga. 227, 45 S. E. Rep. 23, 63 L. R. A. 68; Southern R. R. Co. v. Kendrick, 40 Miss. 374. See also, Raben v. Railway Co., 73 Iowa, 579; Hurt v. Railway Co., 94 Mo. 255; Keller v. Railroad Co., 27 Minn. 178; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Mask, 64 Miss. 738; Railroad

Co. v. Cohn, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 53 S. W. Rep. 698; Railroad Co. v. Goodyear, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 206, 66 S. W. Rep. 862.

Care should be taken by the carrier to make announcements intelligible to the different classes of people usually to be found on public conveyances and to guard against possible misunderstandings. Laub v. Railway Co., (Tex. Civ. App.), 94 S. W. Rep. 550.

passengers personal notice that their particular station has been reached, and a promise by a conductor to notify a passenger personally of his arrival at his station is a mere personal undertaking as between the conductor and passenger and beyond the scope of the conductor's duty.19 Exceptional circumstances, however, may impose this duty, as where considerations of age, sex, or physical infirmity may bring that within the scope of the conductor's duty toward a passenger although otherwise it would be beyond the limit of such obligation. But it must appear that the conductor knew such exceptional facts in order to bind the company.20

So a railway conductor is not bound to personally enter a car upon its arrival at a station to inform passengers for that station that they have reached their destination. It is sufficient if the name of the station is duly announced by an employe of the railway company whom it may select to perform such duty.21 And even though the station is not announced, if it appears that a passenger was asleep and that it is as reasonable to suppose that he was carried beyond his station by his own negligence in such regard as by the carrier's negligence, he cannot recover. Such failure to announce ought not to count against the company relatively to a passenger who cannot show by any satisfactory proof that he was misled thereby.22

19. Railway Co. v. Boyles, 11 Tex. Civ. App. 522, 33 S. W. Rep. 247; Railroad Co. v. Cohn, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 11, 53 S. W. Rep. 698; Railway Co. v. McCullough, (Tex. Civ. App.) 33 S. W. Rep. 285; Railway Co. v. McCullough, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 534, 45 S. W. Rep. 324. 20. Railway Co. v. Boyles, supra.

Where a female passenger is deaf, and the name of the station is announced by the porter, it being a station short of her destination, and she alights supposing

that her destination has been reached, the carrier is not liable for failure to carry her to destination where the servants in charge of the train had no notice of her infirmity. Railroad Co. v. Terry, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 341, 65 S. W. Rep. 697, citing Hutch. on Carr.

21. Railway Co. v. O'Bryan, 115 Ga. 659, 42 S. E. Rep. 42; s. c. 112 Ga. 127, 37 S. E. Rep. 161.

22. The failure to announce the name of a certain station affords cause of action against the company where it appears that

no

Sec. 1122. (§ 615.) Must be careful not to invite the passenger to alight at an improper time or place. As has already been shown, railway carriers of passengers must provide safe platforms and other necessary facilities for access to and for alighting and egress from their trains by their passengers, 23 and their duty in this regard has been indicated, as far as it can be done, from the adjudicated cases. Having provided such platforms, they are required to be careful to bring their coaches up to them in such manner that their passengers may be afforded the opportunity safely to alight upon them; and if the passenger be called upon to leave the coach before this has been done, or if he is reasonably induced to believe, from the circumstances or from the conduct of those in management of the train, that it has been halted in order that the passenger may there alight, and that no other or better opportunity will be given him to do so, and in undertaking to leave the conveyance, with due care and discretion, he receives an injury from the want of the proper facilities for doing so, or by reason of the dangerous character of the ground, the carrier will be held responsible for its negligence.24 A number of such in

the passenger destined to that station was, on the arrival of the train, soundly asleep. The negligence of the company must appear, with at least some degree of certainty, to have been the proximate cause of the passenger being carried beyond his station. Seaboard, etc. R'y Co. v. Rainey, 122 Ga. 307, 50 S. E. Rep. 88, 106 Am. St. Rep. 134.

23. Ante, § 928 et seq.

24. Louisville, etc. R'y Co. V. Lucas, 119 Ind. 583; Richmond R'y Co. v. Scott, 86 Va. 902, 11 S. E. Rep. 404; Ward v. Railway Co., 165 Ill. 462, 46 N. E. Rep. 365, reversing 61 Ill. App. 530, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Railway Co. v. Holsapple, 12 Ind. App. 301, 38 N. E. Rep. 1107; Railway Co.

v. Pavey, 48 Kan. 452, 29 Pac. Rep. 593; Railway Co. v. Friel, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 152, 39 S. W. Rep. 704; Railroad Co. v. State, 81 Md. 371, 32 Atl. Rep. 201; Larson v. Railroad Co., 85 Minn. 387, 88 N. W. Rep. 994; Smitson v. Railroad Co., 37 Ore. 74, 60 Pac. Rep. 907, citing Hutch. on Carr.; Hartzig v. Railroad Co., 154 Pa. St. 364, 26 Atl. Rep. 310; Railway Co. v. Elliott, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 106, 61 S. W. Rep. 726; Railway Co. v. McLane, (Tex. Civ. App.) 32 S. W. Rep. 776; Railway Co. v. Porter, (Tex. Civ. App.) 41 S. W. Rep. 88; Ellis v. Railway Co., 120 Wis. 645, 98 N. W. Rep. 942; McDermott r. Railway Co., 82 Wis. 246, 52 N. W. Rep. 85.

A passenger on a railroad train

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