vided that it "must be presented at ticket office at starting point, where the agent will issue in exchange for mileage coupons a mileage exchange ticket," and the carrier's agent was not supplied with such tickets, the carrier was guilty of a breach of contract in ejecting a passenger from train who was unable to obtain exchange tickets from the agent, and was liable in damages for such ejection.40 In such cases, however, in accordance with the rule that coupon tickets will not be deemed contracts for through carriage in the absence of express terms, the action must be brought against the particular carrier through whose default the injury occurred.41 Sec. 1054. (§ 580b.) Same subject-Round-trip ticket requiring identification. Where, in consideration of a reduced rate, a "round-trip" ticket is sold by which the passenger is to be conveyed to the point of destination and back, and the terms of the contract are that the ticket shall be good for the return trip only upon condition that the passenger will present himself to the ticket agent at the point of destination, identify himself as the original purchaser and procure the ticket to be there stamped, or shall comply with other similar requirements, 42 the validity of the ticket for the return passage depends upon his compliance with the contract, and in case he fails to comply he may be refused carriage and ejected from the car.43 Such a requirement, being for the benefit of fare. Railway Co. v. Wright, 18 Ind. App. 125, 47 N. E. Rep. 491. 40. Pennsylvania Co. v. Lenhart, 120 Fed. 61, 56 C. C. A. 457; Railway Co. v. Street, 26 Ind. App. 224, 59 N. E. Rep. 404. 41. Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 390. 42. As, to exchange his ticket for a return check. Howard v. Railroad Co., 61 Miss. 194. 43. Mosher v. Railroad Co., 127 U. S. 390; Boylan v. Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 146; Moses v. Railroad Co., 73 Ga. 356; Bethea v. Rail road Co., 26 S. C. 91; Edwards v. Railway Co., 81 Mich. 364; Cloud v. Railway Co., 14 Mo. App. 136; Taylor v. Railway Co., 4 Ont. L. R. 357, 2 Canadian R'y Cases 99; Wenz v. Railway Co., 108 Ga. 290, 33 S. E. Rep. 970; Dangerfield v. Railway Co., 62 Kan. 85, 61 Pac. Rep. 405; Railroad Co. v. Stocksdale, 83 Md. 245, 34 Atl. Rep. 880; Bowers v. Railroad Co., 158 Pa. St. 302, 27 Atl. Rep. 893; Daniels v. Railroad Co., 62 S. Car. 1, 39 S. E. Rep. 762; Watson v. Railroad Co., 104 Tenn. 194, 56 S. W. the carrier, may be waived by him, and the necessity of the passenger's compliance will thereby be dispensed with.44 Cases have often arisen under "round-trip" passenger tickets in which agents at terminal points have refused, as required by the tickets, to stamp and sign them for the return passage after the holders had done all required of them; and there is quite a diversity of opinion among the authorities as to the right of the passenger to attempt to return to his destination upon the ticket without this evidence upon it, and to recover damages for being ejected from the train, some hold. ing that he has the right and can thus recover,45 others hold Rep. 1024, 49 L. R. A. 454; Reed v. Railroad Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 50 S. W. Rep. 432; Railway Co. v. Arey, 18 Tex. Civ. App. 457, 44 S. W. Rep. 894; Pittsburgh, etc., R'y Co. v. Coll, Ind. App. 76 N. E. Rep. 816. A provision in a special "roundtrip" ticket, requiring identification, that the return passage shall commence on the date that the passenger identifies himself, is valid, and the passenger cannot rightfully commence his return journey under such ticket on a date later than that stamped upon the ticket as the date of identification. Boling v. Railroad Co., Mo., 88 S. W. Rep. 35. And where such a ticket provides that the carrier selling the ticket acts only as an agent for any connecting carrier, the fact that the agent at destination informs the passenger that the return journey can be commenced on a later date than that stated in the ticket as the date when such return journey must be commenced, cannot operate to bind the other carriers, since such agent is without authority to bind the other carriers; nor will the fact that some of the carriers in the return route honor the ticket after it has expired affect the conduct of a subsequent carrier who ejects the passenger from the train. Boling v. Railroad Co., supra. If the passenger who purchases such a ticket is unable to read or write and therefore fails to comply with its provisions, he will nevertheless be bound by such requirement. Watson v. Railroad Co., supra. 44. Taylor v. Railroad Co., 99 N. C., 185. See, also, Gregory v. Railroad Co., 10 Neb. 250; Railroad Co. v. Blair, 104 Tenn. 212, 55 S. W. Rep. 154. But a waiver will not be presumed from the fact that a gateman allowed the passenger to pass through the gate. (Bowers v. Railroad Co., 158 Pa. St. 302, 27 Atl. Rep. 893); nor from the fact that other passengers have been allowed to travel without having their tickets validated, unless the practice is so frequent as to amount to a custom or an abandonment such as to mislead the passenger. (Watson v. Railroad Co., supra.) 45. Head v. Railway Co., 79 Ga. ing that the refusal to authenticate, as required, is a breach of the contract of carriage giving rise to the only cause of action the passenger can have, which is to recover damages for such breach, and not for an ejection from the train which he has entered with knowledge that the ticket will not be respected. 46 The weight of authority and better view seems to be that the agreement of the carrier to have his agent perform the designated act is merely incidental and subsidiary to the contract of carriage, and the breach of it is not necessarily a repudiation by the carrier of its entire obligation. It may be true that the holder of the ticket may treat the refusal to authenticate it as a breach of the contract, and claim his damage therefor, but as the time has not arrived for performance of the contract to carry upon the return trip until the passenger enters the conveyance, the carrier may still perform, and the passenger, therefore, may elect to insist upon the performance until it is refused when it is due.47 This view, of course, does not go so far as to hold the carrier liable if the passenger declines to make proper proof of his identity, and the carrier's agent refuses to validate the ticket on that ground.48 If the validating agent is not satisfied by the signature of the passenger as to his identity, the burden of producing further proof, if required by the agent, is upon the passenger. Nor is the agent required to accept the mere 358, 7 S. E. Rep. 217, 11 Am. St. Rep. 434; Railway Co. t. Wood, 114 Ga. 140, 39 S. E. Rep. 894, 55 L. R. A. 536; Moore v. Railway Co., 102 Ga. 302, 29 S. E. Rep. 865; Railway Co. v. McKenzie, 102 Ga. 313, 29 S. E. Rep. 869; Railway Co. v. Street, 26 Ind. App. 224, 59 N. E. Rep. 404; Railway Co. v. Jones, (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 S., W. Rep. 37; Railway Co. v. Mar tino, 2 Tex. Civ. App. 643, 18 S. W. Rep. 1066; 8. c. 21 S. W. Rep. 781; Railroad Co. v. St. John, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 257, 35 S. W. Rep. 501; Texas & P. R'y Co. v. Payne, 98 Tex. 211, 87 S. W. Rep. 330, 70 L. R. A. 946. 46. McGhee V. Reynolds, 117 Ala. 413, 23 So. Rep. 68; s. c. 129 Ala. 540, 29 So. Rep. 961; Central Trust Co. v. Railway Co., 65 Fed. 332. 47. Texas & P. R'y Co. v. Payne, 98 Tex. 211, 87 S. W. Rep. 330, 70 L. R. A. 946. 48. Railway Co. v. Cannon, 106 Ga. 828, 32 S. E. Rep. 874; Sinnott v. Railroad Co., 101 Tenn. 233, 56 S. W. Rep. 836; Abram v. Railway Co., 83 Tex. 61, 18 S. W. Rep. 321. verbal assurance of the passenger as to his identity. But ordinarily, where it becomes the duty of the carrier's agent to identify the passenger as the original purchaser of the ticket, he cannot act arbitrarily, but must afford the passenger a reasonable opportunity to identify himself;49 and if he is not satisfied with the passenger's signature, he should, it is said, permit the passenger, on his offering to do so, to procure some other means which are ready and near at hand.50 And although the ticket provides that the passenger shall identify himself to the satisfaction of the carrier's agent, the passenger will only be required to offer such proof as would satisfy the mind of a reasonably conscientious and prudent person.51 And, in such cases, it will be a question for the jury whether the proof offered was such as would have satisfied the mind of a reasonably conscientious and prudent person selected by the carrier to pass upon the question.5 52 Sec. 1055. (§ 580c.) Same subject-Provision that coupon shall not be good if detached. So it is a common provision in the case of coupon tickets, mileage books, and other similar forms, that the several coupons shall not be good for passage if presented detached from the original book, stub or counterpart. Such a provision is reasonable, and the coupon if presented so detached may be refused.53 Hence the holder of a mileage ticket cannot insist upon tearing off the coupons himself, even though it is done in the presence of the conductor,54 49. Southern R'y Co. v. Cassell, Ky. - 92 S. W. Rep. 281; 947. 50. Pittsburgh, etc. R'y Co. v. Coll, supra. 51. Southern R'y Co. v. Cassell, supra; Pittsburgh, etc. R'y Co. v. Coll, supra. 52. Railway Co. v. Hudson, 25 Ky. Law Rep. 2154, 80 S. W. Rep. 454. 53. Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Wysor, 82 Va. 250; Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Harris, 9 Lea, 180; Boston, etc. R. Co. v. Chipman, 146 Mass. 107; De Lucas v. Railroad Co., 38 La. Ann. 930; Houston, etc. R. Co. v. Ford, 53 Tex. 364. 54. Norfolk, etc. R. Co. v. Wysor, 82 Va. 250; Louisville etc. R. Co. v. Harris, 9 Lea, 180. unless waived by a general custom prevailing between the carrier and his passengers.5 55 But where a round-trip ticket, issued in two connected parts, one of which is to be used each way, and containing on the going part the provision that it shall not be good if detached, becomes separated by accident and both parts are presented together, this separation, it is held, will not invalidate it;58 and so it is held that where the going part of such a ticket is not used, the carrier may not insist on the return trip in retaining both parts, and if the passenger in the presence of the conductor separates them he may lawfully tender the return portion in payment of his fare.57 Sec. 1056. (§ 580d.) Same subject-Provision that ticket shall not be transferable.-The ordinary railroad ticket issued without limitations or restrictions is transferable, passing by delivery, and the holder is entitled to ride upon it;58 but where, in consideration of a reduced rate, it is expressly conditioned that it shall not be transferable, or shall be void in the hands of other than the first purchaser, the condition is valid and the transferee cannot ride upon it,59 unless the pro 55. Thompson v. Truesdale, 61 Minn. 129, 63 N. W. Rep. 259, 52 Am. St. Rep. 579. 56. Wightman v. Railroad Co., 73 Wis. 169; Pennsylvania Co. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229, 25 N. E. Rep. 439. 57. Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Holdridge 118 Ind. 281. 58. Sleeper v. Railroad Co., 100 Penn. St. 259; Carsten v. Railroad Co., 44 Minn. 454, 47 N. W. Rep. 49; Hoffman v. Railroad Co., 45 Minn. 53, 47 N. W. Rep. 312; The Williamette Valley, 71 Fed. 712; Nichols v. Railroad Co., 23 Ore. 123, 31 Pac. Rep. 296, 18 L. R. A. 55, 37 Am. St. Rep. 664; Railroad Co. v. Ing, 29 Tex. Civ. App. 398, 68 S. W. Rep. 722. A "round-trip" railroad ticket which contains a provision that it shall be used only by the original holder whose signature it bears, but not in fact signed by anyone, and which is sold on the express understanding that it shall be used by A in going to, and by B in returning from the place of destination, is not void when presented by B upon the return passage after having been used by A for the first part of the journey. Jevons v. Railroad Co., 70 Kan. 491, 78 Pac. Rep. 817. 59. Post v. Railroad Co., 14 Neb. 110; Cody v. Railroad Co., 4 Saw. 114; Way v. Railway Co., 64 Iowa, 48; Walker v. Railway Co., 15 |