published time-tables of the company imposed upon it no further obligation than to use due care and diligence to be punctual in its departures and arrivals, and in the carrying of its passengers according to such tables, and that the failure in this instance to carry the plaintiff as he had been led by them to expect, not being attributable to the negligence of the company, he could not recover. "In this country," it was said, "nearly all railroads publish time-tables, and delays not attributable to negligence are not uncommon; yet suits to recover damages for detention in such cases are almost, if not quite, unknown. That such actions are almost unprecedented shows very strongly what has been understood to be the law upon the subject. "27 Sec. 1108. How when a train is late-Statements of agent as to when it will arrive or depart.-When a train is late, an intending passenger has no right to rely upon the statement of the station agent as to the exact time that it is late and infer from such statement that the train will pass his station just that much later. Thus if he is told by the agent that his train is an hour late when it arrives but forty-five minutes late, and he goes away to get his dinner and is left, the carrier is not liable in damages to him.28 Sec. 1109. (§ 608.) Liability for detention of the passenger. -The liability of the carrier, however, for the detention of the passenger upon the passage after it has been commenced has been held to exist in a number of instances; and whether this detention has been occasioned by the negligence of the carrier himself or of his servants, or from the wilful misconduct of an employe whose duty it is to superintend and direct the forwarding of the conveyances upon which the passenger is to be 27. And see this case for a criticism upon the case of Hawcroft v. The Railway, 8 Eng. L. & Eq. 362, which it is said is the only case which can be cited to sustain the position that the pub lished times for the departures of trains amount to an unconditional contract between the carrier and the passenger. 28. Railway Co. v. Allender, 59 Ill. App. 620. carried, can make no difference.29 In Weed v. The Panama Railroad30 the plaintiff and his wife were passengers on a train which was wilfully and unnecessarily stopped on its route by the conductor during a stormy night, and they, with a great number of other passengers, were obliged to remain upon it until the next day from inability to procure other accommodations. The plaintiff's wife was taken sick from the effects of the exposure and experienced great suffering. The only ques 29. Quimby v. Vanderbilt, 17 N. Y. 306; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 28 id. 217; Van Buskirk v. Roberts, 31 id. 661; Cobb v. Howard, 3 Blatch. 524; Hamlin v. The Railway, 1 H. & N. 408; Hobbs v. Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111. In Eddy v. Harris, 78 Tex. 661, 15 S. W. Rep. 107, one Sparks had arranged for an excursion train on a given day over a road of which Eddy and others were receivers. Sparks had tickets printed stating that they were good on the train, and signed by him as manager. These tickets were placed on sale at the regular ticket office. Harris, desiring to go on the excursion train, bought one of these tickets of the ticket agent, not knowing that Sparks had anything to do with the train. After going part way, the road officials refused to send the train further because Sparks failed to make certain payments he had agreed to make before the train should start. Harris was delayed, had to pay extra fare and to come home on a train earlier than the excursion train would have run, and thereby lost some of the pleasure of the occasion. The court held that the receivers were liable, as by accepting her money a contract to carry on that train was created; that it was doubtful if Sparks' contract affected the question, and that if it did, the act of the agent in selling the ticket must be taken as an affirmation on the part of the road that he had complied with his contract and that the train would run. In England, a condition incorporated in a ticket issued by a railway company to a passenger that the railway company will not "under any circumstances be held reponsible for delay or detention, however occasioned, or any consequences arising therefrom," protects the company from liability for delay or detention of the passenger, even when caused by the admitted negligence of the company. Consequently, where a workman takes a ticket issued subject to the above condition, and in consequence of the negligence of the company he is late in arriving at his destination, and so loses his day's work and his day's wages, he cannot recover the amount of his loss from the company. Duckworth v. Railway Co., 84 Law T. 774, 49 Wkly. Rep. 541. 30. 17 N. Y. 362. tion was said to be whether the company could defend itself by showing that the delay on the route was the wilful wrong of one of its servants. "Viewing the general question," said the court, "as it appears to be clear we must, as being whether the defendants have disregarded their duty as carriers, and the particular point of inquiry, whether the circumstance that the detention was a wilful act of their servant will excuse what would otherwise be a want of proper diligence, this part of the case is relieved from difficulty. If the detention had resulted from negligence of the conductor, the liability of the defendants would be unquestionable. . . No reasons exist for holding a master liable for injuries from the negligence of his servants in his employment which do not equally and with like force preclude him from alleging an intentional default of a servant as an excuse for delay in the performance of a duty the master has undertaken;" and the conclusion was that it was immaterial whether the act was wilful or negligent, and that in either aspect of the case the company was liable. If, therefore, there has been any delay in transporting the passenger, the burden of proof is upon the carrier to show that the cause of delay did not arise from his negligence.31 And, even though the delay be unavoidable, that high degree of care imposed upon a carrier of passengers by law would require him to adopt all reasonable means for the comfort and safety of his passengers, and to extricate them from any dangerous situations in which they have been placed.32 Sec. 1110. (§ 608a.) Duty to stop trains for passengers at regular or flag stations and at passenger platforms. As has been seen, the carrier by railroad is not obliged, except by statute, to stop all of its passenger trains at every station.33 31. This has been held where the train was delayed by a wreck, and the burden of proof was held to be on the carrier to show that such wreck was not due to his own negligence. Railroad Co. v. Harder, (Tex. Civ. App.) 81 S. W. Rep. 356. 32. Railway Co. v. Rogers, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 19, 40 S. W. Rep. 201. 33. Ante § 1060. A state statute requiring each railroad to cause three, each way, of its regular trains carrying passengers, if so many are run daily, But it is bound, both by common law and usually by statute, after providing reasonable facilities for the transportation of passengers and arranging its schedules for the running of its trains, to stop at its regular stations to receive passengers upon such of its passenger trains as by its schedules are advertised to stop at such stations.34 So where passenger trains are in the habit of stopping at a flag station whenever proper signals are given, a railroad company is bound to stop a passenger train on a proper signal.35 And, in the absence of unusual circumstances, it is bound to stop its trains at the platform prepared for the use of passengers.36 In the case of freight trains, however, a different rule is permissible, and it is held not to be an unreasonable regulation that passengers wishing to ride upon freight trains shall be received at some other place than the regular platform used for passenger trains, but that where this is the rule, the way from the station where tickets are procured to the place. where the passenger is to be admitted to the train must be in a safe condition for transit, and passengers may rely upon the presumption that it is so.37 Sundays excepted, to stop at a station, city or village containing over three thousand inhabitants, for a time sufficient to receive and let off passengers, is valid, in the absence of Congressional legisla tion on that subject and is not repugnant to the constitution of the United States when applied to interstate trains carrying interstate commerce. Railway Co. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285. But a state statute, which unnecessarily interferes with the speedy and uninterrupted carriage of the mails of the United States by compelling a fast mail train to turn aside from the direct interstate route, and run to a station three miles and a half away from a point on that route and back again to the same point, and thus travel seven miles, which form no part of its course, before proceeding on its way, cannot be considered as a reasonable police regulation. Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 163 U. S. 142. 34. Purcell v. Railroad Co., 108 N. Car. 414, 12 S. E. Rep. 954, 956; Heirn v. McCaughan, 32 Miss. 17; Indianapolis, etc. R'y Co. v. Birney, 71 Ill. 391; Ballard v. Railroad Co., 15 Ky. L. R. 703. 35. Railroad Co. v. Siddons, 53 Ill. App. 607; Thomas v. Railway Co., 122 N. Car. 1005, 30 S. E. Rep. 343; Railway Co. v. Safford, (Tex. Civ. App.) 48 S. W. Rep. 1105; Freeman v. Railroad Co., 65 Mich. 577. 36. Post, 1117 and notes. 37. Browne v. Railroad Co., 108 N. Car. 34, 12 S. E. Rep. 958; Unusual circumstances, such as accident or unexpected stress of business, may justify the carrier in requiring passengers to enter passenger trains at some point away from the regular station or platform; but where this is the case the carrier must see to it that the place selected is not an unsafe one,38 and, where assistance is necessary, that the passenger has such assistance as is reasonably necessary to enable him to get on the car in safety.39 Sec. 1111. (§ 608b.) Passenger must be allowed reasonable opportunity to enter vehicle in safety. It is the duty of the carrier to furnish to passengers a reasonable opportunity to enter its vehicles in safety. The duty of furnishing safe vehicles and proper platforms and other stational facilities has already been considered. But having furnished these, it has not performed its full duty unless a reasonable opportunity be given to those who wish to become passengers, to leave the stations, waiting-rooms or platforms as provided and to get in safety upon the vehicle furnished for their transportation. The extent of this duty must depend largely upon the circumstances of the case, differing greatly when but one train of cars, for example, is about to leave a small station at which there is but a single track, and when a train is about to leave the union depot in a great city where many trains are constantly coming in and going out in various directions, some local and some limited, where there are many tracks and great bustle and confusion, and where everything tends to confuse and bewilder those not accustomed to much traveling. Under Railway Co. v. Neal, 66 Ark. 543, 51 S. W. Rep. 1060; Simmons v. Railway Co., 41 Ore. 151, 69 Pac. Rep. 440, 1022; Railroad Co. v. Maxwell, 59 Ill. App. 673; Railroad Co. v. Stonecipher, 90 П. App. 511; Railway Co. v. Brown, 46 Ill. App. 137; s. c. 49 Ill. App. 40; Hays v. Railway Co., 51 Mo. App. 438. This rule applies to stockmen traveling with their stock. Railway Co. v. Lagerkraus, 65 Neb. 566, 91 N. W. Rep. 358, 95 N. W. Rep. 2; Railway Co. v. Hudman, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 309, 28 S. W. Rep. 388. 38 Baltimore, etc. R. Co. V. Kane, 69 Md. 11; Missouri Pac. R'y Co. v. Watson, 72 Tex. 631. 39. Post, § 1112, 1127. |